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Abstract 
 
Leading philosophical accounts of joint activity, such as Michael Bratman’s account 
of ‘shared intentional activity’, take joint activity to be the outcome of two or more 
agents having a ‘shared intention’, where this is a certain pattern of mutually known 
prior intentions (plans) that are directed toward a common goal. With Bratman’s 
account as a foil, I address two lacunas that are relatively unexplored in the 
philosophical literature. The first lacuna concerns how to make sense of the 
apparently joint cooperative activities of agents that lack the capacities for planning 
and “mindreading” that one must have in order to be a party to a shared intention 
(consider, for example, the social play of young children or the cooperative hunting 
of non-human primates or social carnivores). The second lacuna concerns how 
participants (including adult human agents) are able to coordinate their actions 
“online”—that is, during action execution as a joint activity unfolds—without 
recourse to plans that specify in advance what they should do (consider the 
coordination involved when two friends meet and do a “high five”). Chapters 2 and 3 
focus on the first lacuna, while chapters 4 and 5 focus on the second.  
 
In chapter 2, I focus on why participants must have mutual or common knowledge of 
each other’s intentions and beliefs in order to have a shared intention: Why must 
these attitudes be “out in the open”? I argue that, if participants lack the concept of 
belief, then one of the two main motivations for the common knowledge 
requirement—to filter out certain cases that intuitively aren’t cases of genuine joint 
activity—actually dissipates. Furthermore, a kind of “openness” that only requires of 
participants that they have the concept of goal but not that of belief can satisfy the 
other main motivation, to make sense of the idea that joint activities are non-
accidentally coordinated. In chapter 3, I offer an account of a kind of joint activity in 
which agents such as young children and some non-human primates could 
participate, given what we know about their socio-cognitive capacities. 
 
In chapter 4, I argue that ‘shared intention’-accounts are unable to say much about 
spontaneous or skilful joint action because of the following widely accepted 
constraint on what one can intend: while an agent might intend—in the sense of 
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commit to a plan—that “we” do something together, an agent cannot intend to 
perform “our” joint action. I reject this constraint and argue that some joint actions 
(such as a joint manoeuvre performed by two figure skaters) are joint in virtue of 
each participant having what I call ‘socially extended intention-in-action’ that 
overlap. In chapter 5, I review empirical work on subpersonal enabling mechanisms 
for the coordination of joint action. The review provides clues to what it is that 
enables participants to successfully coordinate their actions in the absence of plan-
like intentions or beyond what such intentions specify. 
 
While what I address are lacunas rather than problems, an upshot of this thesis is that 
leading philosophical accounts of joint activity may have less explanatory scope than 
one might otherwise be led to believe. The accounts of joint activity and joint action 
that are presented in this thesis are arguably applicable to many of the joint activities 
and joint actions of adult human beings. The account also helps us avoid the false 
dichotomy between a very robust form of joint activity and a mere concatenation of 
purely individualistic actions—a dichotomy that accounts such as Bratman’s 
arguably invite us to adopt. 
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1 Introduction 
We do countless things together: we shake hands, we walk, talk and play together, 
we eat and drink together, we lift heavy objects together, as well as collectively 
engage in more complex activities; we write academic papers, perform ballets and 
concerts, plan and run workshops and conferences, build airplanes, conduct scientific 
experiments, play multi-player online games and participate in religious ceremonies.  
The lists could, of course, go on and on and on. Such activities appear to be more 
than merely aggregates of individual actions. We may both have gone to see the 
same screening of the new Woody Allen film even if we didn’t go to see the new 
Woody Allen film together. Even if it is true that “you and I lifted the heavy sofa”, 
the conjuncts “you lifted the heavy sofa” and “I lifted the heavy sofa” are both 
misleading since each of us only made a partial contribution to the lifting of the sofa. 
This is not merely semantic nitpicking. Whether some collection of individual 
actions makes up a concerted joint action may make a big difference to how the 
actions are experienced in everyday life. Accidentally going to the cinema next to 
someone is typically much less enjoyable than going to cinema together with him or 
her. Similarly, if you are the butt of many jokes told by your colleagues one week, it 
makes a big emotional difference whether or not this is merely an unlucky co-
occurrence or a concerted effort by your colleagues to bully you (Roth, 2011). 
 
Philosophers have attempted to bridge this gap between parallel and joint activity by 
suggesting various ways in which the actions of individuals are  “glued” together 
into a unified activity. By and large, philosophers have focused on the idea that a 
joint action is the outcome of a “shared intention” (or a “joint” or “collective 
intention”) that unifies and coordinates the joint action. Philosophers are not the only 
academics that have taken an interest in joint action though—or to use another term, 
“cooperative action”. Other creatures than adult human beings appear to do things 
together too. Consider, for example, a group of lionesses encircling and attacking 
their prey, or the social pretend play of two toddlers. Behavioural ecologists and 
ethologists have thus studied the cooperative abilities and behaviours of social 
carnivores such as hyenas and lions (Drea & Carter, 2009; Stander, 1992); marine 
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biologists have studied the cooperative hunting of social cetaceans such as killer 
whales (Nøttestad, Fernö, & Axelsen, 2002); primatologists and comparative and 
developmental psychologists have studied the cooperative abilities and behaviours of 
non-human primates (e.g. Boesch & Boesch, 1989; Chalmeau & Gallo, 1995; Melis, 
Hare, & Tomasello, 2006; Petit, Desportes, & Thierry, 1992) and young children (C 
Brownell, 2011; Carpenter, 2009; Hamann, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2011; 
Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006). Concepts such as ‘joint action’ and 
‘cooperative action’ are rarely explicated in detail by these empirical researchers, but 
they are not referring to mere aggregates of individual actions. They take cooperation 
to involve several agents acting in pursuit of a “common goal”, a “joint goal”, or 
perhaps, a goal that is “shared”.  
 
What these empirical researchers are referring to arguably cannot be what most 
philosophical accounts of joint action are accounts of. Up until very recently, 
philosophers have exclusively aimed to elucidate the mundane joint activities of 
adult human beings, and have worked with examples such as two people painting a 
house together, going for a walk together or making a hollandaise sauce together. 
According to most influential accounts, for two agents to genuinely do these things 
together, they must have quite sophisticated capacities for planning, mindreading and 
communication (e.g. Alonso, 2009; Bratman, 1992, 1993; Gilbert, 2009; Pettit & 
Schweikard, 2006).1 Such accounts thus make participation in genuine joint activity 
too conceptually and cognitively demanding for agents such as social carnivores, 
non-human primates or very young children.2 For example, according to Michael 
Bratman’s account of what he calls “shared intentional activity”—an account that I 
will use as a foil throughout the thesis—for us to be walking together, our walking 
must be caused by a mutually known pattern of mental states that includes the 
intention of each of “that we go for a walk together” and the intention of each that 
                                                
1 Notable exceptions include the accounts of Searle (1990), Tollefsen (2005), 
Tollefsen and Dale (2012), Pacherie and Dokic (2006), Pacherie (2007; 2011), 
Butterfill (2012), and Gold and Sugden (2007a). 
2 But see Carpenter (2009) for a defense of the idea that even 1-year-old infants meet 
the demands of Bratman’s account of shared intentional activity. 
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we do this by way of the other’s intention “that we go for a walk together” (I present 
this account in detail in section 1.2.1). For an agent to be a participant in such a 
shared intentional activity, she must thus have the concept of “our activity”, be able 
to have intentions about the intentions of others, and be able to have mutual or 
common knowledge with other agents. There thus appears to be a lacuna in the 
philosophy of joint action.3 This lacuna may lead to a myopic and misleading picture 
of joint action and cooperation, according to which an apparently joint activity either 
really is the genuine thing—a case of shared intentional activity or “true 
collaboration” (Tomasello & Hamann, 2012)—or merely a collection of purely 
individualistic but possibly coordinated activities that are performed in parallel. One 
aim of this thesis is to help philosophers and cognitive scientists avoid this false 
dualism.  
 
The second aim of this thesis is to address another lacuna in the philosophical 
literature, namely how participants together manage to coordinate their actions while 
executing a prior shared intention. Leading philosophical accounts of joint action 
have tended to explicate the “jointness” of joint activity in terms of a prior shared 
intention—a shared plan—that distributes roles and tasks between the participants. 
But they have nothing to say about the intentional structures and subpersonal 
mechanisms that might enable the online coordination involved in carrying out such 
a shared plan. (By coordination that is “online”, I mean coordination during action 
execution, which is performed as the joint activity unfolds. By contrast, “offline” 
coordination is coordination that is specified or carried out in advance of action 
execution, for example by recourse to plan-intentions that specify in advance what 
each participant should do.) Nor do these accounts have much to say about the 
possibility of unplanned but spontaneously coordinated executions of joint actions, 
such as that of two people on a street suddenly rushing to catch and steady a third 
pedestrian who has just tripped and fallen. 
                                                
3 See Tollefsen (2005), Butterfill (2012) and Pacherie (2011) for earlier attempts to 
fill the lacuna. Both Tollefsen and Butterfill intend their accounts to be applicable to 
the joint activities of young children in particular. I touch on aspects of Butterfill’s 
(2012a) account in chapter 3, and I discuss and elaborate Tollefsen’s (2005) account 
in chapter 4. 
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In the next section, I consider what the rationale is for taking shared intention to be 
the linchpin of genuine joint action. I then go on, in section 1.2 to discuss two 
accounts of what shared intention might be: Bratman’s account of shared intentional 
activity and Christopher Kutz’s account of “joint action as such”. Despite the 
different starting points of these accounts, Bratman and Kutz agree about what the 
sociopsychological characteristics of a core set of joint activities are, namely the set 
of small-scale egalitarian joint activities such as that of two people painting a house 
or cooking dinner together. In light of the cognitive and conceptual demands that 
these sociopsychological characteristics impose on participants, I then give a more 
detailed exposition of the two lacunas that I will be concerned with in section 1.3. 
Finally, in section 1.4, I provide a brief roadmap of the thesis. 
 
Note that I sometimes talk of a “joint action” of several agents, sometimes of their 
“joint activity”. Similarly, I sometimes talk of an agent’s contribution as that agent’s 
“action”, sometimes as her “activity”. These terms do not pick out a hard and fast 
distinction, but I will typically use the term ‘action’ when I am concerned with a 
relatively simple (individual or joint) intentional performance, and the term ‘activity’ 
when I am concerned with a relatively complex and extended (individual or joint) 
intentional performance. For example, a particular turn in a dance is a joint action 
while the whole dance is a joint activity. 
 
1.1 From joint action to shared intention 
One way of making the move from joint action to shared intention starts from the 
observation that all the bodily movements that are part of a joint action are bodily 
movements of individuals, so what glues those movements together into a joint 
action must be some “internal component” (Alonso, 2009, pp. 444–445). Along 
similar lines, one may note that the observable behaviours of agents who perform 
actions in parallel and of agents who are engaged in joint activity may be 
indistinguishable to an outside observer (Gräfenhain, Behne, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2009, p. 1430; Searle, 1990, pp. 402–403). Perhaps we happen to walk 
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alongside each other to the cinema, end up next to each other in the ticket cue to the 
box office, and we then accidentally end up sitting beside each other in the cinema 
(although by that point, each of us would probably suspect that the other was a 
stalker!). It is conceivable that at least some joint activities could be behaviourally 
indistinguishable from their merely-acting-in-parallel counterpart activities.  For 
example, Searle stipulates that a case where people in a park run for shelter in the 
rain could be behaviourally identical with a case where people in the same park 
together perform an outdoor ballet (Searle, 1990, pp. 402–403). Again, this suggests 
that there must be an internal component that makes the difference between a mere 
‘multi-agent activity’ and a joint activity. (I will use the term ‘multi-agent activity’ to 
refer the actions of two or more individuals considered as an aggregate, which may 
not be unified by anything besides their spatiotemporal proximity.) Alonso claims 
that this internal component is a shared intention: “the key property of joint action 
lies in […] the participants’ having a ‘collective’ or ‘shared’ intention to so act.” (pp. 
444–445) Searle draws the same conclusion.4 
 
The move from joint action to shared intention is often made by way of an analogy 
with individual action. One role that intentions play in individual agency is to imbue 
actions with intentionality, that is, to make behaviour purposive or goal-directed. It 
may be thought that just as an individual action is intentional under a description 
(Anscombe, 1969), a joint action is intentional under a description of the action as 
joint (Pacherie 2011; Tuomela 2007). Since it is often assumed that an action is 
                                                
4 Alonso and Searle have very different views on what a collective or shared 
intention is though. Note that the important difference-making internal component 
need not be an intention. It may also be something that occurs upstream of intention-
formation. For example, Gold and Sugden (2007a) argue that the intentions of the 
participants in a joint action may be ordinary intentions that merely specify the 
agent’s own actions. What distinguishes joint action from a collection of individual 
actions on their view is the kind of reasoning process that leads up to the formation 
of these intentions. According to Gold and Sugden’s team-reasoning account, joint 
actions are the outcome of intentions that have been formed in response to the 
question “What should we do?”, rather than the question “What should I do?” 
(Bacharach, 2006; Gold & Sugden, 2007a, 2007b; Pacherie, 2011). For each of two 
agents to frame their strategic situation in terms of the former question is for each of 
them to conceive of themselves as a member of a group of which the other agent is 
also a member. 
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intentional under a particular description in virtue of the intention that cause the 
action, it is natural to think that a joint action is intentional under a particular 
description of the action as joint in virtue of a shared intention that cause the joint 
action (Pacherie, 2011, p. 175). The activity of “you and I going to the cinema 
together” may be jointly intentional under that description, but the same activity may 
not be jointly intentional under the description “you and I leaving home together so 
that Alf and Bo can prepare a surprise party in your honour.” (Kutz, 2000, p. 21) The 
former, the thought goes, is jointly intentional in virtue of the fact that we have a 
shared intention to go to the cinema together. 
 
It is fair to say that the starting point for the proponents of all accounts of joint action 
discussed in contemporary analytic philosophy is some causal theory of action (but 
see Seemann, 2009a for a rare exception). Both in the individual and the joint case, it 
is assumed that an intention fails to explain an action if it does not cause the action in 
the appropriate way (Davidson, 1963). Little has been written about what the 
appropriate causal relation between shared intention and joint action is supposed to 
be though. Bratman says that the causal connection from the shared intention to the 
joint action “will go by way of mutual responsiveness of each to each in a way that 
tracks the joint action.” (1992, pp. 338–339, 2009a, p. 159, also 2009b, p. 53) 
Without this appropriate causal connection, the shared intention doesn’t explain the 
joint action according to Bratman. In this thesis, I assume that some version of the 
causal theory of action is correct. 
 
1.2 Two accounts of joint action 
In this section, I present Bratman’s constructivist account of “shared intentional 
activity” and Kutz’s minimalist account of “joint action as such”. These accounts 
represent two candidate answers to the question of what a shared intention is.5 One 
purpose of presenting these accounts is to introduce some philosophical puzzles that 
arise in the debate about what joint action is. By juxtaposing these two accounts, I 
                                                
5 Kutz doesn’t gloss what he is doing as giving an account of what shared intention 
is, but his account can be construed in this way without misrepresenting it. 
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also want to make an important methodological point, namely that the label ‘joint 
action’ or ‘joint activity’ can be appropriately applied to many different phenomena, 
and it is far from obvious that an informative and interesting account of joint action 
as such is possible. The two accounts have different conceptions of what the 
phenomenon to be explained is, and Bratman and Kutz aim to meet slightly different 
constraints in developing their accounts. Despite this, the accounts share many 
assumptions regarding what is characteristic of small-scale egalitarian joint activities 
such as that of two people going for a walk together.  
 
I have chosen to present Bratman’s account because it outlines an intentional 
construction that in my view manages to capture many features that seem to be 
characteristic of many joint activities of everyday life. Furthermore, the construction 
is built out of ordinary personal plan-intentions and beliefs, components that are 
arguably already available within a satisfactory account of individual human agency. 
It is also unusually explicit, and thus provides a clear picture of what the conceptual 
and cognitive requirements are for participating in a shared intentional activity. In 
the rest of the thesis, I will primarily use Bratman’s account as my point of reference. 
Another reason for picking Bratman’s account in particular is that it has been 
influential not only in philosophy (Alonso, 2009; Pettit & Schweikard, 2006), but 
also in developmental psychology (Carpenter, 2009; Tomasello & Hamann, 2012) 6 
and in artificial intelligence research on multi-agent systems (Georgeff, Pell, Pollack, 
Tambe, & Wooldridge, 1999; Wooldridge, 2000). Kutz’s work has not had this 
interdisciplinary impact, but it is a distinctive account that can throw contrasting 
light on the Bratman’s account.7 
                                                
6 The work of Margaret Gilbert and Raimo Tuomela has also influenced the design 
of experiments in developmental psychology (Gräfenhain, Behne, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2009; Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg, & Tomasello, 2011; Hamann, 
Warneken, & Tomasello, 2011; Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006). 
7 Of course, other accounts could probably have been suitable in this introductory 
chapter too: For example, the accounts offered by Gilbert (1990, 2006, 2009), Raimo 
Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller (1988), Seamus Miller’s (1995, 2001), John Searle 
(1990), Philip Cohen and Hector Levesque (1991), Abraham Roth (2003, 2004), 
Philip Pettit and David Schweikard (2006), or Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden 
(2007a; see also Pacherie, 2011). 
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1.2.1 Bratman’s constructivist account of “shared intentional 
activity” 
The target of Bratman’s account of joint action is “cases of small scale shared 
intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations.” (2009a, p. 150) 
This includes most types of everyday activities that one thinks of as being done 
together with someone else, such as you and I painting a house together, singing a 
duet, playing basketball, engaging in conversation, dancing tango, or going for a 
walk or traveling to New York together (Bratman, 1997, pp. 50–51, 1999, p. 130, 
2009a, p. 150). Excluded are cases such as the moderated televised debate between 
the leaders of two political parties (where the participants are not merely acting as 
individual agents but as spokespersons for larger organisations), a strike initiated by 
a union, or the industrial manufacturing of an airplane (cases which both involve 
asymmetrical relations of authority and power). Bratman’s account has been also 
been used by others to make sense of the joint activities young children, such as 
children’s social pretend play, or two children building a block tower together 
(Carpenter, 2009; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005; Tomasello & 
Hamann, 2012). However, Bratman’s focus is on the shared intentional activities of 
“adult humans in a broadly modern world” (2009a, p. 153). His aim is to use the 
resources of his account of individual human agency (see Bratman, 1987, 2007), to 
account for the most “robust” cases of joint activity that these resources allows him 
to capture. Given this motivation and methodological constraint, Bratman is thus not 
himself concerned with the possibility that there are interesting cases of joint action 
to which his account cannot be applied.  
 
According to Bratman, a shared intentional activity is a coordinated activity that is 
the outcome of a certain pattern of intentions and beliefs that are distributed among 
the participants. It is this pattern that Bratman identifies as the shared intention. To 
understand Bratman’s view of shared intention, we must briefly look at his view of 
individual human agency first. To fully get a grip on human agency, we must 
according to Bratman acknowledge the important role that planning plays in our 
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agency. To do this, we must go beyond the belief-desire model of human agency, 
according to which our actions can be exhaustively explained by appeal to 
combinations of beliefs and desires that rationalise and cause them. Bratman argues 
that we must introduce another type of mental state that is irreducible to beliefs and 
desires: namely “plans” or—with another word—“intentions”. What is distinctive of 
the mental state of intention is that it “involves a characteristic kind of commitment.” 
(Bratman, 1987, p. 15) If I intend to F, then I am committed to F-ing. I have then 
settled on F, and thus, the issue of whether to F have been resolved. From then on, 
the F-ing cedes to be an object of deliberation and the commitment to F becomes a 
constraint on further deliberation. While I can change my mind and rescind my 
intention to F, intentions are relatively stable and resist reconsideration.  
 
Intentions are thus both outputs of, and inputs to, practical reasoning. As an 
illustration, let us say that I, on a Thursday one week, form the intention to send the 
full thesis draft to my supervisor on Sunday. I am then committed to doing this, and 
the commitment will constrain my deliberation about how I should spend my Friday 
and Saturday. In view of my belief regarding how much I need to write to complete 
my draft and my belief about the hangover-inducing effects of alcohol, it will be 
irrational for me to intend to drink many cocktails at Penny’s birthday party on 
Saturday (intending this while retaining the intention to hand in the full draft on 
Sunday would create an inconsistent web of beliefs and intentions; there is a demand 
for consistency). Given my commitment, I can also be criticised for being irrational 
if I don’t start to deliberate about what to do in order to carry out my intention 
successfully (there is a demand for means-end coherence). I need to identify what 
sections that are missing from my draft, read up on the relevant literature, and so on. 
No such norms of rationality attach to the mental state of desire. I can desire to finish 
the thesis draft and send it to my supervisors on Sunday, while also desiring to drink 
many cocktails at Penny’s party, even if I know that at most one of these desires can 
be satisfied. No one can criticise me for having such inconsistent desires. Having 
inconsistent desires may be unfortunate but it is not irrational (having mutually 
unsatisfiable desires is, alas, part of the human condition). (Of course, if I have those 
cocktails at Penny’s party even if what I most desire, all things considered, is that I 
	   10	  
hand in my thesis draft on Sunday, then I can be criticised for acting in a way that is 
inconsistent with what I most desire.) However, one cannot knowingly have such 
mutually unsatisfiable intentions without being criticizably irrational.  
 
This difference between the norms associated with desire and the norms associated 
with intention flow, on Bratman’s view, from the different roles that these states play 
in our cognitive economy. The role of desire is to influence our conduct so that we in 
general act so that we seek the good rather than the bad; the role of intention is to 
guide and coordinate our planning, and enable planning to control our conduct. 
Provided that I have not rescinded my intention to send the thesis draft to my 
supervisors before the end of the week, I will be irrational if I don’t in fact perform 
the action when the time to act comes. While desires influence my conduct, they do 
not control it in this way. I am therefore not being inconsistent if I abstain from 
drinking cocktails at Penny’s party, even if I have a desire to do so.  
 
In sum, intentions control an agent’s conduct and coordinate her planning over time. 
Now, it may seem that Bratman thinks that intentions are always directed at some 
future performance of an action, or some future state of affairs that one is committed 
to bringing about. But the plan-like commitments to act that Bratman calls intentions 
can according to him also arise spontaneously and be directed at the present rather 
than the future.8 To distinguish this notion of intention as a plan-like commitment to 
act from a broader notion of intention as any kind of goal-directed state, I will 
sometimes use the term ‘plan-intention’ to indicate that the notion is the former 
“Bratmanian” one. 
 
Bratman’s account of joint action builds on his theory of individual planning agency 
in two respects. First, he identifies shared intention with a functional role that is 
analogous to the functional role of plan-intentions in this theory of individual 
agency. Secondly, the plan-intentions of individuals are the crucial building blocks 
                                                
8 Bratman does not have much to say about present-directed intentions though. For 
critical discussion of Bratman’s treatment of present-directed intentions and 
spontaneous actions, see section 5.1. 
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of his account of a sociopsychological structure that may play the functional role of 
shared intention. Bratman’s aim is to develop a “construction” of interrelated 
intentions and beliefs that can play a role in two or more agents’ joint pursuit of a 
goal, which is analogous to the functional role that intention plays for an individual 
agent’s pursuit of a goal:  
Our shared intention, then, performs at least three interrelated jobs: it helps 
coordinate our intentional actions; it helps coordinate our planning; and it can 
structure relevant bargaining. And it does all this in ways that track the goal of our 
[joint activity]. Thus does our shared intention help to organize and to unify our 
intentional agency in ways to some extent analogous to the ways in which the 
intentions of the individual organize her individual agency over time. An account of 
what shared intention is should explain how it does all this. (Bratman, 1993, p. 99) 
 
Bratman then submits that the following sociopsychological structure can and does 
play the role identified by the functional specification:9 
 
We intend to J if 
(1) (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J 
(2) I intend that we J in accordance with and because of (1a), (1b), and meshing 
subplans of (1a) and (1b); you intend that we J in accordance with and because of 
(1a), (1b), and meshing subplans of (1a) and (1b). 
                                                
9 Bratman elaborates on this construction in his most recent papers on shared agency 
(2009a, 2009b). This elaborated construction makes some points about efficacy and 
stability of the participants’ intentions more explicit, but these aren’t important for 
my purposes here. The construction of (1), (2) and (3) is “View 4” in (Bratman, 
1993, p. 106), although the construction is there presented as a set of individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Since the paper “I intend that we J” 
(1997), Bratman has been open to the possibility that shared intention is a multiply 
realisable phenomenon. Note that in his most recent writings, Bratman sometimes 
writes as if he is merely presenting sufficient conditions for shared intention (2009a, 
2009b). But this should not be taken as a further step back to an even less ambitious 
position. He still takes himself to be giving an account of “one important kind of 
shared intention” (2009a, p. 154, 2009b, p. 45). At his keynote talk at the Collective 
Intentionality VII conference in 2010, Bratman stated that the conditions were not 
merely sufficient but also necessary parts of an unnecessary (but sufficient) package 
of conditions. He made this point by analogy with the “inus”-clauses in John 
Mackie’s account of causation (Mackie, 1965). I have not seen him make this 
analogy in print though. 
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(3) (1) and (2) are common knowledge between us. 
 
For example, for you and I to be going on vacation together, this activity must be the 
outcome of a shared intention to go on vacation together. For this to be the case, each 
of us must have an intention of the form “I intend that we go on vacation together”. 
Each must also intend this by way of (“in accordance with and because of”) the 
other’s intention. We do not intend to go on vacation together if I intend that we do 
this by way of me drugging you, locking you up in the trunk of my car, and driving 
us to the hotel. Each of us must also intend that our subplans for carrying out our 
intentions should be made consistent (“mesh” with each other). Suppose that I intend 
that we spend our time on vacation partying every night until late in the mornings. 
You, on the other hand, intend that we spend the early mornings on pleasant walks in 
the countryside instead. If we know that our subplans clash and neither of us is 
willing to adjust our subplans, then we don’t have a shared intention to go on 
vacation together.  
 
Note that condition (2) does not require that our subplans are in fact consistent. All 
that is required is that each of us intends them to be consistent. This makes us 
committed act in such a way that we can find a solution that we can agree on, 
possibly only after a process of bargaining or negotiation. There is no guarantee that 
we will agree on a solution, in which case our shared intention fails to lead to the 
intended shared intentional activity of going on a vacation together in the appropriate 
manner. On the other hand, if our subplans in fact happens to be consistent (both of 
us intends to go for morning walks) but one or both of us lacks the intention directed 
at this meshing of subplans, then there will be no shared intention to go on vacation 
together. This is because the successful coordination in this case would just be a 
lucky accident rather than an intended result. We need the pattern of attitudes that 
constitutes the shared intention—that is, the construction of (1), (2) and (3)—to 
achieve successful coordination as an intended result since that pattern will otherwise 
fail to play the functional role that Bratman identifies shared intention with. Of 
course, we can still “share” an intention in the loose sense that both intend “that we 
go on vacation together”, but recall that this is not what Bratman means by the term 
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‘shared intention’: A shared intention is a construction that fills a certain role for 
interpersonal coordination in the pursuit of a common goal. 
 
Finally, the fact that we have the appropriately related intentions specified in 
conditions (1) and (2) must be “common knowledge” between us. It is often 
suggested that for you and I to have common knowledge that p, it is not merely 
required that you know that p and that I know that p, but you must also know that I 
know that p, I must know that you know that p, you must know that I know that you 
know that p, I must know that you know that I know that p, and so on in an infinite 
concatenation of ever higher-order beliefs about p (following Schiffer’s (1972) 
definition of what he calls “mutual knowledge*”). Bratman never explains why this 
third condition is needed, but merely says that “it seems reasonable to suppose that in 
shared intention the fact that each has the relevant attitude is itself out in the open, is 
public.” (1993, p. 103) I will not say more here about the common knowledge 
condition, as chapter 2 is devoted to the role of common knowledge in joint action 
(as we shall see, a common knowledge clause is part of virtually all accounts of 
shared intention). At any rate, in the example under consideration, our intentions that 
we go on vacation together will presumably be common knowledge between us, 
since the intentions are likely to have been formed through a process of open and 
explicit discussion. Furthermore, this open discussion itself openly manifests that our 
intentions that we intend to go on vacation together are held in accordance with and 
by way of the other’s similar intentions. 
 
There is something puzzling about the idea that you and I are supposed to each 
intend “that we J”. The content of my intention is not merely “to F”, where F is the 
part of our J-ing that I am in direct control of (to lift my end of the sofa, say), and the 
content of your intention is not merely “to G”, where G is the part of our J-ing that 
you are in direct control of (to lift your end of the sofa). We wouldn’t have a shared 
intention if the following was the case: I intend to lift my end of the sofa, you intend 
to lift your end of the sofa, and each intends this because of the other’s intention and 
by way of meshing subplans. Intuitively, this would merely be an unusually 
interdependent case of two agents acting in parallel rather than two agents intending 
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to do something together. It fails to account for the fact that when we lift and carry a 
sofa together, then the reason each of us lifts our end of the sofa is that we each 
intends that we lift and carry the sofa together. The intention “that we carry the sofa” 
is primary. So, the intentions “that we J” in condition (1) do appear to be needed. 
 
The idea that both of us could intend “that we J” is puzzling though, because, in 
Velleman’s words, it “involves the sharing of something that ordinarily seems 
indivisible.” (Velleman, 1997, p. 35) Recall that an intention is a conduct-controlling 
attitude. If I am in control of our activity, if it is up to me whether we J, then I am 
free to intend that we J. How could you then also intend that we J? That would 
require that it would also be up to you whether we J, which would be incompatible 
with me being in control of our J-ing. If I delegate the intending to you, then the 
issue is no longer up to me, so I can no longer be part of the intending. But if I do not 
delegate the intending to you, then the issue will no longer be up to you, so you 
cannot take part in the intending. Or so it seems. 
 
Bratman’s planning theory of intention allows him to solve this puzzle though. While 
one cannot intend to perform someone else’s action, one can intend that someone 
else performs an action. While I cannot intend to perform my guest’s action of 
leaving before midnight, what I can intend is that my guest leaves at midnight. The 
planning conception of intention thus “allows us to be more liberal about what can be 
intended than we are about what can be attempted; for references to things other than 
our own actions can function appropriately in our plans.” (Bratman, 1992, pp. 330–
331) To illustrate this possibility, Bratman provides the following mundane example: 
I can predict that if I ask you for the time you will tell me the time; so I can intend 
[that I10] get the time from you. This is not an unusual form of control of your action, 
but just ordinary predictability of ordinary agents. (Bratman, 1999, p. 155) 
 
                                                
10 Bratman’s wording here is actually “so I can intend to get the time from you” (my 
emphasis), but this must be a slip. It is the only place (as far as I am aware) where he 
writes anything that suggests that his view is that one might be able to intend to 
perform another’s action. 
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In a similar way, I can intend “that we go on vacation together” if I can assume (with 
justification) that you will intend “that we go on vacation together” when you 
become aware of my intention that we do so (see Bratman, 1997, sec. VI). This may 
be the case if I know you well and I am fairly sure that you will join me in going on 
the vacation.11 Alternatively, I might first intend “that we go on vacation together if 
you intend that we go on vacation together”. When you become aware of my 
conditional intention, you can simply intend (unconditionally) “that we go on 
vacation together”, and as a result, I will intend the same. 
 
There is also a more restricted worry about intentions “that we J” concerning their 
use in an account of joint activity. If the concept of ‘our J-ing’ that is part of the 
content of the participants’ intentions is the very concept that Bratman is trying make 
sense of—that is, the concept of shared intentional activity—then the account is 
viciously circular (see Petersson, 2007). The solution is, of course, to appeal to some 
other less robust concept of “our” activity, which isn’t the concept of a multi-agent 
activity that is the outcome of a shared intention. Here, Bratman appeals to “a 
concept of our [e.g.] painting the house together that involves only the idea that, 
roughly, we are each intentionally painting that house in ways that avoid collisions.” 
(2009b, p. 47) Pettit and Schweikard, who give an account of joint action that is 
similar to Bratman’s, appeal to what they call a ‘joint performance’, which “can be 
conceptualized just as a pattern of behavior in which our different efforts combine to 
effect a certain result.” (2006, p. 29) Each participant thus intends a joint 
performance, rather than a joint action. Thus, according to both these proposals, there 
is a weak notion of joint activity, “that we J” or “joint performance”, which is 
supposed to figure in the content of the participants’ intentions. However, this is not 
                                                
11 Perhaps I don’t need to have any well-grounded expectation about whether or not 
you will form the intention that we go on vacation together. In the absence of 
evidence, I may simply decide to rely on the proposition “that you will intend that we 
go on vacation together” in my planning and practical reasoning, even if I might 
think it is unlikely that you will (as Alonso, 2009 suggests). My reliance might be 
justified by pragmatic considerations. Perhaps I could not bear not spending my 
vacation together with you, and I judge that relying the proposition that you will 
intend to spend it on me will increase the slim chance that you will so intend. 
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the genuine and interesting concept of joint activity that is the target of their 
accounts. 
 
According to Bratman, the small-scale egalitarian joint activities that we adult human 
beings engage in on a daily basis are clearly cognitively and conceptually very 
demanding. Participants must arguably have the concept of belief and the ability to 
accurately attribute beliefs to others (in order to have common knowledge). They 
must also be able to have various plan-intentions with complex contents. This means 
that they must posses the concept of joint activity (“our J-ing”) as well as the concept 
of “meshing subplans”. Furthermore, they must be able to have higher-order plan-
intentions concerning the plan-intentions of others as well as be able to recognise 
others’ higher-order plan-intentions that concern their own plan-intentions. 
 
1.2.2 Kutz’s minimalist account of “joint action as such” 
There are clearly examples that we might think deserve the label ‘joint action’ even 
if they do not have much in common with the cases that Bratman’s account is 
applicable to. In particular, Bratman’s “adult humans in a broadly modern world” 
participate in many joint actions that are not the outcome of interlocking intentions, 
where very little information about what each individual contributes is common 
knowledge. Think of the thousands of people participating in a petition on the World 
Wide Web for example. If the goal of the petition is achieved, then it seems right for 
a signer of the petition to proudly pronounce: “We did it!”. This claim would be true 
even if the signer had no idea who any of the other members belonging to this “we” 
are. Bratman’s account is not applicable to such a case.  
 
Kutz criticizes Bratman and others (such as Margaret Gilbert and Raimo Tuomela) 
for focusing on a narrow range of joint activities in light of which they develop their 
accounts, a range that is restricted to small-scale, highly reciprocal and more or less 
egalitarian joint activities. According to Kutz, the accounts of Bratman, Gilbert and 
Tuomela are illuminating when it comes to some kinds of joint action, but they fail to 
capture joint action in its full generality. Kutz’s ambition is explicitly to give an 
	   17	  
account of “joint action as such” (2000, pp. 4, 31): Joint action is one phenomenon 
that can be captured by his minimalist account of joint action. On his view, there is 
one ingredient that the case of two people going for a walk together and the case of 
thousands of people signing an online petition have in common, namely that the 
participants have what Kutz calls “overlapping participatory intentions”. As Kutz 
uses the term ‘participatory intention’, this is an ordinary personal intention to 
perform an action that frames the action (for the agent herself) as a contribution to a 
collective outcome. Several individuals have overlapping participatory intentions 
when the collective outcome that their actions contribute to is in fact the same 
collective outcome (none of them needs to be aware of this fact though). Kutz argues 
that this is both necessary and sufficient for the actions of several agents to count as 
one joint action.12 If I have the intention to sign an online petition for an asset freeze 
and travel ban on the corrupt elite of the neighbouring country Atlantis, then, when I 
enter my name and email address on the website, I “frame” what I am doing as 
something that contributes to the attempt to collectively, with the other signers of the 
petition, bring about the outcome that Atlantis’ corrupt elite gets their assets frozen 
and are banned from traveling into my country. If you have an intention to perform a 
different action, signing your name and email address on the website, but frame that 
action as a contribution to what happens to be the same collective outcome as the one 
I am contributing to, then we have overlapping participatory intentions. If we both 
perform these actions then we are both participating in the same joint action of trying 
to influence our leaders to make certain decisions.  
 
Note that in this kind of case, there is no mutual responsiveness between us: our 
decisions to sign the petition are completely independent and the joint action would 
take place even if neither of us participated. Each of us is merely joining a collective 
                                                
12 He claims that another ingredient that characterises joint activities is that each 
participant is favourably disposed to the possibility that the others become aware of 
their contribution. Kutz (2000, p. 6) calls this a condition of “mutual openness” (this 
should not be confused with what I call “openness” in chapter 2). However, he 
suggests that “perhaps there is even a limiting case of collective action in which the 
ordinary condition of mutual openness is overridden by strategic concerns.” (p. 19 n. 
40). At any rate, the condition of mutual openness is not important for my concerns 
here. 
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endeavour that is already under way. This means that Kutz’s participatory intentions 
are different from Bratmanian intentions “that we J”. A participatory intention does 
not settle whether the joint action occurs or not, but merely settles whether or not the 
subject of the intention contributes to it. As Kutz puts it, neither of us has the 
“executive perspective” on the joint action that is required for intentions “that we J”. 
Of course, some of the participants involved in the petition will probably have such 
an executive perspective. Perhaps the petition and website was launched by a single 
individual. This person is indeed settling whether or not the collective attempt to 
hassle Atlantis’ corrupt elite will occur or not.13 
 
For Kutz to succeed in showing that he has given an account of joint action as 
such—a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a 
collection of actions to constitute a joint action—he must show that there are no 
forms of joint action where participants lack participatory intentions. If there is a 
case of joint action where participants do not have overlapping participatory 
intentions, then his account cannot be an account of joint action as such. Kutz is not 
really concerned with this challenge though, as he primarily has in mind an objector 
that thinks his account is too liberal rather than too conservative. If he were 
concerned with it, then perhaps he would appeal to the idea that a joint action must 
be jointly intentional under some description, which implies that the content of the 
participants’ intentions must refer to some collective outcome or activity.14 But 
might it not be enough that several agents perform actions that happen to be aimed at 
                                                
13 Kutz (2000) illustrates the difference between participatory intentions and 
intentions “that we J” by considering the case of an orchestra playing Eroica (pp. 
23–24). While the cellist arguably merely has an intention to contribute the 
performance, the conductor has (let us assume) the power to settle whether or not 
they play the Eroica. 
14 Kutz emphasises the importance of the idea that the characterisation of joint action 
mirrors the contents of the participants’ intentions (see p. 27), but he does not 
explicitly appeal to this idea in order to defend the necessity of participatory 
intentions. He also draws on the team-reasoning literature, according to agents must 
be able to think of themselves as acting qua members of a group that acts together in 
order to rationally solve what appears to be trivial game-theoretical coordination 
problems (2000, pp. 7–9; for accounts of team reasoning, see Bacharach, 2006; Gold 
& Sugden, 2007b). 
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one and the same goal, and this goal is achieved as the combined result of their 
efforts? This can occur without any of the agents regarding what they are doing as a 
contribution to a collective outcome. Consider the following case: Pontus and Petter 
live in different top-floor flats in the same building. They are both tormented by the 
fact that the building’s staircase has become full of trash. When Pontus is about to 
leave for work one morning, he forms the intention “that the staircase gets cleared of 
trash”—thus incorporating this end in his planning and practical reasoning—and he 
starts to pick up trash as he descends down the staircase (note that this intention is 
not a participatory intention since he does not conceive of his activity as contributing 
to a collective outcome). As Pontus leaves the flat, Petter comes home from his night 
shift at work and enters the staircase from below. He also forms the intention “that 
the staircase gets cleared of trash”, and starts to pick up trash as he ascends up the 
stairs. Halfway down/up the staircase, they meet each other and each realises that his 
intention has been satisfied thanks to the actions of both of them.15 
 
Would it not be correct here to say that “they cleared the staircase of trash” in a 
collective sense of “they”, as opposed to the distributive sense of “they” in use when 
we say that “they entered the staircase”? We could say that “they jointly cleared the 
staircase of trash”, even if it might be stretching everyday language to say that “they 
cleared the staircase of trash together”. Maybe we should not give much weight to 
such linguistic intuitions, but Kutz himself does so when he discusses a case that he 
takes to demonstrate that overlapping participatory intentions are sufficient for joint 
action:  
Suppose that while we are having a picnic, it begins to rain. I jump up, grab the 
sandwiches and head for the car. I intend to do my part of our saving the picnic, 
hoping you will simultaneously grab the drinks and the blanket. If you do, then it is 
reasonable to say we will have jointly saved the picnic. (Kutz, 2000, p. 18 my 
emphasis)  
 
                                                
15 This example was inspired by a similar example in (Butterfill, 2011) involving two 
communists who independently of each other both set out one dark night to paint the 
same large bridge red. Starting from different ends, they meet each other at the 
middle of bridge and discover that they have both succeeded in painting the bridge 
red. 
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I agree with Kutz’s linguistic intuition here. But if this shows that it is sufficient for 
two or more actions (performed by different agents) to constitute a joint action that 
they are the outcomes of overlapping participatory intentions, then a similar intuition 
about the case of Pontus and Petter ought to demonstrate that it is sufficient for two 
or more actions (performed by different agents) to constitute a joint action if they are 
aimed at the same goal and the achievement of this goal is the combined result of 
these actions. It is just as (in)appropriate to say that the picnickers saved the picnic 
together, as it is to say that Pontus and Petter cleared the staircase of trash together. 
My point here is not that we ought to rely heavily on such intuitions about what it is 
appropriate to say, but merely that if this is what we do rely on, then it seems that not 
even overlapping participatory intentions are necessary for joint action as such. 
(Since neither Pontus nor Petter conceives of their own activity of picking up trash as 
a contribution to a collective outcome, neither of them has a participatory intention, 
and thus, nor do they have overlapping participatory intentions.)  
 
Despite presenting his account as radically different from that of Bratman, Kutz’s 
account is actually largely in agreement with it regarding the characteristics of small-
scale joint activities such as that of two people painting a house together or two 
people going for a walk together (see pp. 17, 21–22, 24, 27). In such cases, we must 
attribute intentions that concern the whole activity, intentions “that we J”, or as Kutz 
calls them, “group-intentions” (2000, pp. 22, 24).16 Furthermore, the intentions of the 
participants of these activities have common knowledge of each other’s intentions 
and these intentions must be related in ways that ensure mutual responsiveness 
between the participants. But according to Kutz, the contributions of the participants 
to the joint activity (our J-ing) will always be directly caused by their participatory 
intentions and only indirectly by their group-intentions. Participatory intentions thus 
                                                
16 However, Kutz at one point express doubt about whether plan-like commitments 
to act in favour of some state of affairs being brought about, such as “that we paint 
the house together” are really the same kind of attitude as that of intentions to 
perform certain actions: “One might ask whether there really are such non-standard 
intentions, or whether they are instead figures of speech, either expressing a hope 
that we will do something, or standing in for an individual intention to promote our 
doing something.” (2000, pp. 21–22) 
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play an ineliminable role, according to Kutz, even in cases of small-scale highly 
interdependent and egalitarian joint activity. 
 
1.2.3 Discussion 
I will here make two points in light of Bratman’s and Kutz’s approaches to joint 
action and their respective resulting accounts. The first point is that we should not 
assume that there is one phenomenon that is the target of various accounts of joint 
action. Bratman never claims that “shared intentional activity” should be taken to be 
joint action as such. First of all, he sets aside cases that involve what he could call 
“robust sociality”, in which participants have different authorities and powers, act on 
behalf of organisations and social institutions, and so on.17 Neither is he primarily 
trying to explicate a “folk notion” of joint action that is supposed to be in play when 
we in everyday discourse talk about people jointly doing something or doing it 
together (even if such talk often do refer to shared intentional activities). Hence, 
Bratman’s and Kutz’s accounts are not really in conflict.18 Kutz explicitly concedes 
that there are kinds of joint action that are richer and more robustly joint than his 
minimalist account is able to fully capture. Such kinds are more fully explicated by 
an account such as Bratman’s. As I argued in the last subsection, I do not think that 
Kutz actually gives an account of joint action as such, since there seem to be cases of 
joint action that do not involve overlapping participatory intentions. Indeed, I think 
there is little reason to think that we can find individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for joint action as such.19 And even if we could, it is not clear 
why such a broad universal account of joint action would be interesting.  
 
                                                
17 In other words, Kutz is unfair when he writes that “Bratman and Tuomela and 
Miller have been misled by their reliance on […] cases of small-scale, highly 
interdependent, and non-hierarchical cooperation […].” (2000, p. 22 my emphasis) 
18 At least if Bratman accepts that shared intentional activities always involve 
participatory intentions derived from the intentions “that we J”. 
19 Kutz briefly raises the possibility that “[c]ollective action types might simply hang 
together in a familiar familial fashion”, but then goes on to argue that this is not the 
case (2000, p. 4). 
	   22	  
The second point I want to make is that despite their divergent starting points and 
vocal differences, Bratman and Kutz are in agreement about the socio-psychological 
characteristics of a certain class of joint action, namely those that are small in scale, 
non-hierarchical, and where participants are in each other’s presence (or at least in 
direct communicative contact). This will be the type of joint activities that I focus on 
in this thesis as well. For both Bratman and Kutz, participants in these activities have 
plan-intentions “that we J” (but see footnote 16). This is not equivalent to merely 
being committed to perform one’s contributory actions that would be part of the joint 
activity, should it occur. Rather, the commitment concerns these actions as parts of 
the whole, where the whole is, so to speak, implicated in the “parthood” of these 
contributory actions. Secondly, the joint activity involves mutual responsiveness of 
intentions and actions between the participants. Finally, they agree that the relevant 
intentions and beliefs are common knowledge among the participants.  
 
1.3 Two lacunas in the philosophy of joint action 
In this thesis, I focus on two relatively unexplored lacunas in the joint action 
literature. On the one hand, I explore the joint activities of relatively cognitively 
unsophisticated agents, such as young children and non-human primates, and on the 
other hand, I look at how participants carry out shared intentions and achieve online 
coordination of actions and movements.20 To explore the latter lacuna is important 
because it highlights that patterns of interlocking plan-intentions, mutual belief and 
so on, are only the tip of the iceberg of what enables and sustains joint activities. 
Exploring the first lacuna is important because it undermines a false dichotomy 
between purely individualistic actions on the one hand, and forms of cooperative 
action such as “shared intentional activity” that are the outcome of the participants’ 
                                                
20 Tollefsen and Dale (2012) identify a number “problems” that face various 
philosophical accounts of joint action. Two of these problems are the “over-
intellectualization problem” and the “execution problem”. The former concerns the 
“myopic” nature of the philosophical accounts, and the latter concerns the their 
“skeletal” character. I have adopted these adjectives too to frame my project. But 
given motivations such as Bratman’s, I think it is misleading to talk about the 
myopic and skeletal character of philosophical accounts as problems. They are more 
accurately taken to be lacunas. 
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shared intention. Note that the joint activities of, for example, young children or non-
human primates, are typically carried out by participants who are in each other’s 
presence and are mutually responsiveness, and who can more or less be considered 
as equal contributors to the activity. They are in this way similar to Bratman’s cases 
of modest sociality (they certainly do not involve participants who are acting on the 
behalf of groups or who have institutionally sanctioned powers and responsibilities). 
Furthermore, there is good reason to think that we can learn something about the 
small-scale joint activities of adult humans by looking at their developmental 
precursors and at the joint activities of species that are closely related to us. In 
addition, trying to understand the cooperative activities of species with different 
cognitive capacities and limitations is arguably an interesting project by itself. 
 
1.3.1 Joint activities with cognitively unsophisticated participants 
As I highlighted at the beginning of the chapter, young children and many non-
human animals engage in forms of joint activity. Before the end of their first year, 
children start to engage in coordinated joint visual attention with caregivers and 
peers (see papers in Moore & Dunham, 1995). Around the same time they also start 
to engage with others in simple joint activities such as the building a block tower 
together, or taking turns digging a hole in the sand (Brownell, 2011; Hay, 1978; 
Verba, 1993). In their second year, engagement in “shared pretence scenarios” is also 
common (Harris, Kavanaugh, Wellman, & Hickling, 1993; Rakoczy, 2008). For 
example, two toddlers might pretend that they are engaged in a telephone 
conversation with each other, each holding a remote control as if it was a mobile 
phone. Arguably, chimpanzees and various social carnivores—wolves, hyenas, 
lions—engage in cooperative hunting (Boesch & Boesch, 1989; Drea & Carter, 
2009; Stander, 1992).  
 
These social non-human animals are not sophisticated “mindreaders”, that is, they 
lack an explicit understanding of others as agents whose behaviour is driven by 
mental states such as beliefs, desires and plan-intentions. Arguably, children under 
the age of 3 also lack such a robust “Theory of Mind”. Following Tollefsen (2005, p. 
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81), I assume that a robust theory of mind includes the following: (i) an 
understanding of other persons in terms of their thoughts, intentions, and beliefs; (ii) 
an understanding that other persons’ thoughts, beliefs, and intentions may differ from 
one’s own; and (iii) an understanding that others have thoughts and beliefs that may 
not match with the current state of affairs (false beliefs). Before 3 to 5 years of age, 
children fail at so-called elicited-response false belief tasks, in which they have to 
take into account an agent’s false belief about (for example) an object’s location in 
order to correctly answer a question about where the agent will look for the object 
(see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2000). Despite this, developmental psychologists 
have adopted Bratman’s account of shared intentional activity to make sense of the 
joint action of young children (Carpenter, 2009; Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Tomasello 
& Hamann, 2012). While children’s spontaneous behaviour (such as their looking 
behaviour) is sensitive to the mental states of others, including their false beliefs, 
already at 15 months of age (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; see Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005), such sensitivity does not reflect the kind of understanding of 
others that is required for participation in a shared intentional activity. Apparently in 
contradiction to this, Malinda Carpenter (2009) states that 12-month-olds “arguably 
show evidence of understanding something about others’ intentions or plans for 
action—the means others have chosen to use to achieve their goals.” (p. 382) She 
interprets this as showing that they understand something about Bratmanian plan-
intentions and that, thus, the mutual responsiveness problem doesn’t really arise. But 
Carpenter seems to use the notion of a ‘plan for action’ in a very broad sense that 
encompasses low-level control of movement sequences during action. Bratman’s 
notion of planning is much more narrow. Recall that intentions are plan-like 
commitments that play a role in practical reasoning that is defined by characteristic 
norms of consistency and means-end coherence. Plans are furthermore hierarchically 
structured so that plans typically need to be filled in with subplans—also 
intentions—as a result of deliberation. Attributing such plan-intentions to others 
seems to require more than an implicit sensitivity to how others’ behaviour is guided 
by e.g. beliefs and desires. Furthermore, some developmental psychologists claim 
that participating in joint activities plays a role in facilitating the development of 
sophisticated mindreading skills (e.g. Hughes, Fujisawa, Ensor, Lecce, & Marfleet, 
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2006; Moll & Tomasello, 2007; quoted in Butterfill, 2012a). As Butterfill (2012a) 
argues, if this is true, then Bratman’s account of shared intentional activity cannot 
applicable to the joint activities that toddlers engage in. 
 
These examples of joint activities with participants who are relatively cognitively 
unsophisticated are clearly not counterexamples to Bratman’s account itself. Bratman 
himself is simply not interested in the joint activities of non-planning agents. There is 
certainly room in Bratman’s overall picture of agency for simpler accounts of joint 
action. For example, there is a place for creatures who lack plan-intentions but who 
are still acting purposively: “Many animals, human and nonhuman, are purposive 
agents – agents who pursue goals in light of their representations of the world.” 
(Bratman, 1999, p. 5)  Furthermore, there are ways in which such agents are able to 
coordinate their activities over time despite their lack of planning capacities. He 
notes that “planning is not the only mechanism that coordinates an individual’s 
purposive activity over time. A tiger hunting her prey may exhibit wonderfully 
coordinated activity without being capable of such planning.” (1993, p. 101) While 
Bratman says nothing about what these mechanisms could be—that just isn’t 
something he is concerned with—nothing of what he says about purposive agency 
suggests that there might not also be mechanisms that coordinate several individuals’ 
purposive activities with regard to a common goal. Consider the hunting of a more 
social cat for example, such as the lion. Lionesses frequently hunt in groups, stalking 
one and the same prey from different directions before they trap the prey as it tries to 
escape. (I am not in a position to positively claim that these lionesses really have a 
common goal, but suppose that they do.) There may thus be patterns of mental states 
or perceptual and motoric processes that fulfil a functional role similar to the role 
that Bratman identifies with shared intention (that role would not include the 
facilitating the interpersonal coordination of plans though).  
 
Cases of joint activity with young children or non-human animals are not obvious 
counterexamples to Kutz’s minimalist account either. To show that they would 
indeed be counterexamples, we would have to show that the young children or non-
human animals do not have overlapping participatory intentions, and I am not sure 
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how this could be shown. Nevertheless, there are clearly mechanisms that enable 
children and social animals to coordinate their cooperative activities, so even if they 
do in fact have overlapping participatory intentions when engaging in joint activities, 
that does not give us much of a grip on how the cooperative hunting of the lionesses 
differs from the case of two adult humans who independently of each other sign one 
and the same online petition.  
 
What I want to emphasize here is that the view of joint action and cooperation that 
one gets from reading contemporary analytic philosophy of joint action will be 
somewhat myopic. An account such as Bratman’s may lead one to adopt a false 
dichotomy between purely individualistic self-regarding actions on the one hand, and 
full-blown shared intentional activity on the other hand. This is partly encouraged by 
the fact that accounts of shared intention such as Bratman’s are often prefaced by the 
observation that there are two different senses in which we might be doing 
something: we, considered as a collectively, might be walking (together); or we, 
considered distributively as a set of individuals, might be walking (in parallel) 
(Bratman, 2009a, pp. 150–151; Gilbert, 2009, p. 168; Kutz, 2000, pp. 1–2). The 
accounts that are then presented as accounts of what characterises activities where 
we are doing something collectively rather than distributively. This suggests a false 
dualism that perhaps is not actually embraced by the accounts’ creators, but which 
may mislead others.  
 
This false dualism is visible in a debate between Michael Tomasello and Christophe 
Boesch concerning whether or not chimpanzees are really collaborating when they 
hunt in groups. Tomasello and Katharina Hamann argue that only humans engage in 
what they call “true collaboration” (Tomasello & Hamann, 2012). Drawing on 
Bratman (1992), they assume that participants only truly collaborate when the 
following is the case: 
“(a) the participants have a joint goal or intention in the sense that they each have 
the goal or intention that we (in mutual knowledge) do X together; and (b) the 
participants coordinate their roles—their plans and subplans of action—including 
helping the other in her role as needed. (Tomasello & Hamann, 2012, p. 2 my 
emphasis; see also Tomasello, 2009, p. 61) 
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Tomasello and Hamann then contrasts such true collaboration with what they argue 
goes on in the group hunting of chimpanzees: 
During the hunting, whereas each chimpanzee is trying to get the monkey for itself, 
and not helping the others in their roles at all, human hunters do such things for their 
partners as giving them weapons, clearing trails for them, carrying their child or 
weapon, repairing a weapon, instructing collaborators in best techniques, and so 
forth (Hill, 2002). The short story is thus that chimpanzees have no joint goal that 
“we” capture it and share it, helping the other in his role as needed, and no sense of 
commitment in either direction. (Tomasello & Hamann, 2012, p. 8, my emphases) 
 
I do not want to question whether or not Tomasello and Hamann are correct in 
construing the difference between humans and chimpanzees in the way they do. But 
the stark contrast they draw between humans and chimpanzees here leaves no room 
for a middle ground between the coordinated behaviour individuals who are each 
pursuing their own self-regarding goal (e.g. “to get the prey for oneself”) on the one 
hand, and the rich form of cooperation that is exemplified in the case humans 
hunting together (see also Boesch, 2005, p. 692, who makes the same stark contrast, 
but puts chimpanzees in the realm of true collaboration). There is arguably 
theoretical space for the view that a hunter could have the goal “that the prey is 
caught”, “to catch they prey”, or even “that I catch the prey” without it being part of 
the conditions of satisfaction of this goal that it gets this prey “for itself” even if the 
hunter does not have the goal “that we catch the prey”.  
 
What we need are accounts that better fit what we know about the socio-cognitive 
profiles and motivations of various non-human animals and young children. We need 
a richer taxonomy of accounts of joint action in light of these constraints (Rakoczy, 
2006, p. 124). My contribution to this project consists of chapters 2 and 3. In chapter 
3, I give an account of a kind of joint action driven by what I call a “joint goal”, 
which is intended to occupy this middle ground between the coordinated activity of 
purely individualistic agents and “true collaboration” (or “shared intentional 
activity”). Other accounts that have been developed for similar purposes are 
Butterfill’s (2012a) account of joint actions driven by what he calls “shared goals”, 
and Tollefsen’s (2005) account of the joint activities of young children, according to 
which they may have a shared intention that is composed of a pattern of 
interconnected intentions-in-action and perceptual states (rather than plan-intentions 
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and beliefs). I touch on Butterfill’s account in chapter 3, and discuss and elaborate 
Tollefsen’s account in chapter 4 (and in Blomberg, 2011). 
 
While making sense of the agency of non-human animals and young children is a 
fascinating pursuit in itself, I also believe that getting to grips with less sophisticated 
and simpler cases of joint action may transform the way we should think about the 
collaboration and joint action among us “adult humans in a broadly modern world”. 
Besides its intrinsic interest, one reason for focusing on examples involving non-
human animals and young children, rather than, say, simple spontaneous joint 
activities with adult humans, is that when adult humans come into the picture, it is 
much more tempting to interpret an episode of joint activity as being within the 
purview of some previous plan-like shared intention to act jointly (see e.g. Bratman, 
1999, p. 139). Once cognitively less demanding accounts of joint action is available, 
this may thus lead us to view some episodes where we exercise our own agency 
together with others in a new light.  
 
1.3.2 Online coordination of actions 
As Tollefsen and Dale (2012) point out, the leading accounts of joint action are 
“skeletal” in that they merely focus on the personal-level mental states that are 
required for joint action. Furthermore, they focus on planning rather than the 
execution of a joint activity as it unfolds. They have nothing to say about the 
subpersonal mechanisms that might enable the online coordination involved in the 
executing these shared intentions, nor do they have much to say about the possibility 
of unplanned but spontaneously coordinated executions of joint actions.21 The 
skeletal character of shared intention accounts of joint action arguably invites one to 
                                                
21 While Searle does indeed think that joint action can be spontaneous, and that we 
often act with what he calls a “collective intention-in-action”, it is still true that his 
account does not have much to say about what this involves. He simply states that 
joint actions are the outcome of individuals who are acting on a special kind of 
psychological attitude, a we-intention. The collective or joint aspect is thus part of 
the attitude rather than the content. I briefly discuss Searle’s account in chapter 4.  
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view joint action and cooperation through the frame of what Mark Risjord calls “the 
standard picture”:  
 
[I]n any joint action, a shared prior intention sets the common plan and roles, while 
the individuals fulfill their different parts with actions that are individually 
intentional. The individual actions become part of a genuine joint enterprise only 
insofar as the agents commit to, accept, or have common knowledge of the goals and 
roles of a prior joint intention. There is, therefore, an asymmetry between individual 
actions and joint actions. For individual action, prior intention and intention-in-
action are independent. An action can be intentional without a prior intention to do 
that act. By contrast, an action cannot be part of a joint performance without a joint 
prior intention. The intentions-in-action of several individuals are bound together as 
a joint action only in virtue of shared prior intentions. (Risjord, 2012, pp. 4–5) 
 
As Risjord notes, this picture of joint action does not contain any resources to make 
sense of the idea that there might be spontaneous joint actions if spontaneous actions 
are intentional actions that are performed without a prior intention. (To this we can 
add that the picture makes it difficult to accommodate the idea that creatures without 
capacities for planning and mindreading could engage in joint action). However, I 
will argue, in chapter 4, that intentions-in-action can in some sense also be joint and 
so can the execution itself of a shared prior intention. 
 
While Bratman says that “mutual responsiveness in action” is a constitutive feature 
of shared intentional activity, he does not explicate what we should take from this 
abstract label (1992, pp.338-339, emphasis in original). He does not have anything to 
say about what it may involve or how people achieve it. Of course, some joint 
activities will largely be coordinated by way of the meshing of plans rather than by 
online coordination of actions. For example, if you and I organize a workshop on the 
philosophy of joint action together, then much of the coordination work will consist 
in ensuring that our plans and the way in which we fill in those plans (that is, commit 
to subplans) are consistent.22 But when it comes to other joint activities, knowing 
that the activity is the outcome of shared intention in Bratman’s sense will tell us 
virtually nothing about how it is coordinated and carried out. Consider the case of 
                                                
22 Note that this coordination work is likely to itself by an example of shared 
intentional activity according to Bratman, namely a conversation (1999, p. 130). 
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two figure skaters performing a well-rehearsed joint acrobatic manoeuvre on ice. As 
Bratman frequently emphasises, plans are always more or less partial, either because 
the time has not come yet for “filling out” the plan with commitments on particular 
means for fulfilling it, or because the plan has reached a level of granularity where 
further planning is not necessary or even contra-productive. Bratman himself notes 
that “my plans will typically be at a level of abstraction appropriate to my habits and 
skills.” (p. 31) In many mundane joint activities, this level of abstraction will 
arguably be found at a level that is above the level where triadic coordination 
between participants and their common goal—“joint action-tracking mutual 
responsiveness”, to use Bratman’s phrase—must occur in order for the joint action to 
be successfully and reliably executed. If you and I shake hands with each other23, 
what accounts for the joint achievement of having our hands meet in the appropriate 
place, close our grips on each other’s hands, and shake our hands in an appropriate 
manner will not be the meshing of our plan-like commitments. Rather, perception-
action feedback loops and subpersonal mechanisms for action control and monitoring 
will play the crucial role here. Recent research in social and cognitive neuroscience 
suggests that such mechanisms may guide actions toward outcomes that are 
represented as collective outcomes as well as individual outcomes (see chapter 5).  
 
Furthermore, it seems plausible that some joint actions are spontaneous, that is, that 
they are performed without the formation of states that incorporate plan-like 
commitments. Consider two people on a street who rush to help a third person who 
has tripped and fallen to his or her feet. Both act immediately and spontaneously in 
response to the accident.24 Now, Bratman thinks that plan-intentions need not be 
future-directed but also present-directed. This would be a limiting case of a “partial” 
plan: The plan merely specifies the goal of the action and simultaneously causes an 
                                                
23 At least according to Pettit and Schweikard (2006), this is a type of joint action 
that is explained by appeal to a shared intention. 
24 This joint action gets initiated in a way similar to the joint saving of the picnic 
discussed by Kutz (see page 19), but the joint helping up and steading of the fallen 
pedestrian, I take it, involves many features that are characteristics of the kind of 
activities discussed by Bratman, such as mutual responsiveness and mutual 
awareness among the helpers regarding what they are doing. 
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action directed toward that goal. However, the only reason for thinking that present-
directed plan-intentions are involved here seems to be a craving for a misplaced 
generality of theoretical scope. Besides the fact that there are good reasons to doubt 
that present-directed intentions are the same kind of state as future-directed 
intentions according to Bratman’s own functional definition of intention (see 
footnote 8), it seems plausible that even adult humans in a modern world like ours 
sometimes act merely in a capacity as purposive agents, temporarily outside a 
framework of planning structures.25 
 
In other words, in order to understand how joint action is coordinated during its 
unfolding performance and in order to make sense of the spontaneous joint actions, 
we need to go beyond an analysis that focuses on the structures of intentional states 
that are the distal causes of the actions of mutually responsive individuals. Chapters 
4 and 5 are dedicated to this lacuna in the joint action literature. Besides the 
elaboration of Tollefsen’s (2005) account that I present in chapter 4 (and in 
Blomberg, 2011), Pacherie (2007, 2012) has also given attention to online 
coordination of joint action, as have Tollefsen and Dale (2012). There is of course 
much interesting empirical work here, and the purpose of chapter 5 is to review some 
of it. 
 
1.4 Roadmap of the thesis 
In chapter 2, I argue that, even when restricting our attention to joint activities that 
are small-scale, highly interdependent, and largely egalitarian, there are several kinds 
of such activities. Some of these kinds are richer—more robustly “joint” in some 
sense—than others. The richer the form of joint activity, the more it demands of 
participants in terms of cognitive sophistication and conceptual resources. I argue for 
this pluralism about joint action by focusing on what motivates the common 
knowledge condition (CK-condition), which is a component in almost all 
philosophical accounts of shared intention and joint action. I identify and explicate 
                                                
25 At one point, Bratman admits that this is a possibility: “It may be, though, that we 
sometimes do things that are merely purposive […].” (2000, p. 35) 
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two motivations. The first is to rule out cases that involve “concealment” of the 
participants’ intentions or (higher-order) beliefs about these intentions. There is, I 
submit, an everyday notion of a robust and rich form joint action that is incompatible 
with the presence of such concealment (this parallels the motivation for a CK-
condition in Gricean accounts of communication (Clark & Marshall, 1981; Schiffer, 
1972)). The other (related) reason for introducing a CK-condition is that joint action, 
like individual action, ought to be non-accidentally coordinated. When agents act 
jointly, they must coordinate the activity together. I argue that, since concealment 
cases can only be constructed if participants have the concept of belief, such cases 
need not be ruled out when it comes to participants who arguably lack this concept 
(such as young children and non-human primates). Joint activities in which such 
agents participate is thus of a less robustly joint kind than joint activities that 
sophisticated mindreaders such as adult humans beings sometimes engage in. The 
less robustly joint kind must arguably still involve non-accidental coordination 
though, so the goals of the participants still need to be “out in the open”. I suggest 
that there is form of openness that does not require common knowledge, but which 
does require that agents have some awareness of a mutual goal-dependency. In 
addition, there is a notion of an even weaker form of joint action that may be 
accidentally coordinated. 
 
In chapter 3, I offer an account of what it takes to have what I call a ‘joint goal’. The 
account specifies a pattern of goals and beliefs that I argue enables agents to 
mutually benefit from the fact that they have a common goal. Two or more 
individuals can according to this account have a joint goal without anyone having the 
goal “that we J”, and their goals only have to be directed at (more or less) the same 
set of states of affairs. The goals need not also represent that set of states of affairs in 
the same way. This account of a joint goal allow us to identify an interesting form of 
joint cooperative activity without shoehorning it into either side of a dichotomy 
between purely individualistic behaviour and “true collaboration” (Tomasello & 
Hamann, 2012). At the end of the chapter, I also consider what sorts of behavioural 
phenomena and experimental results suggest that a multi-agent activity is 
coordinated by a joint goal. 
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While chapters 2 and 3 deals with the myopic character of much of the philosophical 
work on joint action, I proceed to the second lacuna in chapters 4 and 5. In chapter 
4, I give an account of joint actions characterised by mutual responsiveness in action, 
but not by mutual responsiveness in planning. I argue that in some joint activities, 
such as in a dance performed by two figure skaters, actions may be joint in virtue of 
each participant having a “socially extended intention-in-action” with conditions of 
satisfaction that range over not just their own bodily movements but also over the 
bodily movements of the other(s). Following Tollefsen (2005), I suggest that the 
structure of Bratman’s account of shared intention can be modified so that it is 
formulated in terms of Searlean intentions-in-action (Searle, 1980, 1983) rather than 
in terms of plan-intentions. But this requires something that many philosophers of 
action take to be impossible: that one could intend not only that someone else 
perform an action, but also intend directly to perform another agent’s bodily 
movements. I argue in chapter 4 that this is in fact possible under some 
circumstances. A stepping-stone in my argument concerns what the structure of the 
content of one’s intention-in-action is when one directly manipulates a tool. I argue 
that in the case of “fluent” tool-use, the content of one’s intention-in-action range not 
merely over his or her bodily movement, but also over the movement of a tool. I thus 
claim that an agent’s repertoire of basic actions may include both tool-using actions 
and actions that include the performance of another agent’s bodily movements. 
 
Chapter 5 is essentially a review chapter of various strands of empirical work on 
joint action. The chapter is motivated by an attempt to answer the following 
question: How do participants successfully coordinate their actions in joint activity in 
the absence of plans or beyond what their plans specify? The main point of the 
chapter is to show that in many cases, joint action is not something people need to 
work hard to get off the ground, but something that comes naturally to us. I review 
research in cognitive psychology and in social and cognitive neuroscience that 
suggests that there are various subpersonal mechanisms by means of which joint 
actions can be coordinated. 
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Finally, in the conclusions, I sum up the main points of the thesis and offer some 
thoughts about future work that takes off from the research on which this thesis is 
based. 
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2 Common knowledge, openness, and joint action 
 
According to most accounts of joint activity, in order for two or more agents to be 
acting together, they must have “common knowledge” (or “mutual knowledge”) of 
each other’s goals or intentions concerning the activity (Alonso, 2009, p. 458; 
Bratman, 1992, p. 335, 1993, p. 103, 2009a, p. 160; Cohen & Levesque, 1991, p. 
491; Gilbert, 1990, p. 7, 2008, p. 502; Miller, 2001, p. 59; Pettit & Schweikard, 
2006, p. 24).26 As it is often metaphorically put, the attitudes have to be “out in the 
open”, “in the public domain” or be “above board” between the participants. On this 
basis alone, it may seem legitimate to claim, following Chant and Ernst (2008, p. 
550), that common knowledge plays a “central role” in these accounts. However, it is 
not always clear what central role this is supposed to be. The common knowledge 
condition (henceforth CK-condition) is only rarely explicitly motivated.  For 
example, Bratman (1993) introduces the CK-condition by simply asserting that “it 
seems reasonable to suppose that in shared intention the fact that each has the 
relevant attitudes is itself out in the open, is public.” (1993, p. 103, see also 1992, pp. 
334–335)27 Similarly, Miller claims that “mutual knowledge is what distinguishes 
joint action from interdependent action that is not joint”, but never explains what it is 
about mutual knowledge that gives it this status as a distinguishing feature (2001, p. 
60). This lack of explicit motivation is surprising given that the “cost” of 
                                                
26 As we saw in chapter 1, Kutz argues that common knowledge is not constitutive of 
joint action as such. But he repeatedly suggests that common knowledge is 
constitutive of a certain kind of joint action, namely small-scale, highly reciprocal 
and broadly egalitarian joint activities (Kutz, 2000, pp. 6 n. 8, 17, 27). See also 
footnote 29. 
27 In Bratman’s more recent work on shared agency (2009a, 2009b), the CK-
condition has been modified somewhat and receives a more explicit motivation: see 
footnote 34. Gilbert requires that in order for agents to have a shared intention to do 
something, it must be common knowledge between them that each has expressed 
their personal readiness to commit them all to intend as a body to do it (see also 
Gilbert, 1990, p. 7, 2008, p. 502). While it is clear that this state of common 
knowledge is what transforms all the individual expressions of personal readiness 
into the joint commitment, she does not elaborate on what it is about common 
knowledge that allows it to play this transformative role. 
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incorporating a CK-condition appears to be high; the CK-condition seems to make 
accounts of joint activity very cognitively demanding. 
 
It is often claimed that a proposition p is common knowledge among the agents in a 
population if and only if the following is the case: 
 
(everyone knows that)np 
 
for all n (Chant & Ernst, 2008, p. 553; Kutz, 2000, p. 6 n. 8; Miller, 2001, p. 59; see 
also Schiffer, 1972, pp. 30–31). This means that, if it is common knowledge between 
you and I that, say, each of us intends “that we J”, then everyone (that is, you and I 
each) knows…  
…that each intends “that we J” (n = 1) 
…that everyone knows that each intends “that we J” (n = 2) 
…that everyone knows that everyone knows that each intends “that we J” (n = 3)  
and so on and so forth ad infinitum.  
 
In light of this iterative definition of common knowledge, it may appear that 
common knowledge is unreachable by mere mortal adult humans. To have common 
knowledge, agents would have to know an infinite number of facts about their own 
and other agents’ higher-order knowledge (I will explain in section 2.1 why this 
infinite iteration of higher-order knowledge states seems to be necessary to 
adequately characterise what it is for a fact to be “out in the open”). Furthermore, 
these facts include facts about higher-order knowledge of an infinitely high order! In 
light of this, some philosophers have suggested that the CK-condition should be 
replaced by something weaker.28 Kutz argues that the condition may be too strong 
since common knowledge is a “cognitively demanding state” (2000, p. 6 n. 8).29 
                                                
28 Others appeal to an “unanalyzed” (Bratman 1992, p. 335 n. 15, 1993, p. 103 n. 20) 
or “intuitive” notion of common knowledge (Bratman 2009, p. 160; Alonso 2009, p. 
458 n. 44). Perhaps they do so because the analyses of common knowledge that are 
available strike them as psychologically implausible. 
29 Kutz suggests that Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) “weaker, and so more pliable, 
notion of mutual manifestness” is more appropriate than common knowledge (2000, 
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Similarly, Pacherie (2007) claims that “[t]he condition of mutual knowledge […] is 
difficult to satisfy and one may wonder whether such a strong condition is really 
necessary” (p. 166).30 I will argue that there is at least one account of common 
knowledge—namely David Lewis’ account—that is not susceptible to this general 
critique of common knowledge as being too cognitively demanding for finite beings 
like us.  
 
I will primarily be concerned with a more specific worry about the CK-condition in 
this chapter. Even if common knowledge does not (contrary to initial appearances) 
require of agents that they have infinite minds with infinite time on their hands, 
common knowledge arguably still requires of agents that they have the concept of 
belief. This is not a problem for the idea of common knowledge itself or for its 
applicability to the joint activities of cognitively normal adult humans. But it creates 
a dilemma for those who take the CK-condition to be a necessary condition on a 
multi-agent activity being a joint activity.31 As I pointed out in chapter 1, it appears 
on the face of it that agents who lack the concept of belief—such as young children 
and some non-human primates for example—do participate in joint activities. In 
effect, this appearance is either deceiving, or the CK-condition must be rejected as a 
necessary condition on what it takes for a multi-agent activity to be a genuine joint 
activity (Tollefsen, 2005; cf. Breheny, 2006). 
                                                                                                                                     
p. 6 n. 8). The notion of mutual manifestness is very close (but not identical) to 
Lewis’ notion of common knowledge though. As we shall see, contrary to what Kutz 
thinks, Lewis does not adopt the iterative definition of common knowledge (see 
footnote 41). 
30 Pacherie rejects the CK-condition in favour of a condition of what she calls 
“mutual presumption” (p. 171). This condition is satisfied if the participants act on 
the “implicit assumption that other human agents are sufficiently cognitively similar 
to us that their attitudes and intentions can be successfully simulated or inferred.” 
(Pacherie 2007, p. 171) 
31 As I explained in chapter 1, the conditions in Bratman’s account are not necessary 
conditions tout court. Instead, each of the three conditions is a necessary condition of 
a package that is sufficient for a shared intention to be in place, but this package is 
itself not necessary. There may be other packages of conditions that are also 
sufficient for a shared intention to be in place. I will henceforth set this complication 
aside in this chapter. 
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In this chapter, my aim is to accomplish the following: First, I want to defend the 
incorporation of a CK-condition in accounts of joint action. I claim that there is an 
intuitive notion of a rich and robust kind of joint action that does require that the 
goals or intentions of the participants are common knowledge among them. When it 
comes to such joint activity, in which adult human beings often participate, a CK-
condition is needed to rule out cases of multi-agent activity that introduce elements 
of “concealment” as cases of this robust kind of joint activity.32 But the CK-
condition also accomplishes something else: it allows us to make sense of the idea 
that agents can non-accidentally coordinate a multi-agent activity together. Arguably, 
that coordination of a multi-agent activity is non-accidental is required for the 
activity to count as a truly joint activity. Just as a complex individual activity is 
composed of non-accidentally coordinated component actions directed toward a goal 
(think of all the steps involved in preparing and cooking a meal for example), so a 
joint activity should be composed of non-accidentally coordinated component 
actions directed toward a goal. Secondly, I will argue that the introduction of a CK-
condition is not the only way of cashing out the idea that joint activity is non-
accidentally coordinated (even if common knowledge is necessary for ruling out the 
aforementioned “concealment” cases). Common knowledge is sufficient but not 
necessary: There are other forms of “openness” that can rule out accidentally 
coordinated multi-agent activities as examples of truly joint activities. Crucially, 
there is a form of openness that does not require of agents that they have the concept 
of belief.  
 
The upshot of this is that even when we restrict ourselves to small-scale highly 
reciprocal joint activities with only a few agents who are in each other’s presence, 
joint activities are not of one and the same sociopsychological kind. We do not have 
to consider cases such as online petitions, flash mobs, or large-scale industrial action 
to show that there are kinds of joint activities that differ from, for example, 
                                                
32 These concealment cases are similar to the cases that have motivated a CK-
condition in Gricean accounts of communication (Clark & Marshall, 1981; Schiffer, 
1972, pp. 17–30). 
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Bratman’s shared intentional activity. Cases of small-scale highly reciprocal joint 
activities such as social play and coordinated group hunting can demonstrate this too. 
Some such cases are of a kind that is more richly or robustly joint than others. The 
more robust forms require that the participants have more sophisticated socio-
cognitive capacities. I particular I argue that there are at least two everyday notions 
of small-scale and highly reciprocal joint activity, and these correspond to two 
sociopsychological kinds: one that requires of participants that they have common 
knowledge of each others intentions, the other than requires another kind of 
“openness” that does not require of participants that they have the concept of belief.33 
 
I will also look at two philosophical accounts of what common knowledge is. There 
are two reasons for doing this. First, to defend the CK-condition in an account of a 
particularly rich kind of genuine joint action, I need to establish that common 
knowledge is in fact achievable by finite beings like adult humans. Secondly, to 
establish that the joint activities of agents such as young children raise is a real 
dilemma, I have to look closer at accounts of common knowledge to conclude that 
common knowledge really requires agents to have the concept of belief. Hence, in 
the second part of the chapter, I present and critically discuss Schiffer’s and Lewis’s 
accounts of common knowledge. I argue that neither of these have the resources to 
make sense of the possibility of “openness” among agents who lack the concept of 
belief in a satisfactory way. I then go on, in the third part, to present some 
preliminary ideas regarding what openness (without common knowledge) might 
consist in. But first, I will explain why common knowledge is required for a kind of 
particularly rich kind of joint activity. 
 
2.1 The need for openness 
                                                
33 Note that focusing on openness and common knowledge is not the only way in 
which one can show that there are many kinds of joint activity, some conceptually or 
cognitively more sophisticated than others. In chapter 3, for example, I argue that not 
all joint activities involve intentions or goals with contents “that we J”. Instead they 
involve intentions or goals that, while they are not self-regarding, are not about the 
activity of one’s group either (see page 19). 
	   40	  
In the next two subsections, I present what I believe to be the two most convincing 
reasons for thinking that common knowledge is a defining feature of an intuitive 
notion of a particularly rich kind of joint activity. First, the CK-condition plays an 
important role in ruling out problematic cases that we, without the condition, would 
have to classify as instances of genuinely joint activity. This motivation for the CK-
condition underlies the frequent use of metaphors of openness, publicity and 
transparency in association with the introduction of the CK-condition. Secondly, the 
CK-condition seems to be required to capture the fact that when agents act jointly, 
their coordination is non-accidental. With the advent of common knowledge of each 
other’s goals or intentions, the coordination is supposed to become something that 
the participants achieve together.  
 
While I believe these two motivations for the CK-condition are the decisive ones, 
another reason behind the condition is to account for the role that shared intention 
plays in linguistic communication and joint planning. Given my focus on the joint 
activities that are not planned and that are carried out by relatively unsophisticated 
cognitive agents, such considerations in favour of the CK-condition is not so relevant 
for my purposes.34 Hence, I will not discuss them here. 
                                                
34 In his later work, Bratman takes the functional role of shared intention to provide 
the primary motivation for introducing a CK-condition (Bratman, 2009a, 2009b): 
“Since […] shared planning is part of the normal functioning of the shared intention, 
we need an element in our construction of shared intention whose functioning 
involves such thoughts and knowledge of each about our shared intention.” (2009a, 
p. 160) Shared planning requires communication, and, according to many accounts 
of communication, this requires common knowledge of background information 
relevant for interpreting utterances, as well as of the intentions of speakers (Schiffer, 
1972b; Clark, 1996; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). If these accounts are correct, then 
common knowledge will indeed be required for an account that takes shared 
planning to be part of the functional role of shared intention. The shift in Bratman’s 
motivation for the CK-condition between his earlier and later work on shared 
intention is accompanied by a slight change in what is supposed be common 
knowledge among participants according to the condition. In his later work, the CK-
condition requires that “there is common knowledge among the participants of the 
conditions cited in the construction”, where the ‘construction’ (the account) includes 
the CK-condition itself (2009b; 2009a, p.160). Now, on Bratman’s view, that there is 
common knowledge among participants that p implies that each participant actually 
believes that p (see 2009a, p 160). This means that for the CK-condition in his later 
account to be met, each participant must believe that “there is common knowledge 
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Note that the CK-condition is typically a condition on what must be the case for 
agents to have a shared intention, but since a joint activity is the outcome of a shared 
intention on most accounts, this condition must also be met for a multi-agent activity 
to count as a genuine joint activity. 
 
2.1.1 Ruling out concealment cases 
Consider the following case:  
 
Hector and Celia are two 7-year-old siblings. In light of their age, they are unusually 
sophisticated mindreaders. They are also quite unusual (again, in light of their age) 
in that they both still find the activity of building block towers very enjoyable and not 
at all silly. Now, they are both sitting on the floor at home, each in possession of a 
small bag with wooden blocks. Each has come to intend "that we build a block tower 
together". Furthermore, each intends this in accordance with and because of the 
other’s intention that they build a block tower together. Each also intends that their 
subplans for bringing about their common goal mesh. In other words, each at least 
represents (in the content of their own intentions) the other’s intention that they build 
a block tower together, as well as the fact that that the other has subplans for 
bringing the intended goal about. These attitudes of Hector and Celia cause them (in 
the appropriate way) to perform actions that together lead to the building of a block 
tower. 
 
It seems intuitively plausible to say that this building of the block tower by Hector 
and Celia is a genuine joint activity. Hector and Celia do not merely each intend to 
                                                                                                                                     
among the participants that [the conditions in Bratman’s account are met]”. On 
Bratman’s earlier account of shared intention, the CK-condition only required that 
the participants’ intentions “that we J” and the interdependence of these intentions 
were common knowledge among the participants. It was not explicitly required that 
the fact that the CK-condition was satisfied was itself an item of common knowledge 
(this is the more typical form of the CK-condition, see Alonso, 2009, p. 459; Pettit & 
Schweikard, 2006, p. 24).  
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perform a part of something that accidentally makes up a joint activity in some loose 
sense: The case is clearly different from that of two individuals who merely perform 
individual actions in parallel. From a theoretical perspective, the case also goes some 
way toward satisfying Bratman’s account of shared intention (see section 1.2.1).  
Conditions (1) and (2) of Bratman’s account would be satisfied.35 As described, it is 
not clear whether the CK-condition is also satisfied. However, our reactions to 
various elaborations of this case will reveal that in taking the case to be an intuitive 
example of a genuine joint activity, we take for granted that the CK-condition is 
satisfied too. (In the rest of this chapter, I will frame the discussion in terms of 
Bratman’s account, but note I am not here voicing what I think Bratman would say 
about common knowledge, but I am rather offering my own view of the topic. 
Bratman would not, I think, make the appeal to an everyday notion of joint action 
that I make here.) 
 
But consider whether the case is still an example of a genuinely joint activity in light 
of the following additional information:  
 
Hector has three yellow blocks and Celia has three red blocks. Earlier in the day, 
Celia told Hector that their parents would get very angry if they were to see the top 
face of any red block on the floor. However, Hector did not believe her, and he now 
thinks that Celia was trying to trick him into believing that their parents had an 
oddly negative attitude toward red blocks (let us assume that this is what she was 
trying to do, although this is not yet important). However, Celia has now completely 
forgotten that she told Hector this lie about their parents. Now, each still intends 
“that we build a block tower together”, and each does this in accordance with and 
because of the other’s intention. Each also intends that their subplans for bringing 
about that they build a block tower mesh. Because of what Celia told him earlier 
                                                
35 We could also gloss the case without appeal to plan-intentions, and describe it 
merely in terms of beliefs and desires that cause goal-directed actions. In such terms, 
the activity of each is directed toward the goal “that we build a block tower 
together”. The actions of each of them is sensitive to the other’s goal, so each acts (or 
will act) on their goal because they believe that the other’s activity is directed toward 
that same goal. 
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about their parents, Hector now believes (erroneously) that Celia believes that he 
intends “that the top face of any red block is covered” (rather than that he intends 
“that we build a block tower together”). These attitudes cause them (in the 
appropriate way) to take turns putting blocks on top of each other: let us say that 
Celia starts the process by putting down a red block on the floor and combined result 
of their actions is the building of a block tower.  
 
Now, from Hector’s point of view, what is happening is fully consistent with his 
mistaken belief. Note that if Celia indeed would have put down the red blocks with 
the intention “that we build a block tower together” not in accordance with Hector’s 
intention that they do the same, but because she thought that she could exploit his 
attempt to avoid the wrath of their parents, then their turn-taking would lead to 
exactly same behavioural interaction as that which their actual intentions and beliefs 
results in. Furthermore, everything I said about the case before adding the 
information about Hector’s false belief about Celia’s belief about his own intention 
still holds true. But does it remain an example of a genuinely joint activity? I think 
not. It does not seem to be the paradigm case of joint action that it was before the 
introduction of Hector’s false belief. Arguably, it ought to be the case that each of 
Hector and Celia intends “that we build a block tower together” not only because the 
other intends the same, but also because they believe that the other's intention is 
reciprocally sensitive to their own intention. As the case has just been described, 
Hector believes that the fact that he intends that they build a block tower together is 
not a consideration that in any way motivates Celia’s intention that they build a block 
tower together. From Hector’s point of view, Celia is exploiting the fact that he 
behaves in a certain way, in order to achieve her own personal goal. Hector will then, 
in turn, see himself as exploiting this alleged fact about Celia in order to achieve his 
own personal goal. From his mistaken perspective, Celia intends that they build a 
block tower together not only if he intends the same, but also if he intends that the 
top face of any red block is covered or anything else that would lead him to stack his 
blocks on top of hers. In other words, she is not responsive in the appropriate way to 
his intention. As long as what he intends leads to behaviour that complements what 
she is doing in a way that helps her reach her goal, she will maintain and act on her 
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intention. Now, Hector is using this alleged fact about her, that her intention is 
responsive to his behaviour in this way, to successfully realise his own intention that 
they build a block tower together. From Hector’s point of view, they are each, one 
might say, merely using the other as a tool. This seems to jar with what constitutes 
“genuine jointness”. To make the point more vividly, suppose that Hector thinks that 
Celia is a teaser who is determined not to do whatever he intends to do. Accordingly, 
Hector falsely believes that, if Celia recognised his intention that they build a block 
tower together then she would not intend the same. But since he thinks that she is 
mistaken about what his intention is, he can go on and act on his intention that they 
build a block tower together. Here, he would perform his part of the building of the 
block tower thinking that he was exploiting Celia’s mistaken perspective on what is 
supposedly guiding his behaviour. Note that if this happened, conditions (1) and (2) 
could still be satisfied. There ought to be no doubt (or higher-order doubt) about the 
fact that no one is trying to exploit or deceive in the way illustrated by the case.  
 
To rule this kind of case out, let us add a belief-condition to Bratman’s first two 
conditions. In order for the J-ing of two agents A and B to be genuinely joint, the J-
ing must be the outcome of the following pattern of attitudes among A and B: 
 
(1) (a) A intends “that we J” and (b) B intends “that we J”. 
(2) A intends “that we J” in accordance with and because of (1a), (1b), and 
meshing subplans of (1a) and (1b); B intends the same. 
(3) (a) A believes (1) and (2) and (b) B believes (1) and (2). 
 
The third condition takes care of rules out the case where Hector has the false belief 
about Celia’s belief about his intention. If (3) is satisfied, then Hector believes that 
Celia intends that they build a block tower together in accordance with his own 
intention that they build a block tower together. If he believes this then he cannot 
also believe that Celia believes that his intention is “that the top surface of any red 
block is covered”. 
 
	   45	  
Unfortunately, these conditions do not appear to be sufficient for ruling out cases that 
are similarly problematic. We can construct a case where all of (1), (2) and (3) are 
satisfied, but which we arguably would not want to classify as a case of a robust kind 
of genuine joint activity. Consider the following additional modification of the case 
with Hector and Celia:  
 
Celia remembers lying to Hector about their parents’ unfavourable attitude toward 
uncovered top faces of red blocks. However, Celia’s blocks are in fact green rather 
than red. In light of this, Hector no longer has any reason to think that Celia is under 
the impression that he now intends “that every red block is covered with a yellow 
block” (rather than “that we build a block tower together). So each correctly 
believes that the other intends “that we build the block tower together” in 
accordance with and because of their own intention “that we build a block tower 
together” (hence, the above conditions (1), (2) and (3) are fulfilled). Now, Hector 
has recently been amusing himself by pretending to be colour blind while hanging 
out with Celia. In particular, he has recently been consistently calling green objects 
‘red’. Celia knows that there is nothing wrong with Hector’s colour vision or grasp 
of the colour vocabulary, but she (falsely) believes that his pretence was a genuine 
attempt to mislead her. Furthermore, she thinks that he thinks that she has in fact 
been misled. In other words, Celia falsely believes that Hector thinks that she thinks 
that he is colour blind and under the impression that her blocks are red rather than 
green. As a result, Celia now believes that Hector thinks that she intends “that we 
build a block tower together” not in accordance with his similar intention but in 
light of his putative intention “that every red block is covered with a yellow box”. 
But in fact, it has not even occurred to Hector that Celia might think that he thinks 
that she thinks that he is colour blind. He never intended to deceive Celia regarding 
his colour vision or his ordinary use of the terms ‘red’ and ‘green’. 
 
Now, we could add the following condition to our Bratmanian account of shared 
intention:   
 
(4) (a) A belives (3) and (b) B believes (3). 
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Such a condition would rule out the modified case just discussed since according to 
(4), for block-tower building to be a genuinely joint activity, it must be the outcome 
of a pattern of attitudes that includes Celia’s belief that Hector believes that she 
intends that they build a block tower together in accordance with his intention that 
they build a block tower together. However, it would now be possible to construct 
even more complicated cases that still would not strike us as being instances of 
genuinely joint activity. Intuitively, in a genuine joint activity, the attitudes that drive 
the actions of the individuals are, metaphorically speaking “above board”, 
“completely out in the open” etc. What is problematic with the information that we 
have been adding to the original case with Hector and Celia is that it introduces an 
element of concealment, brought about by deception, manipulation, 
misunderstanding, or by some higher-order suspicion that such an element is present 
at a lower level. 
 
Since the CK-condition is typically introduced into accounts of shared intention and 
joint action without explicit rationale, it is hard to say whether ruling out 
concealment cases accurately reflects what the condition is supposed to achieve 
according to various authors. As far as I know, Pettit and Schweikard (2006) are the 
only authors who explicitly motivate the CK-condition with an appeal to a 
concealment case. They consider the case where two people, you and I, have 
intentions “that we J” that are interdependent in the right way, but where common 
knowledge about this fails to obtain because, “for example, you might regard me, 
wrongly, as someone who takes you to be acting like a zombie, as if under hypnotic 
suggestion.” (p. 23) In light of this (briefly described!) example, they suggest that 
“we need to introduce a […] clause that serves to silence it and any other possibility 
of the same kind. The clause stipulates that everything amongst the parties is above 
board.” (Pettit & Schweikard, 2006, p. 23) The thought is presumably that if one is 
acting under hypnosis, then one’s behaviour isn’t guided by one’s beliefs and goals 
in the appropriate way, and this undermines a type of mutual responsiveness that is 
characteristic of genuine joint action. If I believe that you believe that I am under 
hypnotic suggestion, then I believe that you are merely exploiting the fact that I 
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behave in a certain way in order to achieve your own goal, and I will thus, in turn, 
see myself as exploiting this alleged fact about you in order to achieve my own goal. 
Pettit and Schweikard appeals, like I do, to an everyday intuitive notion of a kind 
joint action, a kind that they characterise as “properly joint” and that involves 
“unforced cooperation” (2006, pp. 20, 22–24). 
 
I believe that ruling out such cases is one decisive reason for having a CK-condition 
in an account of shared intention. As I have pointed out, this kind of motivation for a 
CK-condition parallels that which has led some philosophers of language of 
introduce a CK-condition in Gricean accounts of communication (Clark & Marshall, 
1981; Schiffer, 1972, pp. 17–30). It might be objected that while there is a robust 
intuitive notion of genuine communication, there is no such corresponding intuitive 
notion of joint action. Hence, intuitions telling us that some case or other is not really 
a case of genuine joint action must be taken with a grain of salt. In a sense, I think 
this is right. One of my aims of this chapter is, after all, to argue that there are many 
notions of genuinely joint activity. But I want to insist that there is something 
missing from the concealment cases that make them less genuinely joint than cases 
were the relevant beliefs and intentions or goals of the participants are, as it were, 
“completely out in the open”. Rather than thinking of multi-agent activities as simply 
either being properly joint or else not being joint at all, it is better to think of a 
continuum of increasingly joint cases of multi-agent activity. What I am claiming 
here is that the satisfaction of a CK-condition constitutes a step up toward increasing 
jointness on such a continuum. 
 
Note that the modifications that introduce concealment into the block tower building 
case are only possible if Hector and Celia are mindreaders with sophisticated 
metarepresentational abilities. If they were slightly younger, and thus lacking the 
concept of belief, then these problematic cases could not arise.36 So what is arguably 
                                                
36 A very robust finding in developmental psychology is that children fail at so-called 
elicited-response false belief tasks before 3 to 5 years of age (Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2000). This suggests that younger children lack the concept of belief and do 
not interpret the behaviours of others in terms of a robust “Theory of Mind” (ToM). 
This interpretation of the false belief task data is not uncontroversial, but I will in this 
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the main motivation for introducing the CK-condition in accounts of joint action is 
actually undermined when the agents involved lack the concept of belief.37 But this 
does not mean that the CK-condition is not needed when the participants do have the 
concept of belief. 
 
If ruling out concealment was the only valid motivation for introducing the CK-
condition, then we could now drop the condition in the context of an account of joint 
activity with participants who lack the concept of belief. This raises the question of 
whether there is a kind of joint action that agents who entirely lack concepts of the 
mental or intentional (including the concept of goal) could engage in. Of course, 
Bratman’s account, even without the CK-condition, could not be an account of that 
kind of joint action, since condition (2) demands of participants that they have 
intentions concerning both their own intentions and the intentions of others.38 For 
such creatures, should we not even require that each has a first-order belief about the 
other’s goal for there to be genuine jointness? Consider again the case Hector and 
Celia building a block tower, but suppose they both have severe forms of autism. 
Neither of them, let us suppose, have any mental state concepts at all. Nevertheless, 
they are both skilled at predicting what the other will do in terms of behavioural 
regularities. In particular, they know that whenever they put down a block of their 
own colour the other will put down a block of the other colour on top of that block. 
Each has the goal to build a block tower, and on the basis of the knowledge of the 
regularity in the other’s behaviour, they can each exploit the other’s contribution to 
achieve their personal goal of building a block tower. In this case, each agent’s 
                                                                                                                                     
chapter assume that it is correct. 
37 Presumably, this also undermines the main motivation for insisting on a CK-
condition in accounts of communication when applied to the communicative 
utterances of young children. But since communicative intentions, on the Gricean 
view, are intentions to induce a belief in an audience, the fact that children who 
arguably lack the concept of belief appear to make communicative utterances is still 
puzzling for Gricean accounts of communication. 
38 Note that there are good reasons to doubt that young children who lack a robust 
Theory of Mind are able to satisfy Bratman’s second condition even if they have 
some metarepresentational capacities (Butterfill, 2012; Tollefsen, 2005). I set this 
issue aside here in order to focus on common knowledge and openness. 
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expectation about the other’s response to their own block placement will be correct 
in virtue of the fact that they have a common goal, but neither of them represents the 
other’s goal.  
 
Perhaps such “mindblind” coordination characterises the multi-agent activities of 
some non-human animals, such as the pack hunting of wolves or hyenas for example. 
The individuals have a common goal and thanks to their ability to predict the 
behaviour of the other individuals in the pack, they can adapt their own goal pursuit 
to the others’ behaviours in way that maximises their chance of achieving their goal. 
(I elaborate on what it means for several individuals to have a common goal in the 
next chapter). Again, we have a case where each agent seems to be exploiting the 
other to reach his or her own goal. While there isn’t an element of “concealment” 
present in this case, there is a lack of transparency. Each participant is blind to the 
goal of the other. I will call such cases “opacity cases”. Now, I cannot think of any 
good principled reason for not calling such a multi-agent activity “joint” in a weak 
sense of the term. This would constitute yet another kind of joint activity, which is 
even less rich than that which applies to most joint activities involving young 
children for example, who do seem to have the concept of goal if not belief. 
 
As it happens, ruling out concealment and opacity cases is not the only role that 
common knowledge is supposed to play in accounts of joint action. There is another 
important motivation for the introduction of a CK-condition.  
 
2.1.2 Making coordination non-accidental 
When two or more agents are faced with a “coordination problem”, the outcomes of 
the action alternatives open to each agent depend on which actions the others settle 
on. Here is a mundane case: Say that you and I want to meet up at noon. It does not 
matter for either of us where we meet, but in order to reach our goal of meeting each 
other, both must go to the same location (wherever that is) at noon. The best choice 
of where to go for each is determined by the other’s choice of where to go. So, in 
order to successfully and reliably meet in the same place, each of us needs to have a 
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justified expectation about where the other is about to go. But how is this possible 
given that our expectations about each other’s destination are interdependent? Where 
I ought to go depends on where you ought to go, which in turn depends on where I 
ought to go, which again, in turn, depends on where you ought to go, and so on and 
so forth.   
 
Clearly, we can “solve” this kind of coordination problem by, for example, explicitly 
agreeing beforehand about where to meet. Now consider what kind of knowledge 
about each other that we must have in order to pull off this coordination if we have 
explicitly agreed to meet in Bristo Square at noon. It is not sufficient that both of us 
believe that the location for our meeting is Bristo Square. After all, if I do not also 
believe that you believe that the location for our meeting is Bristo Square, then it is 
not at all clear that I will meet you if I go to Bristo Square. This is because my only 
reason for going to Bristo Square rather than some other location is that you believe 
this is the meeting point. So if I go to Bristo Square lacking the belief about your 
belief about the location of our meeting, it will in a sense be a matter of luck if we 
happen to meet each other there. The same could of course be said of you. 
Unfortunately, the situation is not improved if each of us not only believes that the 
location for our meeting is Bristo Square but also believes that the other believes 
this. If I do not also believe that you believe that I believe the location of our meeting 
is Bristo Square, then it is not at all clear that I will meet you if I go to Bristo Square. 
After all, we have just established that if you do not believe that I believe the 
location for our meeting is Bristo Square, then it would be a matter of luck (from 
your point of view) if you happen to meet me in case you go to Bristo Square. So, if I 
do not believe that this is something you believe, then I have no reason to expect that 
you go to Bristo Square rather than to some other location. Again, it seems that if I 
go to Bristo Square and meet you there, I ought to be pleasantly surprised. It would 
be appropriate for me to exclaim, “Oh, you decided to go here too! That’s great!” 
But if we had explicitly agreed to meet at Bristo Square, as stipulated, then this 
would not be an appropriate thing to say. But my (third-order) belief about your 
belief about my belief would not stop the exclamation from being inappropriate 
either. In fact, no finite level of higher-order belief would be sufficient to make sense 
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of the intuition that this exclamation would be highly inappropriate! What is needed 
to make sense of the intuition is the following: When we explicitly agree to meet at 
Bristo Square, the fact that the location of our meeting place is Bristo Square 
becomes “above board”, “completely out in the open”, or common knowledge 
between us. This suggests a desideratum that any account of common knowledge 
should meet. As Gilbert points out, 
in seeking an account of common knowledge one is in part seeking an account of a 
phenomenon such that, for a given proposition p, acts which are premised on the 
belief or assumption that p will surprise no one if this phenomenon is present. 
(Gilbert, 1989, p. 194) 
 
In the context of joint action, when two agents have a shared intention to do 
something their experience of the other’s actions that are performed in pursuit of the 
shared intention will be characterised by a lack of surprise. If we cut off the regress 
of higher-order beliefs at any finite level, all the levels below will be undermined, 
including the first-order belief that the location of our meeting is Bristo Square. 
Hence, if we go there and encounter each other, surprise will be an appropriate 
response.  
 
The claim here is merely that the occurrence of surprise indicates the absence of 
common knowledge. I am not suggesting that lack of surprise itself is a reliable mark 
of common knowledge. Actions premised on the belief or assumption that p may not 
surprise for other reasons than because it is common knowledge that p (and even if it 
is not common knowledge that p). For example, each of us might receive an email 
from a third party informing us that if we go to Bristo Square at noon, the other will 
be there too. Given that we trust the testimony of this third party, each of us might 
arrive at Bristo Square to meet the other as expected. Here, our first-order 
expectation is the result of a common cause, rather than the result of an agreement 
that is the basis for common knowledge. 
 
Some kind of “openness” (in the sense that things are entirely expected, rather than 
that they are not hidden or concealed) seems to be required for coordination of action 
to be non-accidental, and arguably, it is part of our intuitive notion of joint action 
that it is non-accidentally brought about. In support of this, we can draw on an 
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analogy with complex individual activities. The moves a climber makes as he scales 
a rock face are non-accidentally coordinated with each other to combine in such a 
way that they bring the climber to the top. If they are not coordinated in this way, 
then we have reason to question whether it was his agency that brought him to the 
top rather than mere luck (there just happened to be holds in the rock face in the right 
places for him get up there). In order for two agents to act jointly, their actions must 
be non-accidentally coordinated in a similar manner.  
 
The problem that the CK-condition is supposed to solve is not that lack of common 
knowledge undermines the participants’ confidence in successfully bringing about a 
collective outcome. This may be an unwelcome consequence of not having common 
knowledge though. Lack of common knowledge may either undermine a 
participant’s ability to form the intentions mentioned in Bratman’s conditions (1) and 
(2) (assuming a strong belief condition on intention) or it may make it imprudent for 
her to act on these intentions. Consider what happens if it would be much more 
inconvenient for me if I went to Bristo Square but failed to meet up with you than if I 
gave up trying to coordinate and instead stayed at home. Assume that the same is 
true of you.39 If the location of our meeting were not common knowledge between us 
in this case, then it wouldn’t be prudentially rational to go to Bristo Square for either 
of us. In addition, if we assume a strong belief condition on intention, then neither of 
us could even form an intention “that we meet at Bristo square”. Hence, lack of 
common knowledge could thwart our attempts to act on our intentions, as well as 
stop us from meeting other conditions that must be met for us to share an intention. 
But if we assume that our problem of deciding whether or not to go to Bristo Square 
                                                
39 A more dramatic but analogous case is that of the Coordinated Attack Problem, 
also known as the Generals’ Paradox (Campbell, 2005; Gray, 1978, pp. 465–466; 
Rubinstein, 1989; Wilby, 2010). In their discussion of the role of higher-order beliefs 
and common knowledge in joint action, Chant and Ernst (2008) use the Coordinated 
Attack Problem to make the point that common knowledge is sometimes required for 
shared intentions to be formed and joint action come about. What they want to 
analyse is the “role of interactive [higher-order] knowledge in generating collective 
intentions.” (p. 555, my emphasis) I am concerned with a slightly different question, 
namely why common knowledge should be taken to be a constitutive element of a 
particularly strong notion of joint action. 
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at noon has a different pay-off structure, or if we assume a less strict belief condition 
on intention, then this need not be the case.40 Thus, these considerations do not cut to 
the heart of why common knowledge of each other’s intentions and beliefs is a 
necessary component in an account of an intuitive notion of genuinely joint activity.  
 
Note that this motivation for the CK-condition is not undermined if the agents lack 
the concept of belief. While the problem with the case I presented here – you and I 
coordinating to meet at Bristo Square at noon by having merely finite levels of 
higher-order beliefs – assumed that we possessed the concept of belief, the intuition 
that the coordination ought to be non-accidental in genuinely joint action does not 
itself depend on agents having the concept of belief. After all, coordination problems 
arise not only when agents’ higher-order beliefs have to be coordinated, but also in 
attempts by two people to perform interdependent bodily actions in a coordinated 
fashion.  Say that Hector and Celia decide to build a platform on their tower. Above 
the platform, they build a tower-structure each on opposite sides of the platform (so 
that the tower splits up into two turrets after the platform). In order to avoid having 
the structure collapse, they have to simultaneously place their blocks on each side of 
the platform, or it will fall over. Whether t1 (rather than t2)  is the right time for 
Hector to release his grip on his block to let it rest on the platform will thus depend 
on whether t1 is the right time for Celia to do so, and this will, in turn, depend on 
whether t1 is the right time for Hector to do so, and so on back and forth. Note that 
the coordination problem of getting themselves and the other to both act at t1 does 
not depend on the metarepresentational abilities of Hector and Celia, but it is simply 
imposed by the task that they are facing together (note that my point is that the 
                                                
40 Tuomela and Miller’s reason for introducing the CK-condition in (1988, pp. 55–
57) seem to be that, without common knowledge, participants’ confidence in success 
(in the other doing their part of the joint action) will be undermined, and they will 
therefore not be able to intend to their own part of the joint action. Ludwig (2007) 
argues against this claim, and submits that “it is not required that members of a group 
even believe that others will play their parts in a joint action which they nevertheless 
intend to do and perform intentionally.” (p. 387) Elsewhere, Tuomela (2007, p. 113) 
seems to argue that a CK-condition is needed because it typically won’t be 
prudentially rational to participate in joint action without it. Note that this is slightly 
different from arguing that common knowledge is required for having the requisite 
intentions as a matter of conceptual necessity. 
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problem does not depend on such abilities, not that solutions to the problem do not 
depend on such abilities).  
 
To sum up, the two main motivations for the CK-condition are the following: (i) to 
rule out concealment cases that are in tension with an intuitive notion of genuine 
joint activity; and (ii) to make sense of the idea that coordination in genuine joint 
activity is achieved non-accidentally by the participants. Motivation (i) is 
undermined when it comes to participants who lack the concept of belief, but a 
similar type of case, opacity cases, reveals that there is an intuitively important 
difference between, on the one hand, joint activities where coordination is enabled by 
first-order beliefs about the goals of the other participants, and, on the other hand, 
joint activities where coordination is enabled by mere “smart behaviour reading”. In 
contrast, (ii) remains important regardless of the metarepresentational capacities that 
the participants are equipped with. While it is clear that something like the infinite 
regress implied by common knowledge is required by (i), common knowledge may 
be just one of many ways in which the openness required by (ii) can be provided. 
 
I have so far argued that both reasons for introducing a CK-condition in accounts of 
joint action with cognitive normal mindreading adults are reasons that should be 
taken seriously. But if the CK-condition is in general too cognitively demanding, or 
even completely psychologically implausible, then we might have to revise our 
intuitive notion of what is involved such genuine joint action. In the next section, I 
present and critically discuss how Schiffer (1972) and Lewis (1969) have tried to 
make the infinite regress associated with common knowledge compatible with a 
commitment to psychological realism. In the case of Lewis’ account, I also consider 
whether common knowledge really requires that agents have the concept of belief. If 
it doesn’t, then perhaps it can both help us rule out concealment cases and make 
sense of a kind of openness that agents lacking the concept of belief can participate 
in. However, I conclude that if Lewis’ account is to be at all informative, then it will 
require that agents have the concept of belief. 
 
2.2 Common knowledge as a virtual infinite regress 
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We have already encountered the iterative definition of common knowledge: A 
proposition p is common knowledge between the agents in a group if and only if 
 
(everyone knows that)np 
 
for all n. If this was true of Hector and Celia for example, then the concealment cases 
that we came up with would indeed be ruled out. In addition, the openness required 
for non-accidental coordination to occur would be in place. But how could common 
knowledge construed in this way play a role in the real-time decision-making of 
agents with mere bounded rationality and finite minds? The definition seems to 
demand from agents that they have beliefs with infinite inexhaustible content (“I 
believe that you believe that I believe…ad infinitum). Furthermore, to ascertain that 
no concealment is present, or that coordination is indeed non-accidental in the 
requisite way, the agents must presumably make an infinite number of inferences to 
an infinite number of beliefs (unless they could somehow all appear simultaneously 
and non-inferentially?). Thus, the iterative definition seems to make common 
knowledge into a mere ideal state of affairs that will never realised in the actual 
world where joint action happens. So by introducing a CK-condition to rule out 
problematic concealment cases and capture the sense in which coordination in join 
action is non-accidental, we face the problem of articulating a psychologically 
realistic account of common knowledge.  
 
I will here explore two ways in which the infinite regress of the iterative definition 
can be made harmless (in Schiffer’s account) or avoided entirely (in Lewis’ account). 
  
2.2.1 Virtualising the infinite regress with dispositional beliefs 
(Schiffer) 
The iterative definition becomes outrageously unrealistic only if we assume that each 
proposition in the definiens must be the content of an occurrent belief that each agent 
actively considers. This would obviously make common knowledge unattainable 
given the iterative definition of common knowledge. If one also thinks that an 
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occurrent belief is something like a tokened sentence in a language of thought, then 
the notion of occurrent beliefs of an infinitely high order becomes absurd. But those 
who subscribe to the iterative definition of common knowledge clearly do not 
embrace these assumptions. According to Schiffer (1972) – as far as I know the first 
to propose this definition41 – the beliefs (or knowledge-states) referred to in the 
definiens may merely be dispositional beliefs (or “standing beliefs” as they are also 
called). Consider Schiffer’s following defence of his iterative account in response to 
two potential objections:42 
First, it is no objection to the claim that S knows that p that the thought that p never 
once entered S's head. For example, I trust that it is true of each philosophy don in 
Oxford that he knows that his maternal grandmother was never married to Benito 
Mussolini. Second, it is no objection to the claim that S knows A knows S knows A 
knows S knows that p that S may have to be “convinced” or “brought to see” that he 
is entitled to claim to know this. I doubt that many a non-philosopher would agree 
right off the bat that he knows that he knows that he knows that 843 + 2 = 845. 
(Schiffer, 1972, p. 36) 
 
This makes the infinite regress into a merely “virtual” one. There is no obvious 
reason why the number of dispositional beliefs should be finite, nor why the contents 
of the beliefs couldn’t be explicated without appeal to the notion of infinity. Now, I 
am not saying that Schiffer’s response to the two objections he considers do not lead 
to some complications, because they do. Presumably, the point of the last sentence in 
the quote above is that while the non-philosopher wouldn’t agree “off the bat” that he 
knows that he knows that he knows that 843 + 2 = 845, the non-philosopher would 
nevertheless know this since he could be brought to see that he should accept it. Even 
if Schiffer is correct about the general point that one believes many things which has 
never crossed one’s mind and which one would have to work hard to infer, it seems 
                                                
41 The iterative definition is very often erroneously attributed to Lewis’s earlier work 
Convention from 1969 (see e.g. Campbell, 2002, p. 160; Kutz, 2000, p. 6 n. 8; 
Skyrms, 2009, pp. 137–138). However, the iterative definition is nowhere to be 
found in (Lewis 1969). 
42 Note that Schiffer’s account also includes a characterisation of how the infinite 
regress of higher-order beliefs can follow from a finite basis (similar to Lewis’ 
basis). But Schiffer, unlike Lewis, identifies what it is to have common knowledge 
with having the beliefs in the infinite regress rather with being in a situation that 
provides the finite basis. See Wilby (2010) for a lucid discussion of this aspect of 
Schiffer’s account (see also Peacocke, 2005). 
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implausible to say that every proposition that one has reason to believe is the content 
of a dispositional belief that one has. This would imply that one knows all truths 
about mathematics if one accepts certain mathematical axioms and principles. This is 
at least in conflict with everyday notions of belief and knowledge. Perhaps this is not 
something we need to worry about, but there is a more serious problem with relying 
on dispositional beliefs to virtualise the infinite regress. The problem is that it is hard 
to see how common knowledge could make a difference for experience and action if 
the infinite regress is merely one of dispositional beliefs.43 
 
Note that it isn’t required that the agents themselves grasp that they are in a situation 
of common knowledge for the purpose of ruling out concealment cases. That is not 
something that the agents themselves are concerned with. The CK-condition rules 
out concealment cases for us analysts who are trying to account for what needs to be 
the case for them, the agents, to be involved in a genuine joint action. However, it is 
different when it comes to the second motivation for the CK-condition. It looks like 
participants need to have an occurrent grasp of the fact that they have common 
knowledge (rather than some finite level of higher-order belief) in order to be able to 
together coordinate a multi-agent activity in a non-accidental manner. If you and I 
cannot distinguish between the case of having common knowledge that the location 
for our meeting is Bristo Square on the one hand, and the case of merely having 
finite higher-order beliefs about the location of our meeting, then neither of us would 
be able to make a reliable judgement about whether it would make sense for me to go 
to Bristo Square at noon or not. I would then not be able to judge whether or not I 
would be surprised in case I went to Bristo Square and met you there.  
 
So, on the one hand, it looks like the state of common knowledge must be graspable 
somehow, in order to make an impact of the experience and judgements of the 
                                                
43 The higher-order dispositional beliefs do reflect a kind of awareness of their 
contents only in the following sense: If you and I have common knowledge that p, 
then if someone would query either of us about whether you believe that p, whether I 
believe that you believe that I believe that p, or whether you believe that I believe p 
(for example), then we would both answer affirmatively (see Pettit & Schweikard, 
2006, pp. 23–24). 
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participants (Gilbert, 1989, p. 193; Heal, 1978). But if common knowledge is 
identified by the infinite set of higher-order beliefs as in the iterative definition, then 
such an occurrent grasp seems to be psychologically impossible.  
 
2.2.2 Virtualising the infinite regress with reasons to believe 
(Lewis) 
I will look in more detail at what is arguably the seminal philosophical account of 
common knowledge: namely the account presented in Lewis’ Convention (1969). 
There are good reasons for focusing on this account in particular. Like Schiffer’s 
account, it avoids the most straightforward objections to the effect that common 
knowledge is unattainable in the real world. Furthermore, it is the account that is 
most prominent in the philosophical literature on shared intention and joint action. 
Bratman frequently refers to Lewis’ account as an example from “a large literature 
on common knowledge” (1999, p. 102 n. 15, p. 117 n. 20; see also 1999 p. 111, n. 8, 
where he refers to Lewis’ notion of a ‘basis for common knowledge’). When 
Bratman does say something more substantial about common knowledge, it is always 
consistent with Lewis’ account (see e.g. Bratman 1999, pp.102, 139, 2009a, p.160). 
Pettit and Schweikard (2006, pp. 23-24) straightforwardly refer to Lewis (1969) as 
the source of their notion of common knowledge. Gilbert (1990) notes that “[e]xactly 
how to define [common knowledge] is somewhat moot” (p. 13 n. 4) and then refers 
to Lewis (1969), Schiffer (1972), Heal (1978), and her own account (Gilbert, 1989, 
pp. 186–197). In light of its prominent position, an interesting question is whether 
Lewis’ account can provide what is requested from it within the context of theories 
of shared intentionality and agency. 
 
Like Schiffer, Lewis sidesteps the objections concerning psychological realism by 
virtualising the infinite regress that is associated with the notion of common 
knowledge. But Lewis does this by putting the regress entirely outside the heads of 
the individuals involved. The infinite regress is not even a regress of dispositional 
beliefs, but a regress of reasons to believe.44 Furthermore, unlike Schiffer, Lewis 
                                                
44 As Vanderschraaf & Sillari (2009) notes, “it would be more appropriate to speak 
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doesn’t define common knowledge in terms of this regress, but in terms of a state of 
affairs called a basis for common knowledge, from which the infinite regress can be 
derived. For example, when we agree to meet at Bristo Square at noon, our making 
the agreement constitutes a basis for common knowledge about where we will meet 
at noon. And on this basis, we can each expect the other to be at Bristo Square at 
noon, and if we set cognitive limitations aside for a moment, each of us would on 
this basis also be justified in having higher-order expectations about these 
expectations of a potentially infinitely high order. 45 A basis for common knowledge 
need not be an explicit agreement of course, it could also be shared habit or practice 
(we always meet at Bristo Square), or an environment that we both inhabit and 
perceive and both perceive that the other perceives (if we sit facing each other at the 
floor with half-built block tower between us, then this situation constitutes a basis for 
our common knowledge that there is a half-built block tower between us).46 
 
Lewis characterises the conditions under which common knowledge obtains in the 
following way: 
 
Let us say that it is common knowledge in a population P that [q] if and only if some 
state of affairs A holds such that: 
 (1) Everyone in P has reason to believe that A holds. 
 (2) A indicates to everyone in P that everyone in P has reason to believe 
that A holds. 
                                                                                                                                     
of ‘common reason to believe’” instead of ‘common knowledge’ as the target 
phenomenon of Lewis’ account. 
45 Lewis interchangeably refers to higher-order ‘expectations’ and higher-order 
‘beliefs’ (see p. 55). I therefore assume that he takes an expectation to simply be a 
belief about some future event. Note that there is nothing in Lewis’s account that 
necessarily restricts the content of common knowledge to concern the future though. 
46 Bratman gives the following example of a case where two agents get common 
knowledge of each other’s intentions and beliefs in the way required for them to have 
a shared intention, without recourse to any explicit communication: Two strangers 
arrive at a public basketball court and starts to take turns shooting even if they do not 
explicitly agree on taking turns shooting (Bratman, 1999, p. 139). Here, the idea is 
that the social setting makes it common knowledge that each intends that they do 
this, and that each intends to do it by way of the other’s intention to do the same. 
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 (3) A indicates to everyone in P that [q]. 
We can call any such state of affairs A a basis for common knowledge in P that [q]. 
(Lewis, 1969, p. 56) 
 
He explains what it is for a state of affairs to indicate something to someone in the 
following way:  
 
Let us say that A indicates to someone x that [q] if and only if, if x had reason to 
believe that A held, x would thereby have reason to believe that [q]. What A 
indicates to x will depend, therefore, on x’s inductive standards and background 
information. (Lewis, 1969, p. 53) 
 
The account builds on the idea that the potentially infinite chain of higher-order 
expectations can be generated from a basis that is finite. Since we agree to meet at 
Bristo Square, we both have reason to believe that the agreement has been made. 
After all, we speak the same language and each understands what the other says. Our 
exchange of speech acts also indicates to each of us that both of us have reason to 
believe that the agreement has been made. In addition, the state of affairs that we are 
part of indicates to both of us that we will meet at Bristo Square at noon.  
 
With a basis for common knowledge, something very much like the infinite list of 
justified higher-order beliefs in the iterative definition follows:  
 
I	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  [q]	  [from	  (1)	  and	  (3)]	  
You	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  [q]	  [from	  (1)	  and	  (3)	  
I	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  you	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  [q]	  [from	  (1),	  (2)	  
and	  (3)]	  
You	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  I	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  [q]	  [from	  (1),	  (2)	  
and	  (3)]	  and	  so	  on	  into	  infinity	  [from	  (1),	  (2)	  and	  (3)]	  
	  
While Lewis distinguishes ‘reason to believe’ from ‘actual belief’, he does not say 
much about what having a reason to believe involves. That an agent has a reason to 
believe that p at least does not imply that the agent actually believes that p. Lewis’ 
“actual beliefs” seem to include all one’s occurrent beliefs, but perhaps they also 
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include some subset of his dispositional beliefs. He talks about the actual (higher-
order) beliefs as being “formed” or “generated” (see e.g. p. 56) from a basis of 
common knowledge, and their formation is the result of “actual reasoning” (p. 55). 
This surely sounds like he is talking about the formation of occurrent or consciously 
entertained beliefs. But at same time, it seems like Lewis takes what one believes 
(simpliciter) to include more than what one occurrently entertains or consciously 
endorses. Otherwise it is hard to make sense of his claim that “[a]nyone who has 
reason to believe something will come to believe it, provided he has a sufficient 
degree of rationality.” (p. 55)47 
 
Lewis’ account has the advantage that the infinite number of propositions about 
beliefs that is contained in the definiens of the iterative definition, each of which one 
has reason to believe is true, need not be part of what one believes or knows. Hence, 
Lewis’s account is not open to any simple charges of lack of psychological realism. 
Participants need not actually make any inferences to any justified or true higher-
order beliefs (or even first-order occurrent beliefs), they only need to be able to have 
higher-order reasons to believe (as Paternotte, 2010, p. 260 emphasises).48 So Kutz’s 
charge that (Lewisian) common knowledge is a “cognitively demanding state” is 
wrong, at least if he meant that it is too demanding in terms of cognitive load or 
processing (2000, p. 6 n. 8). Neither does it seem to be the case that a demand for 
common knowledge is so “difficult to satisfy” as Pacherie takes it to be (2007, p. 
                                                
47 Perhaps Lewis uses the term ‘rationality’ to refer not only to the agent’s logic of 
reasoning, but also to his degree of cognitive control, perceptual capacities, attention, 
and so on. In order for an agent to come to have an occurrent belief that q when he 
has reason to believe that q, he must presumably direct some degree of attention to 
the issue of whether q is the case or not. 
48 When common knowledge serves to solve coordination problems—when it 
grounds rational action—then Lewis thinks that, typically at least, the members of P 
do not just have reason to believe that others have reason to believe (etc.) but also 
have actual higher order beliefs—that is, they actually believe propositions—of 
some complexity. When Lewis comments on a simple case where two people agree 
to meet again the next day to carry on a conversation, he describes them as having 
higher-order beliefs of an order between three and five (see p. 52, also p. 32). 
According to Lewis, the cut-off point beyond which no actual higher-order beliefs 
are generated is determined by the rationality of the members of P, their background 
information, and their standards of inductive inference. 
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166). In addition, Lewis is not (unlike Schiffer) pressed into having to claim that we 
believe, say, all the true propositions of mathematics that follow from axioms that we 
accept. 
 
Recall that the iterative definition is problematic because it seems to make it 
impossible for agents to grasp that they have common knowledge. In other words, 
given this definition it is hard to see how common knowledge could make a 
difference to an agent’s experience or action. How does Lewis’s account fare in light 
of this problem? Since Lewis does not define common knowledge in terms of a set of 
infinite higher-order beliefs or reasons to believe, it is not obviously the case that 
agents may not be able to grasp the fact that they have common knowledge that q in 
contrast to merely having finite higher-order belief that q. In order for common 
knowledge of something to be a reason that motivates participants into action, they 
must have an occurrent grasp of the fact there is common knowledge. This is not 
impossible in light of Lewis’ account.  
 
For a member x of population P to have an occurrent belief “that there is common 
knowledge in P that q”, x must be able to grasp that she is in a state of affairs A such 
that (1) everyone in P has reason to be believe that A holds, that (2) A indicates to 
everyone in P that everyone in P has reason to believe that A holds, and that (3) A 
indicates to everyone in P that q. There is no obvious need for x to infer an infinite 
number of higher-order beliefs of an infinitely high order to entertain this belief. 
Admittedly, the content of this belief looks quite complex, but we should not demand 
that participants must be able to articulate the content of a belief that they entertain.  
 
In order to say more about what cognitive and conceptual demands that Lewis’ 
account places on participants, we need to get a better idea of what it is to have a 
‘reason to believe’ something. This also matters when we consider whether Lewis’ 
account might provide an account of openness that is applicable to the joint actions 
of young children (and perhaps also non-human animals) who lack the concept of 
belief. Tollefsen (2005) claims that “no matter what account of common knowledge 
you present, it presupposes that participants have knowledge (either tacit or explicit) 
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of the mental states of others.” (Tollefsen, 2005, p. 82, n. 12, also p. 92) And having 
such knowledge requires “an understanding of mental representation” (ibid.). But 
must agents really have metarepresentational capacities, and in particular the concept 
of belief, to have common knowledge given Lewis’ account?  
 
Besides saying that what one has reason to believe somehow depends on one’s 
inductive standards and background information, Lewis does not give us much 
guidance on this issue. In an exposition and analysis of Lewis’s account of common 
knowledge, Cubitt and Sugden’s (2003) provides the following definition of ‘reason 
to believe’:  
 
To say that some individual i has reason to believe some proposition x is to say that 
x is true within some logic of reasoning that is endorsed by (that is, accepted as a 
normative standards by) person i. For x to be true within such a logic of reasoning, it 
must either be treated as self-evident or be derivable from propositions that are 
treated as self-evident using the inference rules of the logic. (Cubitt & Sugden, 2003, 
p. 184) 
 
Given this definition, for two or more agents to have common knowledge of q, they 
must each have the concept of belief. ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ here. What an agent has 
reason to believe, on this reading, is dictated by the agent’s evidence and the logic of 
reasoning that the agent has endorsed (whether this logic is also endorsed by us as 
analysts is irrelevant). It would clearly be against the spirit of this to allow an agent 
to have a reason to believe a proposition that he cannot actually believe. If an agent’s 
reasons to believe are relative to the logic of reasoning he endorses, they should also 
be relative to the concepts that he can entertain. In order to be common knowledge 
between two or more agents, q must either be treated as self-evident by the agents or 
be derivable by them from propositions that they treat as self-evident. So, on this 
reading, for an agent to have a ‘reason to believe’ something, the reason must be 
accessible to the agent in a fairly strong sense. The agent must have the conceptual 
resources to believe what he has reason to believe. In line with this, Glüer and Pagin 
(2003) claim, regarding Lewis’ account of common knowledge, that “if [an agent] is 
unable to form beliefs about beliefs, then, it seems, no state of affairs A will give him 
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reason to believe, and thus will not indicate to him, that everyone in the population P 
has reason to believe that A holds.” (p. 42 n. 27)49 
 
However, it is not obvious that this is the reading Lewis intended, and it is certainly 
not the only possible reading. There are notions of having a reason to believe p 
according to which I can have a reason to believe p even if I lack a concept that I 
need in order to believe p. Perhaps all that is required for me to have a reason to 
believe p is that some evidence for p is available to me. I might then have reason to 
believe, for example, that the animal that I see swimming over there in the lake is a 
beaver, even if I don’t have the concept of a beaver (so I instead believe that it is a 
‘giant water rat’). Evidence that the animal is a beaver is available to me: I can see 
the animal’s broad tail slapping in the water, and I have noticed that there are 
gnawed-off tree trunks here and there along the waterfront. For all that, I may not be 
able to form the demonstrative thought “that’s a beaver” because I do not possess the 
concept of a beaver.  
 
By these lights, I could have evidence that you have evidence that my goal is that we 
build a block tower together even if I cannot believe that you believe that this is my 
goal. (The evidence here could be, for example, that we are facing each other, that 
we have a few blocks each, that I make eye contact with you and that I grab and raise 
a block suggestively.) But given such a weak notion of what it is to have a ‘reason to 
believe’, we face the problem of how the agents would be able to grasp that they 
have common knowledge of their goals, rather then merely second- but not third-
order evidence of their goals, as well as the problem of explaining how common 
knowledge about each other’s goals should lead to agents experiencing no surprise 
when actions are performed in pursuit of these goals. Furthermore, we will get no 
guidance from the account regarding what the cognitive or conceptual demands are 
of being able to stand in relations of common knowledge. For the purposes of 
understanding what openness consists in among agents who lack the concept of 
                                                
49 Glüer and Pagin make this claim in the context of a discussion about whether it 
would be a problem for Lewis’ theory of linguistic meaning (of which his account of 
common knowledge is a part) if speakers without the concept of belief exist. 
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belief, Lewis’ account either ends up construing openness as unachievable (since it 
requires the concept of belief), or it tells us nothing about how openness enables 
coordination of joint action to be non-accidental. As a consequence, the account does 
not give us any clues about what cognitive capacities and concepts that agents must 
possess in order to act on common knowledge.  
 
To sum up this second section, we have seen that there are accounts of common 
knowledge that avoid some of the problems associated with a CK-condition. The 
condition is not necessarily too cognitively demanding in general. The infinite 
regress of higher-order beliefs need not be arrived at through an infinite number of 
steps in someone’s reasoning, and the beliefs need not be actively entertained. 
Instead, the infinite regress can be “virtualised”, either by making the beliefs 
dispositional, or by making identifying common knowledge with a certain type of 
situation—a basis for common knowledge—that provides agents with reasons to 
believe the propositions in the regress. When it comes to the joint activities of 
mindreading adult humans, both these accounts can be plugged into an account of 
joint action to successfully rule out concealment cases. However, I have argued that 
Schiffer’s dispositional belief account fails to explain how common knowledge 
enables coordination to be non-accidental. Lewis’ account seems to be more 
congenial when it comes to this second desideratum, since it avoids making the idea 
that participants can grasp the fact that they have common knowledge of some 
proposition into a mysterious phenomenon that requires appreciation of an infinite 
regress.  My main concern here, however, is whether the CK-condition implies that 
participants must have the concept of belief. While this is not obviously the case 
given Lewis’ account, Schiffer’s account clearly implies this. The problem with 
Lewis’ account, on the other hand, is that it is entirely uninformative regarding what 
conceptual capacities that are required for agent to be able to have common 
knowledge with others. 
 
In the next section, I consider what “openness” might be if it doesn’t require the 
concept of belief, given that openness is something that can make sense of the idea 
that coordination in joint action is non-accidental. 
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2.3 Openness without common knowledge 
Young children engage in sustained episodes of joint attentional activity already in 
their second year of life, long before they seem to acquire the concept of belief. Now, 
joint attention is typically taken to involve a kind of mutual awareness or openness 
between the co-attenders concerning their direction and focus of attention (Eilan, 
Hoerl, McCormack, & Roessler, 2005; Moore & Dunham, 1995; Seemann, 2012). 
This openness enables young children to coordinate genuine joint attention together 
in a non-accidental way, despite their lack of the concept of belief. Perhaps this kind 
of openness can play the role that common knowledge normally plays in accounts of 
joint action. This is essentially what Tollefsen (2005) proposes. She claims that joint 
attention can replace common knowledge and “introduce the openness that needs to 
be present in cases of joint action.” (p. 92) Recall that the concern to rule out 
concealment cases never arises in the case of agents who lack the concept of belief – 
since the element of “higher-order concealment” depends on them possessing the 
concept of belief – so this kind of openness only needs to account for how 
coordination can be non-accidental.  
 
There are two desiderata on an account of the kind of openness that we need. First, it 
must make sense of how coordination of joint action can be non-accidental. 
Secondly, it must not require that participants have the concept of belief. With regard 
to the second desideratum, we should consider whether openness could occur 
between agents who have no concepts of the mental or the intentional at all 
(including the concept of goal).  
 
Hutto (2012) proposes that “basic joint attention” (p. 314) is best understood “in 
terms of interactive unprincipled embodied engagements” rather than in terms of 
reciprocal mindreading (p. 329).50 To be fair, Hutto doesn’t discuss openness or 
                                                
50 Hutto does not merely think that pre-linguistic children cannot recognise or 
attribute propositional attitudes to others, he think that they themselves don’t even 
have propositional attitudes. They merely have what he calls “intentional attitudes” 
with “nonsemantic directedness”. This claim of his is not relevant for my purposes 
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common knowledge, but if we take as a given that joint attention involves openness, 
then Hutto must be claiming that openness can be achieved by pre-linguisitic infants 
who according to Hutto have no mental state concepts.51 In the case of joint 
attention, we could say something more about what the embodied interactive 
engagements that results in openness are: if A and B are jointly attending to x, then 
A’s attention is directed toward x partly because A’s attention is controlled by B’s 
attention and B’s attention is directed toward x partly because A’s attention is 
controlled by B’s attention. There seem to be no reason why this couldn’t occur 
without A or B representing the attention of the other. Furthermore, this triadic 
interaction could be subserved by reliable subpersonal mechanisms as well as the 
overt behaviour of the co-attenders (bodily orientation, gaze-direction, and so on). I 
do not see why such interaction could not in principle deliver the kind of non-
accidental joint coordination that we take to be an important feature of joint 
attention. Perhaps this triadic coordination, even in the absence of any 
metarepresentation, could even give rise to a distinctive experiential signature so that 
the character of A’s and B’s perceptual experiences of x would be different in the 
context of joint attention than in the context of an individual perceptual attending (as 
argued by Campbell, 2005). And perhaps the best way of making sense of the mutual 
dependency of attentional control involved in joint attention is that the triadic 
coordination is the realiser of what we might call a “dual-subject psychological 
                                                                                                                                     
here. 
51 Hutto (2012) writes that what “distinguishes joint attention is that it involves a 
meeting of minds by means of adopting a common point of focus.” (p. 309) But 
arguably, his most explicitly described example of a basic joint attentional episode 
does not involve such a meeting of minds: “Imagine two footballers battling 
furiously over possession of a ball. This is an activity that requires each player not 
only to monitor the ball’s position and progress but also to keep tabs on the other’s 
monitoring of the same and their monitoring of such monitoring. Through these 
means, skillful players swiftly pick up on their opponent’s possible moves and 
strategies as they emerge during a game, allowing the exploitation of crucial 
opportunities.” (2012, pp. 309–310) Such a competitive encounter does not seem to 
involve openness. Perhaps this is why Hutto does not discuss this puzzling aspect of 
joint attention. 
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state” of mutual awareness that q, say, that there is a block tower between us (Wilby, 
2010, p. 93).52 
 
While this may be a good treatment of the kind of openness involved in joint 
attention, it isn’t applicable to the case of genuine joint action. In the case of basic 
joint attention, what is “out in the open” is a concretely manifested fact that is 
available to perception, such as “that there is a block tower between us”, or “that 
there is a candle between us”. In contrast, in the case of joint action, what must be 
out in the open is that I have a certain goal, and that you have the same goal, say, 
“that we build a block tower together” or “that a block tower is built”. In a joint 
action, each participant is exercising her agency, that is, performing goal-directed 
actions. The emergent triadic coordination of embodied behaviours and objects in the 
world—Hutto’s embodied interactive engagements—is not sufficient for agents to 
engage in a genuine kind of joint action.53 The interactants in the triadic interaction 
of basic joint attention are concrete and relatively easy to track and monitor (e.g., my 
gaze direction, your gaze direction, the location of the block tower on the floor). But 
in the case of joint action, what must be recognised, tracked and monitored are each 
of our goals or intentions, and the actions that we perform in pursuit of them. The 
kind of openness that we need must therefore involve the agents representing each 
other’s goal.  
 
To account for non-accidental coordination, it must also be the case that each agent’s 
own goal is formed partly because they represent the other has having this goal too. 
Moreover, they each need to somehow be aware of the fact that the other’s goal 
                                                
52 In light of this radical-sounding proposal, it is worth noting that Bratman remarks, 
about his more recent account of shared intention, that it is “conceptually 
conservative in the sense that the concepts it uses—with the possible exception of the 
concept of common knowledge—are available within the theory of individual 
planning agency.” (2009a, pp. 162–163, my emphasis, see also 2009b, p. 58) He also 
says: “I am not in a position to claim that [common knowledge] can itself be 
understood solely in terms of structures of individual agency.” (2009b, p. 51 n. 17). 
53 I am not denying that some episodes of joint attentional activity qualify as this 
genuine kind of joint activity, but there are some joint attentional episodes that, while 
giving rise to openness, don’t qualify as instances of this kind of joint activity. 
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depends on their own goal in a reciprocal fashion, so that if either didn’t have this 
goal, then the other wouldn’t have the goal either (alternatively, they need to be 
aware of the fact that the other wouldn’t act on their goal if they themselves didn’t 
act on their goal). But for an agent A to appreciate this dependency, she doesn’t have 
to be able to attribute a belief to B that has A’s own goal represented in its content, 
or any other belief for that matter. In other words, while an awareness of mutual 
goal-dependency is needed, this awareness need not be underpinned by 
representation of the dependency as mediated by belief. Unfortunately, I do not have 
much to say about how this mutual dependency between the goals of two individuals 
may arise, but perhaps the non-contentful embodied interactive engagements that 
Hutto refers to have a role to play here. The kind of openness that involves agents 
representing each other’s goal may depend on a more primitive kind of openness that 
emerges from embodied triadic interactions. 
 
A requirement of such an awareness of mutual goal-dependency, instead of a CK-
condition, would allow agents who have the concept of goal or desire, but not that of 
belief, to interact with each other in such a way that their goals are “out in the open”. 
Young children as well as non-human primates seem to be agents who fit this socio-
cognitive profile. There is plenty of evidence demonstrating that even before their 
first birthday, young children are able to recognise the goal that the behaviour of 
others is directed toward (Behne, Carpenter, & Call, 2005; Carpenter, Akhtar, & 
Tomasello, 1998; Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Woodward, 1998). For 
example, at merely 9 months of age, infants respond in appropriately different ways 
to superficially similar behaviours that have different goals. They express more 
impatience when an adult fail to give them a toy because of unwillingness than if 
they fail because they are unable to (Behne et al., 2005). Studies of imitation in 
infants show that their imitation is not modelled on the precise behavioural 
performance of the other agent, but that it is sensitive the goal toward which the 
behaviour was directed, as well as to what the most effective means of achieving that 
goal is (Carpenter et al., 1998; Gergely et al., 2002). It has also been shown that 
some non-human primates are sensitive to the goal-directness of others’ actions (e.g. 
Call, Hare, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2004; Phillips, Barnes, Mahajan, Yamaguchi, & 
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Santos, 2009). However, young children (before 3 to 5 years of age) as well as non-
human primates appear to lack a proper concept of belief. This suggests that they 
may explain and predict the actions of others not in terms of beliefs, desires and 
intentions, but in terms of facts about the world (that is, what they believe to be the 
case) and desires or intentions that they attribute to others (Perner and Roessler 
(2010, p. 205) call this “the hybrid account of children’s conception of intentional 
action”). 
 
One way of buttressing the idea that participants at least need to represent goals in 
order to stand in the relation of openness needed for genuine joint activity, is to 
consider the “opacity case” with the incarnations of Hector and Celia who have 
severe autism, presented at the end of section 2.1.1. If Hector exploits his knowledge 
of Celia’s behavioural patterns and Celia exploits her knowledge of Hector’s 
behavioural patterns back, then this does not seem on a par with a case where their 
goal-formation processes are sensitive to the goal of the other and they are aware of 
this goal-sensitivity. Openness involving awareness of mutual goal-dependency 
helps rule out opacity cases, but a completely non-representational type of openness 
does not rule them out. This shows that awareness of mutual goal-dependency is an 
ingredient in one important kind of joint activity. This kind of joint activity is less 
rich than the kind of joint activity that involves common knowledge, but it is richer 
than a joint activity that merely involves completely non-representational openness 
(if such openness is possible). This suggests that there is an important intuitive 
difference between joint activity that involves openness in the sense of awareness of 
mutual goal-dependency, and joint activity that involves some even weaker type of 
openness. 
 
2.4 Varieties of joint activity 
What I have argued is that while a CK-condition is indeed required to capture a 
strong notion of joint action that agents who have the concept of belief can engage 
in, there is a form of openness that allows agents who only have the concept of a 
goal, and who can be aware of the fact that their own and the other’s goal stand in a 
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relation of mutual dependency: either both goals should be present or neither of them 
should. My third aim in this chapter was to substantiate the claim, made in chapter 1, 
that there are many kinds of joint activity, of which some require more cognitive 
sophistication than others.  
 
In light of concealment and opacity cases, there seems to be at least three notions of 
joint activity that can be distinguished. When there is a possibility of concealment, 
which comes with the concept of belief, then the CK-condition is needed. While 
concealment is automatically ruled out when we are dealing with joint activities with 
agents who lack the concept of belief, openness that involves awareness of mutual 
goal-dependency is still required to account for non-accidental coordination and rule 
out opacity cases. Perhaps there is also a kind of joint activity, exemplified by basic 
cases of two people jointly attending to something for example, that involves a kind 
of openness that doesn’t even involve them representing the behaviour of each other 
as goal-directed (I will leave this possibility open). Thus, there are different kinds of 
joint activity, all of which require different forms of openness. This is perfectly 
consistent with Tollefsen’s claim that the joint activities of young children (which 
are characterised by whatever kind of openness that is provided by joint attention) 
are of the same kind as those activities that are captured by Bratman’s account (see 
Tollefsen, 2005, pp. 83–84), even though Bratman requires common knowledge.54 
There are several kinds of joint activity, all of which belong to the same super-kind 
of joint activity that involve openness.  
 
Now, I think it would be a mistake to identify this joint action super-kind that 
incorporates an overarching “openness”-condition with joint action as such. As I 
mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, Kutz and Pacherie have both proposed 
accounts of joint action that do not include a CK-condition, and arguably, the 
conditions that they replace it with do not make a demand for openness of any kind.55 
For example, Kutz claims that in order for participants to be acting together, “each 
                                                
54 For more on Tollefsen’s account, see chapter 4. 
55 See footnotes 29 and 30. 
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must not only act in light of beliefs about the other's plan, but each must also be 
favorably disposed towards the other’s possible knowledge of this strategic 
sensitivity.” (2000, p. 6) Such favourable dispositions can clearly be in place without 
openness. According to Kutz, joint action can accordingly be coordinated in a purely 
accidental manner. Consider the following example, due to Ludwig (2007), who also 
claims that joint action can occur without common knowledge:56 
 
Suppose that country X launches a pre-emptive nuclear strike against country Y. 
After the initial strike, some missile silos in country Y are still operative. However, 
country Y has established an elaborate procedure for firing its missiles as a 
safeguard, which requires two on-site operators, who are physically isolated from 
one another, and one remote operator, all to punch in a secret code and turn a firing 
key at their locations in order to launch a missile. Consider the team charged with 
this for surviving silo 451. After the strike, which interrupts communications 
between them, none of them knows whether the others have survived, and have 
some reason, perhaps even preponderant reason, to think that they have not. 
Nonetheless, they intend to launch the missile. Each of them intends that they do it, 
and so each of them intends to do his part in launching the missile. Each punches in 
his code, and then turns his key, hoping that there are still others who are doing their 
parts, however unlikely it may seem; and so they launch the missile in silo 451 
together, and they do so intentionally. (Ludwig, 2007, pp. 387–388) 
 
If the three operators perform a joint action in this case, then this joint action is not of 
the rich kind that is non-accidentally coordinated, in which the goals and beliefs of 
participants are “completely out in the open” (the operators surely have the 
dispositions required by Kutz though). But I see no reason to deny that there is some 
notion of weakly joint action according to which it is correct to say that the two 
operators did indeed launch the missile together, and did so intentionally. 
 
This is consistent with my remark about the case of the severely autistic incarnations 
of Hector and Celia. Even if their mutual exploitation of each other’s behavioural 
patterns is completely devoid of openness, their activity might still qualify as a form 
of weakly joint activity. Arguably, keeping a broad open view of different varieties 
of joint action will be important if we what to understand, for example, the 
                                                
56 See Kutz (2000, p. 18) for another example used to make the same point. 
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development and evolution of capacities for, and forms of, more advanced kinds of 
joint activity.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Most accounts of shared intention and joint action include a CK-condition, but the 
condition is typically included without any explicit motivation. In this chapter I have 
tried to make the motivation for a CK-condition explicit. I have argued that there are 
indeed good reasons for including a CK-condition: First, there is the need to rule out 
certain problematic counterintuitive cases that involve elements of concealment. 
Without the CK-condition, we would have to classify such cases as instantiations of 
genuinely joint activity. Secondly, genuinely joint activity should be non-
accidentally coordinated. A CK-condition is one condition that rules out joint 
activities that are accidentally coordinated. Furthermore, I have defended the 
condition from objections that common knowledge is too cognitively demanding in 
general (as common knowledge seems to require of agents that they make an infinite 
number of inferences to higher-order beliefs of an infinitely high order). While I do 
not want to claim that I have decisively put these objections to rest, I showed ways in 
which one can defend accounts of common knowledge from these objections. In 
effect, there are good reasons for including a CK-condition in accounts of the kind of 
joint action that adult humans engage in when they, say, go for a walk together or 
wash dishes together. 
 
I have also argued that common knowledge is merely one among many (or two, at 
least) forms of openness. Agents who lack the concept of belief, such as young 
children, can still engage in joint activities that are characterised by openness 
concerning the goals of the participants, since there are forms of openness that do not 
require that the participant have the concept of belief. I have suggested that what is 
needed in order to make sense of the idea that participants can coordinate a joint 
activity in a non-accidental manner is that each is aware of the fact that their goals 
stand in a relation of mutual dependency. However, they need not represent this 
dependency as being mediated by the other’s belief about their own goal. Hence, 
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young children who have the concept of a goal but not that of belief can appreciate 
this form of openness. Since they do not have the concept of belief, one of the 
motivations behind the CK-condition, that concealment cases must be ruled out, is 
undermined. Perhaps there are also forms of openness that doesn’t even require 
agents to have the concept of a goal. Such openness might be characteristic of joint 
attentional episodes that very young children engage in for example. However, I 
have argued that such openness is not adequate for an account joint action (as 
opposed to joint attention).  
 
In the final section of the chapter, I suggested that there is no good reason to think 
that the presence of some form of openness is a condition that is constitutive of joint 
action as such. Some everyday notions of joint action require some form of 
openness, but reflection on cases suggest that there are also weaker notions that don’t 
require any form of openness.  
 
There is one feature that all the cases of joint action that I have described or referred 
to so far seem to have in common, namely that they all involve actions that are 
performed by different agents but which in some sense are all directed toward the 
same goal. In some cases, this converging directedness is present in virtue of a 
Bratmanian shared intention. In other cases, it is present in virtue of 
sociopsychological structure that I will call a “joint goal”. In the next chapter, I look 
at what it means for actions to be directed at the same goal—for agents to have a 
“common goal”—and what it takes for two or more agents to instantiate the 
sociopsychological structure that I identify with a joint goal. 
  
	   75	  
3 What it takes to have a joint goal 
In this chapter, I develop an account of cooperation based on the notion of having 
what I will call a ‘joint goal’.57 As in the previous chapter, the aim is to develop 
conceptual and theoretical resources for understanding the joint activities of agents 
that are cognitively unsophisticated compared to normal human adults. According to 
the account of a form of joint activity that I propose here, participants in such an 
activity do not need to represent what they are doing (or about to do) as part of a 
joint activity.58 Furthermore, while they must have a common goal, they do not need 
to represent this goal in the same way; they may each construe the goal in a different 
“aspectual shape”.59 Both these features contrast my account with most philosophical 
accounts of joint activity. Most accounts require that participants intend “that we J” 
or intend “to perform my part of our J-ing” (Alonso, 2009; Bratman, 1992, 1993; 
Kutz, 2000; Pettit & Schweikard, 2006). For our carrying of the sofa to be a genuine 
joint activity, each must intend “that we carry the sofa”. On the proposal that will 
follow, our carrying of the sofa could be a form of joint activity if each had the goal 
“that the sofa is moved downstairs” or “to move the sofa downstairs” (that is, 
without either of us representing this as the result of a joint or cooperative activity). 
Furthermore, on most accounts, the participants need to represent their common goal 
in the same way (so that the goals are specified intensionally in the same way). This 
requirement is typically not explicitly spelled out, but it is, I believe, widely 
embraced (Miller, 1995, p. 53 is explicit about this). In order for us to have a shared 
intention to kill Batman, it is not sufficient that you intend that we kill Batman and I 
intend that we kill Bruce Wayne. If we are not aware of the fact that “Batman” and 
“Bruce Wayne” are co-referring terms, then we will not be able to coordinate a joint 
                                                
57 For the sake of simplicity, I will from now on restrict myself to talk about two 
agents and I will only discuss examples of joint cooperative action involving two 
agents. But I see no reason why my account may not be scaled up to cases involving 
more than two agents. 
58 Pacherie and Dokic (2006, p. 110) and Butterfill (2012a) also allow for this 
possibility. 
59 To use Searle’s term (1992, p. 155). 
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assassination. Such a requirement is appropriate if we are giving an account of the 
joint activities of planning creatures such as adult human beings who are equipped 
with capacities for linguistic communication. When we engage in complex joint 
activities involving the coordination of plans, breakdowns in communication and 
coordination is to be expected if we represent our goals and surroundings in different 
ways. Since I will here be focused on joint activities in the here and now, where 
goals can be anchored to perceptually available objects in the participants’ 
immediate environment, such a ‘same aspectual shape’-requirement is less apt. 
 
Among cognitive scientists who are interested in developmental and comparative 
aspects of cooperation, cooperation is typically defined in terms of two or more 
agents pursuing a “shared”, “joint”, “common”, or perhaps “collaborative” goal (e.g. 
Boesch & Boesch, 1989; Brinck & Gärdenfors, 2003; Brownell & Carriger, 1990; 
Chalmeau & Gallo, 1995; Henderson & Woodward, 2011). Unfortunately, these 
researchers rarely (if ever) explicate what they mean when they use these terms. In 
the animal cognition literature, the notion of a common goal sometimes seems to 
simply refer to a situation where the same token object is the target of several 
agents’ goal-directed states or actions. In an influential paper on cooperative hunting 
among chimpanzees, Boesch and Boesch (1989, p. 550) operationally define 
cooperation as “two or more individuals acting together to achieve a common goal”. 
Chalmeau and Gallo (1995) talk about the common goal of the chimpanzees studied 
by the Boesches as being “the prey” itself (p. 103). Similarly, Brinck and Gärdenfors 
talk of goals as actual objects that are present in the agents’ environment, such as 
“water to drink, food to be had, or an antagonist to fight” (2003, p. 485). It may be 
that these are just elliptical ways of referring to full propositional contents such as 
“that we catch the prey” or “that we fight the antagonist”. After all, the content of a 
goal determines under what conditions the goal is satisfied, it does not merely 
determine which object an agent’s bodily movement is directed toward (see Jacob, 
2012, p. 209). Nevertheless, the way that goals are talked about in the animal 
cognition literature suggests that a common goal perhaps do not need to have any 
collective content (or “‘we’-content”). Joint cooperative action directed toward such 
a common goal wouldn’t demand of the participating agents that they have a concept 
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of cooperation or joint action—of “our J-ing”. Given our interest in the cooperative 
activities of relatively cognitively unsophisticated agents, an account that did not 
require of agents that they have goals with collective content would arguably be 
preferable. 
 
My aim in this chapter is to explicate a notion of joint action that is broadly in line 
the Boesches’ definition of cooperation that I referred to in the previous paragraph.60 
I use the term ‘common goal’, ‘same goal’ and ‘shared goal’ as synonyms. Thus, if 
two agents have a shared goal or the same goal, then they have a goal in common. 
Besides specifying what exactly this entails, I will give an account of what must be 
the case in order for a common goal to enable cooperation. The mere fact that two 
agents happen to have the same goal does not itself facilitate cooperation after all. In 
this chapter, the aim is thus to develop an account of what I will call a ‘joint goal’, 
such that when two or more agents have a joint goal, they are cognitively situated 
vis-à-vis each other and their surroundings in such a way that the fact that they have 
a common goal can play a role in facilitating and coordinating joint action in pursuit 
of the goal. I reserve talk about one agent “sharing in a goal” (with one or more other 
agents), to refer to how one party of a joint goal is cognitively situated in relation to 
the other parties and the surrounding environment (see page 110). 
 
I am using the term ‘joint goal’ in a way that is analogous to the way that Bratman 
uses the term ‘shared intention’: it is a label for a type of socio-psychological 
structure that is appropriately situated. Coordinated activity that is the causal 
outcome of this socio-psychological structure is, I claim, an interesting kind of joint 
activity. My account is thus a kind proto-version of Bratman’s account of shared 
intentional activity. It is a “proto-version” because a joint goal cannot play the full 
functional role that Bratman takes a shared intention to play. Recall from section 1.1 
that a Bratmanian shared intention is a socio-psychological pattern of mental states 
                                                
60 The Boesches’ definition of cooperation appears to have been influential among 
those who study cooperation among young children and non-human animals. See, for 
example, Chalmeau and Gallo (1995), Brownell et al. (2006) and Naderi et al. 
(2001). 
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that facilitates the coordination of the participants’ plans and intentional actions in 
ways that track their common goal, as well as structures their bargaining with regard 
to this coordination. The role of a joint goal is narrower: A joint goal helps 
coordinate the actions of two or more agents with regard to the agents’ common 
goal. The account is thereby applicable to the joint activities of what Bratman calls 
“merely purposive agents” who lack plan-intentions and who may have no linguistic 
abilities at all (and thus have no means to engage in bargaining). 
 
In the next section, I articulate some terminological choices and assumptions that I 
have made. In section 3.2, I use an example of apparent cooperative problem-solving 
from the animal behaviour literature to explain why the notion of having a common 
goal should be part of a useful notion of cooperation. I then go on to distinguish, in 
section 3.3, between three different senses in which two or more agents can have a 
goal in common, and argue that the sense that is crucial for understanding 
cooperation among relatively cognitively unsophisticated agents is that of two agents 
having an “extensionally common goal”. When two agents have a goal in common 
extensionally, then the goal of each agent will be satisfied by (more or less) the same 
sets of states of affairs, but the agents need not represent these states of affairs in the 
same way, under the same aspectual shape. Merely having a common goal is not 
sufficient for this commonality to play a role in facilitating cooperation though, and 
in sections 3.4 and 3.5 I discuss what else needs to be the case for a common goal to 
be able to play the wanted facilitating role. I summarize and present the account of a 
joint goal in section 3.6. In section 3.7, I try to show how this notion could be 
empirically tractable by looking at some behavioural phenomena that count as 
evidence for the presence of a joint goal. 
 
3.1 Terminological preliminaries: outcomes, goals and goal-
directed states 
The goal of an action, say, “that the mug is grasped”, picks out an outcome among 
many that defines what must be the case for the action to be successful. If I reach out 
to grasp a mug, my action might have all of the following outcomes: I push the 
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handle on the mug so that it rotates counter-clockwise, I cast a shadow on the table, I 
make ripples in the coffee, and also, I grasp the mug with my hand. Only the last 
outcome is the goal of my action; the other outcomes are side effects of my action. 
So the term ‘goal’ refers to the outcome that an action (or activity) is directed 
toward. But as I will use the term, it also refers to the content of a goal-directed 
(mental) state of an agent.61 I assume that there is a close connection between these 
two senses of ‘goal’: an action is directed toward its goal in virtue of the content of a 
goal-directed state that the agent of the action is in. Despite this assumption, it is 
important to keep the senses apart since an observer may recognise what goal an 
action is directed toward without attributing a goal-directed state to the agent that is 
performing the action. Recognising the goal-directedness of an action is not the same 
as recognising an agent as guided by a goal-directed state. Furthermore, an agent 
may have a goal without concurrently performing any overt bodily movements, 
while mentally preparing to perform an action for example. 
 
I will not defend my assumption that actions are goal-directed in virtue of the content 
of a goal-directed state of the agent performing the action. But I take it that is a 
plausible assumption. This does not mean that behaviours may not be purposeful in a 
weaker evolutionary sense, without having this purposefulness in virtue of a goal-
directed state that is the cause of the behaviour. Perhaps the behaviour of insects is 
purposeful only in this weak sense.62 Arguably, the behaviour of a collection of 
agents may in this weaker sense be collectively purposeful too. For example, 
consider the feeding behaviour of a family of Stegodyphus spiders. When a large 
prey such as a fly lands in the family’s web each spider independently approaches 
the prey in response to the vibrations in the web caused by the prey (Ward & Enders, 
                                                
61 Note that the term ‘goal’ is sometimes used to refer to the goal-directed state itself 
(e.g. Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005, p. 676) and the term ‘goal 
state’ is in turn sometimes used to refer to the content of a goal-directed state (e.g. 
Gallese, 2010, p. 207; Millikan, 2004, Chapter 16)—that is, to what I refer to as a 
‘goal’. The term ‘goal-directed state’ has the advantage of avoiding this ambiguity. 
62 The egg-laying behaviour of the female Sphex digger wasp repeatedly glossed by 
Daniel Dennett as the outcome of an inflexible automatic mechanism comes to mind 
(e.g. Dennett, 1998, pp. 191–192 n. 11). For critical discussion about the empirical 
details and philosophical use of the Sphex example, see Keijzer (2012).  
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1985; quoted in Brosnan et al., 2010, p. 2701). Each then (again, independently of 
each other) starts to pull the prey toward their communal nest where the prey is 
digested and consumed by all. No spider could on its own catch and transport the 
large prey. Even if there are no goal-directed states involved in the guidance of this 
behaviour, the function of the behaviour of each spider may well be to bring it about 
that the prey is collectively brought to the nest, and this can only occur if several 
spiders simultaneously pull at the prey. If this is actually the evolutionary function of 
spiders’ behaviours, then it is arguably an interesting case of a form of collective 
behaviour (see Butterfill (2011) for a deflationary definition of joint action that 
would capture this and similar cases). However, as I will use the term ‘action’, the 
spiders are not performing actions, and thus, the spiders’ collective behaviour do not 
constitute a form of joint action either. This is not a substantive philosophical point, 
but a circumscription of the phenomenon that I am interested in. The point of 
controversy in debates about whether or not creatures such as young children, non-
human primates or social carnivores are really engaging in joint cooperative action 
concerns what kinds of cognitive processes and representations (if any) that enable 
them to engage in the apparently cooperative activity; whether their actions are 
directed (in the evolutionary sense) toward a collective outcome is beside that 
point.63 
 
The goal of an agent is a non-existent intentional object that is determined by the 
content of the agent’s goal-directed state. This state successfully or unsuccessfully 
guides the performance of the action. The state of affairs that is brought about can 
either satisfy or frustrate the goal. The conditions of satisfaction of a goal are 
determined by the content of the goal-directed state, as well as by its context. Some 
philosophers take the content of a mental state to be its complete conditions of 
satisfaction (e.g. Searle, 1983), but I will instead take the conditions of satisfaction to 
                                                
63 I do not want to deny that questions about distal and proximate causes of 
behaviour are related. As Noë (2006, p. 13) points out, if there are opportunities to be 
had in interactions that is cooperative in the biologist’s sense (interactions that result, 
on average, in a fitness benefit for all participants involved), then it is likely that 
(possibly psychological) mechanisms that improve individuals’ ability to partake and 
coordinate their actions with each other will be selected for. 
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be determined by both a state’s content and its context (following Recanati, 2007). 
The conditions of satisfaction for my mug-grasping action are not merely determined 
by the content of my goal-directed state but also, for example, by where and when 
‘here’ and ‘now’ are indices for. If I now have the goal “to grasp the mug”, then that 
goal will not be satisfied if I grasp the mug tomorrow. On this view, an agent need 
not represent everything that determines the conditions of satisfaction. 
 
An agent can have many goals at the same time, and more than one goal can be 
satisfied by the bringing about of the same state of affairs. If I have the goal to make 
soup for dinner, the goal to eat something with plenty of iron in it, and the goal to use 
that last celery stalk that is left in the fridge, then the state of affairs of me making 
and eating lentil soup with celery in it will satisfy all three goals. Goals are 
individuated by their contents, so the goal of making soup and the goal of making 
lentil soup are two different goals, even if they are had in the same context. The sets 
of states of affairs that satisfy these goals are different but overlapping (assuming 
that the specification of the content of the first goal is not merely an elliptical 
specification of the content of the second goal). 
 
Since I am assuming that a goal is the content of a goal-directed state, I will have to 
clarify what the relevant notion of “sameness” should be when agents are said to 
have the same goal. Do the goals have to have the same content as it is intensionally 
specified or is extensional sameness sufficient? This makes the presentation of my 
account different from a closely related account, namely Butterfill’s (2012a) account 
of what he calls “shared goals” (he uses the term ‘shared goals’ to refer to a pattern 
of goals and expectations about goals-directed actions that can play a certain 
functional role, rather than to refer to two agents simply having the same goal). 
Butterfill takes actions to be directed toward goals, but he does not assume that they 
are goal-directed in virtue of any goal-directed states (2012a, pp. 36–37). An effect 
of this is that Butterfill doesn’t have to worry about what the criteria should be for 
agents to have the same goal. 
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The claim that an action is goal-directed in virtue of the content of a goal-directed 
state of the agent performing the action needs to be qualified slightly. The claim is 
that her behaviour (or thought) is caused either by (i) a mental state with a world-to-
mind direction of fit such as a desire or an intention (meaning that if there is a 
discrepancy between world and goal, then this calls for the world rather than the goal 
to be changed), or by (ii) the combination of some desire or intention and a means-
end belief, where the means is the goal toward which the agent’s action is directed. 
An example of (ii) is the following: I have the desire to eat and the means-end belief 
that “if I cook dinner, then I will get to eat”. This combination may cause me to go 
into the kitchen, look into the fridge, put some ingredients in a pan, and so on, a 
combination of actions—an activity—that are all directed toward the goal of cooking 
dinner. Note that in this example the goal of cooking dinner may not be the content 
of a state with a world-to-mind direction of fit. While there is a state with world-to-
mind direction of fit involved (the desire to eat), the content of this state is not the 
goal of cooking dinner. Of course, it is conceivable that, in the process of 
deliberating about what to do, I form or acquire an “instrumental desire” or intention 
to cook dinner (see Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 217). But this need not be what 
happens. As Sterelny (2003) points out, “[w]e can trade talk of instrumental goals for 
talk of beliefs”, and thus “convert intentional explanations that mention instrumental 
goals into intentional explanations that mention only ultimate goals.” (p. 88) We can 
imagine a creature with only one desire—say, the desire to survive—but who still 
performs various actions and engages in various activities directed toward many 
different goals.  
 
3.2 Why cooperation requires a common goal 
It will be useful to start off by considering why it is that having a common goal 
should be a defining feature of cooperation. I will do this by examining a case drawn 
from research on of cooperative problem solving among non-human animals. Two 
possible interpretations of this case will be considered. According to the first 
interpretation, the two agents who are involved in the case do not have a common 
goal. According the second interpretation, they do. 
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In a study of cooperation in a species of large parrots called keas, Tebbich et al. 
(1996) tested whether kea dyads could together make food available for retrieval 
using a seesaw. The food reward was placed in a box under a Plexiglas lid that was 
attached to one end of the seesaw (see Figure 1). If a kea stepped onto the seesaw’s 
other end, the lid was lifted, making the food available for the other kea to retrieve.  
 
 
Figure 1 Testing apparatus used by Tebbich, Taborsky, and Winkler (1996).  
Three of the four dyads that were tested succeeded in bringing about this state of 
affairs on most trials. The kea that retrieved and ate the food—the “recipient”—was 
always the dominant member in the dyad, and the “donor” who stepped onto the 
seesaw was always the submissive member. The dominance relationships between 
the keas were determined through observations of the keas interacting in a context 
independent of the setup of the experiment. Tebbich et al. showed that the dominant 
kea is more likely to approach the submissive kea in an aggressive manner the 
further the submissive kea is from the seesaw (this correlation was absent in control 
trials in which no food was placed under the lid). 
 
On one plausible interpretation, the successful retrieval of the food by the dominant 
kea is an outcome of the submissive kea’s goal to avoid aggressive attacks (“that I 
avoid aggressive attacks”) and the dominant kea’s goal to retrieve the food (“that I 
retrieve the food”). Assume for the moment that these are the only goals that are 
relevant for explaining the keas’ behaviour. Given the way the keas’ environment 
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was set up by the researchers, the opportunities for satisfying these goals are 
interdependent in such a way that if one goal is to be satisfied, then the other goal 
will have to be satisfied too. The only way in which the donor can avoid aggressive 
attacks is for the donor to step onto the seesaw, and the only way in which the 
recipient can retrieve the food is to make the donor step onto the seesaw. In the 
experiment, the goal of each kea is thus only satisfied by the outcome of the donor 
stepping onto the seesaw.  Let us call the case when given this interpretation The 
Individualistic Keas case. If this interpretation is correct, then the keas do not have a 
common goal. 
 
Perhaps the dominant kea’s actions are also directed at the goal “that the submissive 
kea gets onto the seesaw”, since it has—through fairly advanced causal reasoning—
figured out what will happen to the lid covering the food if that state of affairs is 
brought about. There is no need to assume that the submissive kea has this goal 
though, and given the right learning history, the dominant kea’s threats and attacks 
may not be directed at this goal either. He may simply have been conditioned 
through reinforcement learning to perform the threats and attacks in such a way that 
the likelihood of the food becoming available for retrieval is maximised.64 Naderi et 
al. here suggest such an interpretation: 
 
Dominant keas might have learnt that a kea on the handle ‘means’ they can get food, 
and their aggressive behaviour toward their companion was aimed at forcing them to 
sit on the handle. The submissive kea might have learnt that the handle is a safe 
place from the attacks of their dominant companions, etc. and this explanation leaves 
little room for an interpretation as being a complex co-operative interaction. (Naderi, 
Miklósi, Dóka, & Csányi, 2001, p. 61) 
 
The point that Naderi et al. make is that individual activities may converge in such a 
way that they “mimic cooperation” (Chalmeau & Gallo, 1995, p. 102). In light of 
similar considerations, Chalmeau et al. (1995) claim that in order to establish that the 
                                                
64 However, such a behaviourist explanation would have a hard time explaining that 
a “role switch” immediately occurred when a formerly submissive kea ended up in a 
new dyad where it was the dominant member. Instead of then behaving like a donor 
again, it switched to behaving like a recipient. 
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observed behaviours of two or more agents (in their case, two chimpanzees) really 
amount to cooperative action in an interesting sense, we must rule out that the 
behaviours are not just the result of brute reinforcement learning during pursuits of 
purely individual rewards. In the case of the keas, since avoidance of bullying will be 
a reward that is contiguous with the submissive kea’s stepping onto the seesaw, this 
behaviour will be reinforced. Likewise with the dominant kea’s aggressive behaviour 
against the submissive kea whenever it isn’t near or on the seesaw: the food-reward 
will be contiguous with not threatening or attacking the submissive kea when it 
stands on the seesaw, so this behaviour will be reinforced. 
 
This contingent environmental interdependence of the two keas’ pursuits of their 
respective goals doesn’t seem to be sufficient for their behaviour to be cooperative in 
any interesting sense. While it is true that the goals drive the keas’ behaviours to 
converge on the only state of affairs that happens to satisfy their goals, this is too 
contingent on the specifics of the keas’ environment. We want the notion of 
cooperation to pick out a type of situation where agents with the right sort of 
psychological enabling mechanisms can reap the benefits of coordinated action in 
flexible and novel ways. In Individualistic Keas, the fact that the behaviours of the 
keas converge on a state of affairs that satisfy both goals isn’t contingent enough on 
their goals and beliefs.  The notion of cooperation should therefore be tied to the 
content of goal-directed states and to how these contents are related.  
 
Consider the following alternative interpretation of the keas’ behaviour: The 
dominant kea realises that in order to reach the goal of retrieving the food, it must 
come about “that the submissive kea gets onto the seesaw”. As a result of his65 
practical reasoning, he thus adopts this as his goal. Similarly, the submissive kea 
realises that in order to avoid aggressive threats or attacks from the dominant kea, he 
should try to bring it about “that I get onto the end of the seesaw”. If we assume that 
the submissive kea’s goal also can be glossed as “that the submissive kea gets onto 
the seesaw”, then the two keas have the same goal in the sense that the content of 
                                                
65  Both members of all dyads that “solved” the task successfully were male. 
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their goal-directed states can be described in the same way. Furthermore, the same 
set of states of affairs would satisfy both their goals. Now, assuming that the keas 
can detect that they have the same goal here—or at least, that their behaviour is 
sensitive this fact—then the keas can achieve the result that the dominant kea 
retrieves the food and the submissive kea avoids all threats and attacks, without any 
of them having to spend any energy on enforcing or resisting coercion. Let us call 
this The Goal-Aligned Keas case. Contrasting this case with the Individualistic Keas 
thus shows how agents can potentially benefit from having the same goal, allowing 
smoother and more efficient coordination of behaviour. This is why cooperation is a 
form of multi-agent activity that is directed toward a common goal of the 
participating agents. I will postpone the question of whether the keas are cooperating 
here (the coercion involved may give one doubts) and maintain focus on what it is 
for two agents to have a common goal. This question is more complex than it may 
seem. 
 
3.3 Having a common goal 
There is one sense of having a common goal according to which, roughly, two agents 
have a common goal if the content of their goal-directed states can be specified using 
the same sentence. Consider Searle’s example of several individuals running to take 
shelter from the rain: 
 
Imagine that a group of people are sitting on the grass in various places in a park. 
Imagine that it suddenly starts to rain and they all get up and run to a common, 
centrally located shelter. Each person has the intention expressed by the sentence “I 
am running to the shelter.” But for each person, we may suppose that his or her 
intention is entirely independent of the intentions and behavior of others. In this case 
there is no collective behavior; there is just a sequence of individual acts that happen 
to converge on a common goal. (Searle, 1990, pp. 402–403, my emphasis) 
 
This is not, as Searle points out, a case of collective behaviour or joint activity in any 
interesting sense, even though all the individuals involved have a type of goal in 
common (and represent that type of goal in the same way: each represents the 
running as performed by “I”). Each agent has a goal that is directed toward the same 
type of state of affairs. The term ‘common goal’ is sometimes used by Searle and 
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other philosophers as a label for this relationship between goals (Cohen, Levesque, & 
Smith, 1997, p. 96; Miller, 1986, p. 133; see also Kutz, 2000, p. 5 n. 7 on “same 
goal”). However, this is clearly not sufficient (nor is it, perhaps, necessary) for two 
agents to have a common goal in the sense intended by the Boesches and other 
researchers who have adopted their definition of cooperative action. I will therefore 
refer to this relationship between agents as them having a common goal-type. 
 
Whether having a common goal-type facilitates the cooperation between two or more 
agents will depend on if and how the satisfaction of one agent’s goal is connected to 
the other’s agent’s goal satisfaction, and this will be up to what the environment is 
like in which the agents are embedded. If each of us have a goal “that I make lentil 
soup for dinner”, then this may develop into a situation where we all make one big 
pot of lentil soup that we together have for dinner. But if we each have the goal “that 
I win the race” in one and the same hundred meter sprint race, then the fact that we 
have a common goal-type will not help us coordinate our actions to achieve some 
collective outcome.   
 
3.3.1 Intensionally common goal 
So-called “Frege cases” suggest that, for the purpose of making sense of an agent’s 
cognition and behaviour, we cannot individuate beliefs and goals extensionally. In 
Frege cases, an agent holds seemingly inconsistent beliefs or other attitudes but is 
unaware of this because she does not know that the attitudes are representing one and 
the same object under different aspectual shapes (or “modes of presentation”). As far 
as the agent knows, she is representing two different objects. Thus, I may both intend 
to kill Batman at the same time as I intend to save Bruce Wayne’s life. If I am 
unaware of the fact that Batman and Bruce Wayne are two names (aspectual shapes) 
that refer to one and the same person, then I can have both these goals without being 
criticisably irrational for having inconsistent intentions. We can easily make sense of 
this if we individuate goals intensionally. In contrast, it is far from obvious how 
those who take mental states to be individuated extensionally can make sense of 
these cases. 
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For the purpose of explaining the joint action of several agents, similar 
considerations arguably recommend that beliefs and goals should be individuated 
intensionally. After all, in many circumstances, the mere fact that two agents have 
goals directed toward the same states of affairs will not help them coordinate their 
actions unless they also represent those states of affairs in the same way. If I have the 
intention that we kill Batman and you have the intention that we kill Bruce Wayne, 
then this will not help us coordinate a joint assassination even if the same states of 
affairs will satisfy the de re intention of each to see the man variously referred to as 
Bruce Wayne or Batman dead. In order for our common goal to play a role in 
making us join forces in such a case, we thus need what I will call an intensionally 
common goal. In order for several agents to have an intensionally common goal, it is 
not sufficient that the same states of affairs satisfy their goals; they must also 
represent these states of affairs under the same aspectual shape. 
 
How goals should be individuated across agents has not been a topic of discussion or 
debate in the joint action literature, although the question of how mental state 
contents should be individuated is big topic in philosophy of mind in general. 
However, Seamus Miller explicitly states that, in order for several agents to have 
what he calls a “collective end”, the goal that they are directed toward, must be 
“aimed at under the same description” by them all (Miller, 1995, p. 53).66 The phrase 
“under the same description” invites the thought that the requirement is only 
applicable to agents with linguistic capacities, but we can express the same 
underlying idea by saying that agents have to aim at the same state of affairs with 
(more or less) the same aspectual shape in order to have the same goal. Presumably, 
the reason Miller commits to this same-description requirement is that merely having 
                                                
66 Miller elsewhere formulates this same-description requirement in a somewhat less 
strict way, so that the state of affairs only needs to be “aimed at under more or less 
the same description by each agent.” (Miller, 2001, p. 58). Kutz also seem to require 
several agents to have an intensionally common goal in order to have what he calls 
“shared goals”. He submits that, “[b]ecause the objects of intention are intensional 
[…], the question of whether agents’ [participatory] intentions overlap depends upon 
the way their joint activity is described.” (2000, p. 20) 
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an extensionally common goal will not be able to facilitate cooperation in many 
cases. Indeed, when it comes to more complex forms of joint activity that we “adult 
humans in a broadly modern world” engage in, which involve verbal communication 
and long-term planning, the ways in which participants represent their goals and 
subgoals will have to be more or less aligned. For language-using creatures like adult 
human beings, such cases may be quite common.  
 
Besides Frege cases, another reason for thinking that propositional attitudes cannot 
simply be individuated extensionally concerns how indexical thoughts function. In 
the Goal-Aligned Keas case, the keas have a common goal because the goal of each 
kea concerned the same individual. As I characterised the content of their goals, they 
represent this individual in the same way, namely as “the submissive kea”. But one 
might think that it is more plausible that the submissive kea represents this goal as 
“that I get onto the seesaw”, rather than as “that the submissive kea gets onto the 
seesaw”. (I will later consider whether the best way to gloss the goal is simply as “to 
get onto the seesaw”, without any explicit representation of the agent herself at all.) 
These two ways of representing one and the same desired set of states of affairs are 
not equivalent since they may have very different cognitive and behavioural 
consequences. For the purpose of explaining an individual’s behaviour, we cannot 
specify the content of the indexical “I” in merely extensional terms. Perry (1979) 
vividly illustrates this point with a story about himself following someone in a 
supermarket who is leaving a trail of sugar on the floor, presumably because the 
shopper’s sack of sugar is torn. At this point, Perry in the story truly believes “that 
the shopper is making a mess” and he is trying to catch up with the shopper to inform 
him or her about this. He then looks down into his cart to suddenly realise that it is 
he who is the shopper making a mess. In the story, Perry thus forms the true belief 
“that I am making a mess”, stops the cart and rearranges the sack so that the sugar is 
no longer spilling out of it. Note that when Perry realises that he is the shopper who 
is making a mess, he acquires a new piece of information that makes a difference to 
his behaviour. This shows that we cannot, for the purpose of explaining behaviour, 
individuate all beliefs simply according to their extensionally specified contents, that 
is, the sets of states of affairs that would make the beliefs true. Suppose that we do 
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individuate beliefs in this way. Then the belief that Perry in the story has “that the 
shopper is making a mess” will be the same belief as the belief “that I am making a 
mess”. Given such a principle of individuation, we cannot explain Perry’s apparent 
insight and the behaviour that follows from it by appeal to a change in his web of 
beliefs (after all, no such change has occurred: his web of beliefs after his insight will 
be exactly the same as it was before the moment of insight). The same point can be 
made about goals. If the submissive kea had the goal “that the submissive kea gets 
onto the seesaw”, but did not know that he was the submissive kea, then this goal 
would not be able to explain his action of stepping onto the seesaw. As the 
submissive kea realised that he was the submissive kea, he would form the goal “that 
I get onto the seesaw”. This adds weight to the idea that, for the purpose of 
explaining behaviour, we cannot merely individuate goals in terms of their 
extensionally specified contents. On the other hand, if we want to preserve the idea 
that the two keas do have a common goal in the Goal-Aligned Keas case, then we 
cannot simply think of the indexical ‘I’ as contributing a Fregean sense to the goal. If 
we did that, then the dominant kea’s goal “that the submissive keas gets onto the 
seesaw” would not be the same goal as the submissive kea’s goal “that I get onto the 
seesaw”. I will return to this in the next subsection. 
 
While a ‘same aspectual shape’ requirement may chime with our intuitions, as well 
as be appropriate in the context of an account of the robustly joint activities of 
linguistic creatures such as adult human beings, it is not appropriate for my current 
purpose. My purpose in this chapter is to construct an account of socio-psychological 
structure that helps agents who are relatively cognitively unsophisticated to reap the 
mutual benefits that opportunities for joint cooperative action provide them with. In 
light of this purpose, the ‘same aspectual shape’ requirement is too strong. It is 
primarily when language-using creatures engage in complex planned joint activities 
that breakdown of coordination may be expected due to a mismatch of how the world 
is represented (in language) by the different agents. When we are dealing with joint 
activities in the here and now, with goal-contents that are anchored to objects that are 
perceptually available to all participants, it is sufficient for agents to aim at the same 
states of affairs without necessarily representing them in the same way. I submit that 
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an extensionally common goal can play a role in facilitating cooperation in many 
circumstances. Agents who presumably have very different outlooks on their 
surroundings can thus engage in the kind of joint cooperative activity that I want to 
give an account of. Consider the joint cooperative action of young children and their 
caregivers, or the joint activity of a guide dog and its blind owner as they navigate to 
a familiar destination such as, say, the grocery store (Naderi et al., 2001). Arguably, 
this destination will be represented in very different ways by the guide dog and its 
human owner, and there is no reason to think that such an extensionally common 
goal could not be the basis for a socio-psychological structure that coordinates their 
activity with regard to their (extensionally) common goal. 
 
3.3.2 Extensionally common goal 
By taking the relevant notion of having a common goal to be the notion of having an 
extensionally common goal, the keas in the Goal-Aligned Keas case will count as 
having a common goal. This is as it should be, even if it introduces an asymmetry 
between how goals should be individuated intrapersonally and how they should be 
individuated interpersonally. As Perry shopping story illustrated, for the purpose of 
explaining individual behaviour, the contents of beliefs and other attitudes cannot 
simply be individuated extensionally. 
 
Given a fairly well-known view of what the contents of intentions—one important 
kind of goal-directed state—are, fixing the notion of a common goal to that of an 
extensionally common goal seems to create a problem though. According to this 
view, the self, the indexical ‘I’ figures in the content of an intention (without it, the 
state carrying the content in question cannot be an intention but must be some other 
type of mental state). This seems to be Searle’s (1980, 1983) view for example. 
Björn Petersson (2011) calls this the “agent-reference thesis” regarding the content 
of intentions. According to Searle, the content of a prior intention to raise my arm 
that I have prior to actually raising it is “[that] I perform the action of raising my arm 
by way of carrying out this intention” (Searle, 1983, p. 92, my emphasis).67 On 
                                                
67 The content of the intention-in-action that finally causes the bodily movement is 
	   92	  
Searle’s view, goals that two agents have in virtue of their intentions will never be 
the same goal in the extensional sense. Given commitment to the idea that agents 
engaged in joint cooperative action must have a common goal, this view leads to 
some counterintuitive consequences. 
 
Consider the following cooperative problem-solving task used by Brownell et al. 
(2006) to test young children’s capacities for cooperation. Dyads of young children 
faced an apparatus with two handles separated by a transparent screen that controlled 
a toy animal, a dog-puppet that could move (“dance”) to music emitted from its 
inbuilt speakers (“sing”) (see Figure 2). To activate the dog-puppet, both handles had 
to be pulled (more or less) simultaneously.  
 
Figure 2 Apparatus used in the cooperation task (from Brownell et al. 2006, p. 808). 
 
Due to the distance between the handles and the placement of the plastic screen, one 
child couldn’t simultaneously pull both handles on their own. In other words, due to 
                                                                                                                                     
self-referential in a somewhat similar way, but the self does not figure in the content 
as an agent. Searle specifies the content as “[m]y arm goes up as a result of this 
intention in action” (Searle, 1983, p. 93). The object of an intention-in-action is not 
an action, but a bodily movement or some other event that is not an action. 
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the structure of the environment, the contributions of both children were required for 
either child to reach their goal that the dog-puppet danced and sang. Now, if each 
child has the goal “that I make the dog-puppet dance and sing”, then the activity of 
each child is directed to separate sets of states of affairs. The child on the left will be 
trying to bring about that he makes the dog-puppet dance and sing, while the child on 
the right will be trying to bring about that she makes the dog-puppet dance and sing. 
This would thus be similar to Searle’s case of people running for shelter in that both 
children have the same goal in the thin sense that their goals can be specified using 
the same sentence. But unlike in Searle’s case, each agent can only achieve his or her 
goal if the other agent also achieves his or her goal. Even so, if we individuate their 
goals according to their extensionally specified content, then the children do not have 
a common goal. But while I think Searle is correct in saying that we often represent 
ourselves as agents in the content of our prior intentions (future-directed plans), it 
strikes me as implausible that we explicitly represent ourselves as agents with respect 
to our more immediate goals. As Petersson (2011) points or, both everyday talk 
about what people intend and desire and the phenomenology of agency suggest that 
the agent-reference thesis is wrong when it comes to our present-directed agency. 
 
To gloss the goals of the children in Brownell et al.’s experiment as “that I make the 
dog-puppet dance and sing” seems odd. We typically express what we intend to do 
using infinitival clauses, so each child’s goal should arguably be described as “to 
make the dog-puppet dance and sing”. The phenomenology of agency suggests 
something similar. As I type these words on my laptop for example, or as I reach out 
and grasp the coffee mug on my desk, my focus of attention is not on my own 
involvement in achieving certain outcomes—the appearance of certain words on the 
screen, taking a sip of coffee—but on the outcomes themselves. Plausibly, this is also 
true of the children facing the apparatus with handles and the dog-puppet: They are 
focused on bringing about the outcome that the dog-puppet starts to dance and sing, 
not on that they themselves play a role in realising this outcome. The focus of each 
child is presumably to make the dog-puppet dance and sing, rather than that “I” make 
it so.  
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If each child simply has the goal “that the dog-puppet dances and sings”, then their 
goals will be directed toward the same states of affairs and they also have the same 
content. But this goal could be satisfied even if they do not participate in making the 
dog-puppet dance and sing. It is certainly possible that this accurately reflects what 
their goals are, but intuitively, it seems plausible that part of what the children want 
is to activate the dog-puppet. The children do not merely want to observe the dog-
puppet dance and sing, in which case a child would be equally satisfied if they 
observed the other child and a third agent make the dog-puppet dance and sing 
together. What each child wants is arguably still to bring it about that the dog-puppet 
became active. An experiment by Watson and Ramey (1987) showed that 3-month-
old infants respond with much more pleasure in response to the movements of 
mobile if the movements occurred in response to their head movements (the head 
movements activated the mobile through a pressure-sensitive pillow against which 
the infant’s head was resting), than if the movements occurred in response to the 
whims of an experimenter. A plausible interpretation of this result, suggested by 
Bermúdez (1995), is that the infants take more pleasure from watching the mobile 
move in response to their own movements because they appreciate the fact that they 
make the mobile move, that they have exercised their own agency.  
 
While the children in Brownell’s experiment were 1- or 2-year-olds, it is a plausible 
that their preferences in this respect are similar to those of the 3-month-old infants: 
They prefer to observe changes brought about by their own agency than to observe 
the same changes occurring independently of their actions. But this does not mean 
that the infants or the children explicitly represent themselves as agents in their 
goals. Rather, the role of their agency may merely be implicitly represented in the 
cognitive system’s architecture (Recanati, 2007 makes a similar point of about the 
causal self-reference of perceptual states).68 The function of the goal-directed states 
that guide the children’s handle pulling (or the infants’ head movements) to bring 
                                                
68 This is not how Bermúdez formulates his take on Watson and Ramey’s 
experiment. He argues that the infants represent themselves explicitly when they take 
pleasure in exercising their own agency, but that this explicit representation is 
nonconceptual. This difference is not important for my purposes here though. 
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about their goals would in some sense fail to fulfil their function if the states weren’t 
involved in bringing about the state of affairs that satisfies the goals—that the dog-
puppet dances and sings, or that the mobile moves. This implies that the states would 
also fail to fulfil their function if the child or infant herself was not involved in 
making the state of affairs in question come about. However, there is no reason to 
think that the states would fail to fulfil their function if other agents were also 
playing a causal role in bringing about the satisfaction of their goal.  
 
Note that if each child has the goal “to make the dog-puppet dance and sing on my 
own”, then the goals are directed at states of affairs that are mutually exclusive. 
Some goals thus exclude contributions from others in achieving the goal, 
independently of what the world is like. Following Miller and Tuomela (2001, p. 6), 
I will say that a “[g]oal P of an agent X is dividable if and only if (X believes that) 
there will, or at least can, be parts or shares for at least one other agent to bring about 
(or sustain) P.” As long as the goals are dividable, the fact that agents have the same 
goal in a thin sense may thus play a role in facilitating joint cooperative action. 
Crucially for my purposes, a goal can be dividable without concerning a joint 
activity. If I set out in my prison cell to dig a tunnel that emerges outside the walls of 
the prison, my goal would not be (normally) not be frustrated if I discover, as I have 
dug half the distance, that you have been digging a tunnel from the outside toward 
my cell. As we meet in the middle, our tunnel-digging goals are satisfied, even 
though neither of our goals was about a joint activity. Dividable goals may of course 
also be goals “that we J” or “that I perform my part of our J-ing”, but the important 
point here is that they need not be. Dividable goals may also be only implicitly 
concerned with one’s own agency or they may be “agent-neutral” (Butterfill, 2012b; 
see also Gold & Sugden, 2007a, p. 130). 
 
On the view I advocate, the goal of each child is thus most plausibly characterised as 
“to make the dog-puppet dance and sing” or “that the dog-puppet dances and sings”, 
in which case they are both directed at the same state of affairs. This allows us to 
hold on to the idea that for the purpose of understanding cooperation among the 
cognitively disadvantaged (relatively speaking), the useful sense of sameness of 
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goal-contents have to do with the represented state of affairs, not with the way in 
which the state of affairs is represented. In other words, the pullings on the handles 
in Brownell et al.’s experiment might be directed toward a common goal, even if one 
child represents the dog-puppet as, say, “Pluto”, while the other child instead 
represents it as “Snoopy”.  
 
As I have formulated the notion of an extensionally common goal, two (or more) 
agents have a common goal if and only if their goals are satisfied by the same set of 
state of affairs. But this is actually a simplification, because as it stands, it is too hard 
and fast: there need not be perfect overlap between the states of affairs that satisfy 
the goals. Or rather, whether two agents have a common goal is not an all or nothing 
affair. To make this point vivid, consider the following case: Suppose that Fritz and 
Tom are two cats who are unusually social hunters and playmates.69 Each of them 
has a goal concerning the same mouse. Fritz’s goal is “that we play with the mouse” 
and Tom’s goal is “that we hunt the mouse”. Now, suppose that Fritz mistakenly 
ascribes his own goal, “that we play with the mouse”, to Tom, and that Tom 
mistakenly ascribes his own goal, “that we hunt the mouse”, to Fritz. As a result of 
these goals and goal-ascriptions, the two cats end up chasing the mouse in a 
coordinated fashion. After some chasing, the mouse is caught and Tom feeds on it. 
This outcome satisfies both Fritz’s goal and Tom’s goal.  
 
Intuitively, it seems right to say about this case that Fritz and Tom jointly chased the 
mouse in a cooperative fashion and that they did this partly in virtue of the partial 
overlap of their goals. The overlap is partial because there are states of affairs that 
will satisfy Fritz’s goal but not Tom’s, and there are states of affairs that will satisfy 
Tom’s goal but not Fritz’s. If Fritz simply lets the mouse go after they have been 
chasing it around for a while (to Fritz’s delight), then only Fritz’s goal will be 
satisfied. Alternatively, if the two cats start by approaching the mouse together and 
the mouse does not notice them before Tom knocks the mouse unconscious with his 
                                                
69 Thanks to Till Vierkant for putting forward a less elaborate version of this example 
as a challenge the claim that having a common goal is necessary for joint cooperative 
activity. 
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paw and immediately proceeds to eat it. In this case, there has not been any chase 
(that is, no play), so only Tom’s goal will have been satisfied. Still, despite these 
counterfactual possibilities, it is not clear that we should exclude this as a case of 
joint cooperative action.  
 
Note that this case is similar to The Individualistic Keas case that I described in 
section 3.2. In both cases, there are two agents who seem to lack an extensionally 
common goal but given the environment they find themselves in, their goals are 
partly overlapping. However, we concluded that the dominant and the submissive 
kea did not have a common goal at all (recall that on The Individualistic Keas 
interpretation, the dominant’s goal was “that I retrieve the food” and the 
submissive’s goal was “that I avoid aggressive attacks”). This conclusion is correct 
because there are so many counterfactual but plausible circumstances —nearby 
possible worlds—in which only the goal of one kea is satisfied. It is unlikely that 
their goal-pursuits will lead to an outcome that satisfies both their goals, but as it 
happens, within the confines of the particular experiment, this is exactly what one 
would expect to happen. If we bracket the role of the researchers’ design of the 
experiment, it is merely an accident that the behaviours of the keas converge in a 
way that makes both their goals satisfied. The play/hunt of Fritz and Tom is quite 
different, at least given some plausible assumptions about cats and mice. Assume, for 
example, that in most circumstances in which two cats and a mouse meet, the cats 
will end up chasing the mouse both if the cats play with the mouse and if they hunt 
the mouse. Since, let us assume, a mouse is very good at detecting and tracking cats, 
it is very unlikely that a cat would be able to sneak up on a mouse and immediately 
kill it. Furthermore, if two cats chase a mouse, the mouse will become very tired and 
eventually become an easy prey for a cat that intends to catch and eat it. If this is all 
true, then in most circumstances in which the play/hunt were to occur, Fritz and Tom 
would mutually benefit from coordinating their goal-pursuits even if they do not, 
strictly speaking, have an extensionally common goal. 70 On the other hand, if these 
                                                
70 Compare with Kutz’s discussion of what it means for two agents to share goals 
(see 2000, pp. 20–21): “[A]gents’ intentions overlap – they share goals – when [(a)] 
the collective end component of their participatory intentions refers to the same [type 
of] activity or outcome and [(b)] when there is a nonempty intersection of the sets of 
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assumptions are false, and the cats’ joint chase of the mouse was more of an 
accident, then we would arguably be less inclined to say that the joint chase was a 
case of cooperative action after all.  
 
The lesson to draw from this is that having a common goal is not an all or nothing 
affair. While it is clear that the individualistic keas do not have a common goal, Fritz 
and Tom have a common goal to some considerable degree (in all nearby possible 
worlds where Fritz and Tom have these goals, their goal-pursuits will lead to a 
coordinated chase of the mouse). The category of common goals is thus a fuzzy one, 
and so, by implication, is the category of what I will call “joint goals”. However, to 
simplify the discussion, I will continue to assume that for two or more agents to have 
a common goal, their goals must be such that they are be satisfied by the same set of 
states of affairs.  
 
To sum up, I have argued that the notion of common goal that is useful for the 
purpose of understanding joint cooperative activities of relatively cognitively 
unsophisticated agents such as preverbal infants and the non-human animals for 
example, is the notion of an extensionally common goal rather than that of an 
intensionally common goal. This marks a difference to what is otherwise a useful 
notion of sameness when we are considering the behaviour of one and the same 
agent. Note that I am not denying that a stronger notion of sameness is required for 
agents to count as participating in some more robust intuitive form of joint action, 
                                                                                                                                     
states of affairs satisfying those collective ends.” (p. 20) I take it that Kutz is here 
giving necessary and sufficient conditions (labeled (a) and (b) by me) for several 
agents to have a goal in common. In order for several agents to have a common goal, 
Kutz thus only requires that there is one possible state of affairs that satisfies their 
goals. But this does not mean that he would say that the dominant and the submissive 
kea share a goal in The Individualistic Keas case since the keas do not have 
participatory intentions (there is no “collective end component” that is part of the 
content of their intentions). Note though, that Kutz elsewhere in the same paper says 
that “when we share a goal, the intentions of each are only satisfied by the 
performance or realization of the same token activity or outcome.” (p. 5 n. 7, my 
emphasis) This is in line with my much more stringent initial formulation of what is 
required for having an extensionally common goal, according to which two agents 
have a common goal only if the overlap between the sets of states of affairs that 
satisfy their goals is perfect. 
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according to which agents need to represent the goal in the same way. However, the 
purpose here is not to capture an intuitive everyday notion of cooperation or joint 
action. Instead, our aim is to explicate a notion of a having a common goal (or 
having the same goal) that is useful for theorizing about cooperation among, for 
example, non-human animals and very young children. 
 
3.4 The recognised action interdependence condition 
The fact that two or more agents have an extensionally or intensionally common goal 
is not by itself a fact that is conducive to cooperation. Whether it is or not will 
depend, among other things, on the structure of the agents’ environment and the 
tasks that the agents are facing. In the context of Brownell et al.’s cooperative task 
presented in the last subsection, having a common goal to make the dog-puppet 
dance and sing is potentially conducive to joint action. But suppose that the 
apparatus was designed differently, so that the following was the case: If both 
handles are pulled simultaneously, then the apparatus jams and the dog-puppet 
breaks. The dog-puppet is only activated if only one of the handles is pulled out. In 
such circumstances, the fact that the children have the goal “to make the dog-puppet 
dance and sing” in common is more likely to hinder than to help that their common 
goal becomes satisfied. If it was the case that each handle when pulled activated the 
dog-puppet, irrespectively of whether or not (and when) the other handle is pulled, 
then the fact that the children have their common goal will make no significant 
difference with regard to how each of them pursue their goal. Furthermore, even if 
the tasks and the environment of the participants are such that the common goal is 
potentially conducive to joint action, the participants’ behaviour must also be 
sensitive to this goal commonality for it to be actually conducive to joint action. This 
is why having a common goal is not enough for two or more agents to have a joint 
goal. There must also be recognised interdependence with regard to the pursuits of 
the common goal from the perspective of each participant.71 Recall that the Boesches 
                                                
71 I am borrowing the term “recognized interdependence” from Bratman (2006, p. 2). 
Bratman is concerned with recognised interdependence of intentions rather than 
actions though. 
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(1989) operationally define cooperative behaviour as “two or more or more 
individuals acting together to achieve a common goal” (p. 550, my emphasis). 
Perhaps the inclusion of “acting together” reflects a recognition that it is not 
sufficient for two or more individuals to all be trying to achieve a common goal for 
this attempt to be joint or cooperative in any interesting sense. 
 
Note that if the participants have intentions “that we J” as required by Bratman’s 
account, or perhaps intentions “to perform my part in our J-ing”, then there will, 
irrespectively of what the participants’ environment is like, be actual 
interdependence between the contributions of the participants. For me to succeed in 
performing my part of our J-ing as my part, you must successfully perform your part 
of our J-ing, and vice versa. The same goes, of course, for each of our intentions 
“that we J” However, since we do not want our account of joint cooperative action to 
demand of participants that they have intentions or goals with such collective 
content, a recognised interdependence condition needs to be explicitly incorporated 
into our account.  
 
Other accounts do not require that agents have intentions or goals with collective 
content, such as Seamus Miller’s “collective end”-account and Stephen Butterfill’s 
“shared goals”-account of joint action. Butterfill outlines a set of relations between 
goals and expectations that he suggests may play an important coordinative function 
in the joint activities of young children. The expectations include “expectations about 
a common effect”, which means that “on balance each agent expects this goal to 
occur as a common effect of all of their actions directed to the goal, her own and 
others’.” (Butterfill, 2012a, p. 40) Seamus Miller also incorporates a condition of 
recognised interdependence in his account of what he calls a “collective end”, which 
he takes to be a necessary ingredient in joint action. In the following, Miller’s ‘end’ 
is what I refer to as ‘goal’: 
 
[Collective ends] are ends that are necessarily shared; they are not ends that are 
shared only as a matter of contingent fact. Suppose you and I are soldiers being shot 
at by a single sniper. Suppose further that we both happen to see the sniper at the 
same time and both fire at the sniper in order to kill him. I have an individual end, 
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and you have an individual end. Moreover, my individual end is one that I share 
with you; for the death of this one sniper will not only realise my individual end, it 
will simultaneously realise your individual end. However, this is not yet a collective 
end, for the fact that I have as an end the death of the sniper—as do you—does not 
generate independent [sic, recte interdependent] acts of shooting. For neither of us 
needs the other to realise the individual end we share. Accordingly, I may well retain 
my individual end, when I know you have abandoned yours. As it happens we have 
shared individual ends; but they are not necessarily shared individual ends. (Miller, 
2001, pp. 58–59, also 1995, pp. 52–53) 
 
Put into my terminology, Miller’s requirement would demand that, for two agents to 
have a joint goal, their common goal must be such that it can only be satisfied if they 
both pursue the common goal, and furthermore, each agent must be in a position to 
be moved by this fact to act in pursuit of the goal. To be positioned in this way, they 
must have certain expectations about the likely effects of various means they can 
take to achieve their goal and about how these effects may combine with the likely 
behaviour of the other agent. It is not merely required that there is actual 
interdependence between the agents’ goal-pursuits but that this interdependence is 
recognised by the agents themselves (if it is not recognised, then the fact that they 
have a common goal cannot play a role in generating their interdependent actions). 
Suppose that the sniper in Miller’s example is actually a supervillain who cannot be 
killed by normal bullets, but only by injections of two particular substances that 
mixes into a deadly poison in his body. While we are completely unaware of this, our 
rifles are unbeknownst to us loaded with bullets filled with these particular 
substances; your bullets with one substance, mine with the other. In this case, the 
satisfaction of our goals happens to necessarily intertwined since we both need to fire 
and hit the sniper in order to get her killed. This mere fact wouldn’t generate 
interdependent actions, even if our goals in the given context happen to be such that 
the satisfaction of one of them is necessarily tied up with the satisfaction of the other. 
 
It is unclear why Miller’s formulation of the interdependence condition is so strong. 
Instead of requiring that the goal is such that, by each agent’s own lights, it couldn’t 
be achieved merely by the performance of the agent’s own action, we should just 
require of each agent they recognise that the combined effect of their own and the 
others’ actions increases the likelihood of goal achievement, and that this recognition 
causes them to perform their own action in pursuit of the goal. Furthermore, this 
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increase in likelihood of goal achievement may merely be a summative increase.72 
Miller seems to require that the recognised interdependence must be stronger kind, 
so that the recognised increase in likelihood cannot be merely summative. On such a 
stricter view, it may be that you and I firing at the sniper would involve a joint goal if 
the actions we are about to perform complemented each other in such a way that they 
combined to increase the likelihood of the sniper being shot dead beyond that of 
merely giving us two chances of hitting the sniper. For example, if you fire your rifle 
first and I fire mine in quick succession, then if your shot doesn’t kill the sniper, it 
will get her off-balance and thereby make it easier for me to hit and kill with the 
second shot. You might aim slightly more to the left than you would otherwise do, in 
the hope that the sniper will take cover toward the right where I will have a better 
line of sight than I do now. I might anticipate this, waiting to fire when the sniper 
goes for cover in the way expected. If we both fire our shots in light of such 
expectations, then this stricter recognised interdependence requirement would have 
been satisfied. However, it is not clear to me why we should formulate the 
requirement in this strict way. It should be sufficient if the recognised increase in 
likelihood of goal achievement causes each agent to perform his or her action. If the 
soldiers in Miller’s example would have shot anyway, irrespectively of what they 
expect the other soldier to do, then the fact that they have a common goal will play 
no role in generating their action. However, if each soldier judges that the chance 
that just one shot hits the sniper is too low for him or her to bother taking a shot and 
each soldier also judges that given the summed chance of one of their two shots 
hitting the sniper is high enough for them to each take a shot, then the fact that they 
have a common goal will have played an role in generating their actions of shooting 
at the sniper (even if the interdependence is involved here is “merely” summative). 
 
Note that this recognised interdependence requirement rules out the Goal-Aligned 
Keas case as an example of the kind of cooperation we are trying give an account of 
here. Given the setup of the experiment, there is no sense in which the fact that the 
                                                
72 This doesn’t rule out that there are other actions that could be performed the 
agents could perform on their own which would increase the likelihood of goal 
achievement even more. 
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dominant kea has the same goal as the submissive kea, namely “that the submissive 
kea gets onto the seesaw”, plays a role in making it more likely that this goal is 
achieved. Once the submissive kea has this goal (possibly as a result of being bullied 
by the dominant kea), the dominant kea is not in a position to contribute to the 
achievement of this goal. While there is dependency between the goals—the 
submissive kea wouldn’t have the goal to get onto the seesaw unless the dominant 
kea had that goal first—there is no dependencies between the actions the keas 
perform in the pursuit of their common goal. (Of course, this is true given the 
circumstances of the experiment. With a different setup and apparatus, the 
recognised interdependence requirement might have been met.) 
 
3.5 Representational and metarepresentational “glue” 
For two or more agents to be able to take cooperative advantage of the fact that they 
have a common goal, it is not sufficient that they each recognises the 
interdependence between their own future action and some action that the other 
agent(s) may perform. An agent must also expect, at least to some minimal degree, 
that the other agent(s) will in fact perform this action. But this does not mean that the 
agents must be able to attribute goal-directed states to the other agents. As I have 
previously speculated, the hunting performed by packs of wolves, hyena or lions may 
be facilitated by the fact that the pack members have a common goal, even if none of 
them is aware of this fact. They may be able to successfully predict and coordinate 
with each other in virtue of this fact that the animals have a common goal that, even 
if they do not represent the others’ behaviours as goal-directed. Instead, they may 
merely be “smart behavioural readers”. 
 
Smart behaviour reading will not enable agents to engage in flexible forms 
cooperation in which novel goals are adopted and pursued though. Without the 
ability to recognise the goals toward which the actions of others are directed, agents 
will not be able to reason about various possible means by which these goals may be 
achieved. In other words, being able to predict the future behaviour of others is not 
all that goal-recognition enables an agent to do. It also enables her to help others by, 
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for example, directing the other’s attention to means of achieving her goal that she 
isn’t currently using. Such skills may clearly be useful in facilitating more effective 
and robust joint cooperative action.  
 
At any rate, insofar as we are interested in the joint cooperative behaviour of young 
children and non-human primates, there is plenty of evidence demonstrating that 
young children—from before their first birthday—and some non-human primates are 
indeed skilled goal-readers (Behne et al., 2005; Call et al., 2004; Carpenter et al., 
1998; Phillips et al., 2009; Woodward, 1998).73 However, note that the fact that they 
can recognise the goals that another’s action is directed toward does not mean that 
they attribute goal-directed states to the other agents. Instead, they may simply 
represent the goals as states of affairs toward which the actions are pulled, or 
represent them as the function of the bodily movements in question (Csibra & 
Gergely, 2007; Gergely & Csibra, 2003). In other words, recognising the goals that 
actions are directed toward does not necessarily require metarepresentational 
capacities. One can recognise a goal that another agent’s action is directed toward 
without representing that goal as something that is represented by the other agent. 
But perhaps young children do have a mentalistic understanding of goal-
directedness, even if they do not yet have a similar understanding of beliefs. With 
such a partial understanding of other minds, they could make sense of actions in 
terms of partially subjective motivating reasons for action. Before the age of about 3 
to 4 years, they would do this not in terms of beliefs and desires, in thought goes, but 
in terms of facts about the world (thus, they draw on their own beliefs about the 
world) and desires that they attribute to others (Perner and Roessler call this “the 
hybrid account of children’s conception of intentional action” (2010, p. 205)). 
 
                                                
73 Can they also recognise whether a goal is dividable or whether it about the agent 
herself bringing about some state of affairs “on her own”? Research by Becchio et al. 
(e.g. 2010) demonstrates that at least adults seem to be able to discriminate between 
very similar actions (directed toward the same object) that are performed with 
competitive or cooperative intent, based solely on the kinematics of the bodily 
movements. In light of this, it doesn’t seem far-fetched that young children and some 
non-human animals may be able to discriminate between dividable goals and purely 
“individualistic” goals. 
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Note that if we required that agents had an intensionally common goal rather than 
merely an extensionally common goal, then an agent could only reliably detect that it 
had a goal in common with another agent if it was able not merely to recognise the 
outcome toward which the other’s activity was directed but also recognise the way in 
which the other represented this outcome. An understanding of goals as outcomes 
represented by goal-directed (mental) states such as intentions or desires will not 
provide an agent with this ability. To be able to do this, the agent must also be able to 
attribute beliefs different from their own to other agents (say, the belief that the dog-
puppet is “Pluto” rather than “Snoopy”). An agent that lacks this ability will still, of 
course, represent the outcome that the other’s activity is directed toward in some way 
(with some aspectual shape), but the agent does not necessarily attribute a 
perspective on that outcome that belongs to the other agent. There is no need for 
“Level-2”-type perspective taking (Masangkay et al., 1974).  
 
To summarise, it may be that agents who are merely smart behaviour-readers are 
able to gain mutual advantage from the fact that they have the same goal and the 
opportunity to perform interdependent actions to achieve this goal. But if the agents 
are able to recognise the goal that the others’ activity is directed toward, and able to 
detect that this is also their own goal, then this would allow them to cooperate in a 
much more flexible manner, and direct their activity toward a variety of goals. In the 
case of young children and non-human animals, it is rarely (if ever) necessary that 
the agents discriminate between different ways in which goals are represented. 
Typically, these agents can simply (and safely) assume that goals of others are 
represented in the same way that they represent them. 
 
3.6 An account of joint goals 
I will now summarise and make more explicit what I have said so far regarding the 
conditions under which two or more agents having a common goal can play a role in 
facilitating cooperation between them. I will say that two agents have a joint goal 
when they are related to each other and to their environment in such a way that the 
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following conditions are met. For two agents A and B to have a joint goal g, the 
following conditions must be met: 
 
1. Common goal condition: Agents A and B have an extensionally common goal 
g. For this to be the case, their goals must be directed toward (more or less) 
the same set of states of affairs. It is not necessary that A and B represent g in 
the same way, that is, they need not have an intensionally common goal. 
2. Action-readiness condition: Each of agents A and B is ready and able to 
initiate an action a / b directed toward g. 
3. Recognised action interdependence condition: In virtue of their common goal 
g, A and B each believes (i) that the other agent will perform the action b / a, 
and (ii) that g is more likely to be satisfied if both a and b are performed than 
if either a or b is performed on its own. 
 
If the beliefs mentioned in the recognised action interdependence condition result in 
A actually performing a and B actually performing b, then the joint goal of A and B 
glues a and b together into a joint action aimed at g. (The beliefs may of course turn 
out to be false, but I assume that they are typically true and true in virtue of the fact 
that the actions a and b are directed toward the common goal g.) Note that to have 
the beliefs required by the recognised action interdependence condition, A and B 
need not (but may) attribute goal-directed states to each other, it is sufficient that 
they expect that the other will exhibit goal-directed behaviour directed toward g (in 
other words, I here equate ‘action’ with ‘goal-directed behaviour’). 
 
It will be useful to have a way of talking about the beliefs and goal-directed states 
that one agent must have in order to take part in a joint goal with another agent. I will 
reserve the verb phrase “to share in a goal with” to refer to this. For agent A to share 
in a goal g with agent B, the following must be the case (assuming that A has the 
concept of a goal): 
 
1. A has goal g; 
2. A is ready and able to perform action a in pursuit of g; 
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3. A believes that B will perform action b in pursuit of g; 
4. A believes that g is more likely to be achieved if a and b is performed than if 
either a or b is performed on its own. 
 
 
This account of joint action as the result of a joint goal has some counterintuitive 
consequences. Cases can be constructed in which all three conditions are satisfied 
but where the “joint action” would not ordinarily be characterised as cooperative. 
Recall Bratman’s account of shared intentional activity and the crucial role that the 
second condition in making such shared intention activity cooperative. In order for 
the coordinated activity of two agents to count as a shared intentional activity, each 
agent must not only intend “that we J”, but also intend the efficacy of the other’s 
intention “that we J”—each intends that they J in accordance with and because of the 
other’s intention that they do the same—as well as intend that their subplans for J-
ing mesh. The requirement that the agent intend that their intentions are held in 
accordance with and because of the other’s intention rules out cases where one agent 
tries to entirely bypass the intentional agency of the other agent. Consider Bratman’s 
example of two people who each intends that they go to New York together by 
throwing the other into the trunk of the car and driving there (1992, p. 333). Even if 
the two end of fighting each other at the threshold of the trunk, each trying to lock up 
the other in the compartment, it will still be true that it is more likely that they end up 
going to New York if both agents perform their respective actions than if only one of 
them does (they won’t end up going to New York if one of them simply stays at 
home and never even approaches the car). In this case, all three conditions that I have 
presented are arguably fulfilled. There are also cases that involve a non-cooperative 
element without anyone acting in conflict with the other’s goals or chosen means. 
Suppose that one member of a dyad faced with Brownell et al.’s cooperative 
problem-solving task, agent A, believes that the other dyad member, agent B, will 
grab hold of the other handle, but A is not sure whether B will actually pull it out 
(perhaps he correctly believes that she thinks to activate the dog-puppet, it is 
sufficient if both handles are simply simultaneously held by them). If A then, in 
addition to performing the action of pulling out the handle on his side (action a), also 
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intends to, at the same time, grab hold of B’s free arm and yank at it hard in order to 
mechanically pull out the other handle while B is holding on to it (B’s action b is thus 
merely to hold the handle bar). Thus, the dog-puppet is activated (g is satisfied) 
partly as a result of A using B as a mechanical tool to pull out the other handle. This 
case does not seem to be ruled out by Bratman’s second condition. However, 
Bratman also submits that a shared intentional activity must involve mutual 
responsiveness in action, and that this mutual responsiveness must be an outcome of 
the shared intention (Bratman, 1992, pp. 338–339). I take it that this requirement 
rules out that this dyad’s activation of the dog-puppet would qualify as a shared 
intentional activity. 
 
Neither of these two cases looks like a case of what we would intuitively call 
“cooperation”. Should we then not include a condition similar to Bratman’s second 
condition in order to filter out counterintuitive cases like these? For the purpose of 
constructing an account of what facilitates cooperation among relatively cognitively 
unsophisticated agents, the answer must be no. As I have pointed out earlier, 
Bratman’s condition demand of participants not only that they have the conceptual 
capacities to have plan-intentions concerning the plan-intentions of themselves and 
the other participating agents, it also requires that they have the conceptual capacities 
for having plan-intentions concerning the meshing of their own and others’ subplans. 
It seems unlikely that this falls within what, say, three-years-old children, let alone 
non-human primates and social carnivores have capacities for. This may not actually 
be a problem for Bratman himself since he is primarily interested in the shared 
agency of planning agents, such as “adult humans in a broadly modern world” 
(2009a, p. 153). However, others have adopted his account to understand what is 
involved in children’s participation in joint activity (e.g. Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 
680; Carpenter, 2009, p. 381). So it seems to at least be a problem for certain ways in 
which Bratman’s account has been put to use. 
 
I will bite the bullet here. I do not claim that the fact that two or more agents have a 
joint goal directed at g invariably lead to joint action that is cooperative. All I am 
claiming is that, under most circumstances, if two agents A and B have a joint goal 
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directed at extensionally common goal g, then this reliably facilitates coordinated 
cooperation directed toward g. I am here following Butterfill (2012), who submits 
that the pattern of expectations and goal-relations that he presents as able to supports 
an important role in coordinating joint activity, can only do so “in favourable 
circumstances”, where the presence of coercion is one type of unfavourable 
circumstance (p. 42). Note though, that the presence of coercion will in many cases 
provide the material that is needed for a simple reinforcement learning story about 
how individualistic goal-pursuits may be shaped to mimic cooperation, as I pointed 
out in section 3.2. The involvement of coercion will thus often be a factor that 
favours an individualistic interpretation of what guides the behaviours that are 
observed. 
 
Like Butterfill’s account, which my account closely resembles, my account is not 
overly cognitively demanding. When it comes to the mindreading capacities required 
of the participants, the account at most requires that agents are able to recognise the 
goals of others. Furthermore, agents must have general capacities for reasoning about 
how several causal contributions may generate a combined effect. The condition of 
recognised action interdependence arguably implies non-trivial cognitive demands 
on such reasoning. Exactly what is required will of course depend on the task that the 
participants are facing.  
 
The account I have given fits what the cognitive scientists quoted in this chapter’s 
introduction gloss the goals that primates must have in common in order to be 
engaged in cooperation for example. Importantly, the account allows for, but does 
not require that agents represent goals with collective content or “we”-content. Thus, 
agents need not have any concept of cooperation or joint activity in order to 
participate in cooperative or joint activity on this account. All that is required is that 
their goals are “dividable” (Miller & Tuomela, 2001). As I have pointed out already, 
dividable goals may be “agent-neutral” without having any collective content 
(Butterfill, 2012b; Gold & Sugden, 2007a, p. 130). A virtue of this is that we can 
side-step problems or challenges of analytical circularity that accounts of joint action 
that require participants to have intentions “that we J” face (see Petersson, 2007). 
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The agents merely have to represent the goal of their action and that the other’s 
contribution has a role to play in increasing the chance of goal achievement.  
 
In the next and final section, I consider what kind behavioural phenomena that can 
be taken to support an inference to the claim that an activity is coordinated by a joint 
goal.  
 
3.7 How to recognise ‘joint goal’-driven joint action 
My aim in this section is to show that the notion of joint goal is empirically tractable. 
Whether or not we should claim that a multi-agent activity is coordinated by a joint 
goal will depend on whether a joint goal figures in our best psychological 
explanation of how that activity came about. Since the issue here is one of inference 
to the best explanation, we should not demand a fixed set of behavioural criteria that 
can be used in every case to decisively determine whether a joint goal is present or 
not. The best one can hope for is a set of relevant constraints and factors that can be 
used to judge whether an inference to a joint goal is justified or not. 
 
3.7.1 Accidental and coordinated collective achievements 
One way of testing for whether two or more individuals have a joint goal is to see 
whether they reliably achieve an outcome that is desired by each but which can only 
be brought about if they coordinate their actions. In such a case, the performance of 
the subtask of each comes to nothing unless the other also performs his or her 
subtask. If one can observe that an individual only performs their subtask (or is more 
likely to perform it, or performs it at higher rate) when the other individual is likely 
to carry out his or her subtask—only when the other individual is present and facing 
in the relevant direction for example—then we can infer that this individual has some 
understanding of the role the other participant plays for successful task completion.  
 
On the basis of this line of reasoning, primatologists, comparative psychologists, and 
developmental psychologists have tested whether various types of agents are able to 
coordinate their actions to achieve a common goal. I will consider some such studies 
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in light of what they can tell us about various creatures’ capacities to have a joint 
goal. The following experimental setup from Melis et al. (2006) is representative. 
Melis et al. tested whether chimpanzees were able to rationally judge when to recruit 
a collaborator in order to retain food.74 Each subject was presented with a platform 
baited with food that was placed behind a railing. A rope was threaded through metal 
loops on the platform, with both ends of the rope extending through the railing into 
the test room that the subject was released into. If a subject only pulled on one rope 
end in order to drag the food-baited platform toward the railing, then the rope would 
unthread through the metal loops and come loose from the platform (and thus make it 
impossible to retrieve the food). In order to get the platform to get closer to the 
railing, either both ends had to be pulled at the same time or one end had to be pulled 
while the other was held steady.  
 
 
Figure 3 The baited food platform used in Melis et al’s (2006) study of cooperation in 
chimpanzees. A rope is threaded through metal loops on the platform, with both ends of the 
rope extending into the test room behind the railing. 
In an adjacent locked room another chimpanzee, a potential co-operator, was 
waiting. By removing a wooden peg, a subject could release the other chimpanzee 
into the test room. What Melis et al. were interested in was how the decision of a 
                                                
74 In a second experiment, Melis et al. (2006) tested whether chimpanzees could 
make an informed choice between two potential collaborators, which they had 
previously collaborated with at the same task in an introductory session. In the test 
session, chimpanzees preferred to recruit the collaborator who had been a more 
effective partner in the previous introductory session. 
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subject to release or not to release the other chimpanzee depended on whether it was 
physically possible for the subject to retrieve the food from the platform or not.  
 
There were two conditions in Melis et al.’s experiment: the “collaboration condition” 
and the “solo condition”. In the collaboration condition, the ends of the rope were 
placed three metres apart, so that it was impossible for the subject to hold or pull 
both ends of the rope at the same time. Hence, in order to retrieve the food on the 
platform in the collaboration condition, the subject would have to release the 
collaborator into the test room, so that each could pull one rope end and together 
drag the platform toward the railing. In the solo condition, then ends of the rope were 
placed fifty-five centimetres apart, so that it was possible for the subject to pull both 
rope ends at the same time. The subject could thus acquire all the food for herself 
without having to share half of it with the collaborator. The result was that seven of 
the eight chimpanzee subjects released the collaborator significantly more often in 
the collaboration condition than in the solo condition.75 Melis et al. took this to show 
that the chimpanzees were sensitive to the fact that both their own contribution and 
the contribution of the collaborator were required for successfully food retrieval. 
 
This experiment gives an either/or measure of subjects’ understanding of whether or 
not a situation calls for cooperation: the chimpanzee can either release the potential 
partner or choose not to. In other experiments, subjects are repeatedly trying to do 
something either alone or together with a partner. This allows one to compare the 
rate at which subjects try to achieve a goal (such as retrieving food) without and with 
a partner. If a task requires the contribution of a partner, and there is a significant 
difference in the rate of attempts between when the partner is absent and when he or 
she is present, then this suggests that the individuals are monitoring each other’s 
activity and modulating their activity in light of what the other is doing (see e.g. 
Chalmeau & Gallo, 1995; Chalmeau, 1994; Visalberghi, Quarantotti, & Tranchida, 
2000 for studies of nonhuman primates).76 
                                                
75 Seed et al. (2008) used a very similar setup as that of Melis et al. to test rooks’ 
cognitive capacities for cooperation, but with negative result. 
76 Alternatively, one can compare the rate when partners have different degree of 
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If a subject clearly shows sensitivity to the fact that a task requires another’s 
contribution, then any interpretation that construes the behaviour of these agents as 
rational will involve attribution of a dividable goal to at least one agent (the subject 
in Melis et al.’s task). Purely individualistic goals, goals “that I do A on my own” 
cannot be satisfied if the agent knows that doing A is impossible without the 
contribution of another agent. It may of course be the case that the goal that the agent 
has in common with another, say “to bring the platform to the railing”, is a goal he 
has only in virtue of an instrumental desire that he has formed in light of his ultimate 
desire “to eat all food myself”. The goal the agent has in virtue of his ultimate desire 
will not be one that he has in common with another agent then.  
 
Note that the experiments confound the situation where subjects have a common goal 
but fail to grasp that there is an opportunity to benefit from coordinated action, and 
the situation where they do not have a common goal but where they have the causal 
understanding required to benefit from coordinated action if they would have a 
common goal. The capacity to have dividable goals and to recognise that one has a 
goal in common with another agent can thus be masked by failure to meet other 
performance requirements of the task though. In particular, the task may require a 
quite sophisticated understanding of causal relationships for an agent to understand 
that the contribution of another agent can help him or her to achieve the goal. But if a 
subject only acts in concert with a partner, or only acts when a partner is likely to 
contribute, then inferring that the subject has the capacity to share in a goal with 
another seems to be justified (that is, that the subject is able to appreciate that he and 
another agent have a common goal and that it is more likely that the goal is achieved 
if both perform their contributions). 
 
However, apparently purposive coordination may be the result of the fact that the 
agents are embedded in the same environment at the same time, and thus presented 
with similar constraints and opportunities for action. This may accidentally lead to 
                                                                                                                                     
perceptual access to each other’s activity, as in Mendres and de Waal (2000). 
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similar actions being performed roughly at the same time toward the same target 
object. But we cannot conclude from the fact that coordination is merely accidental 
that the agents do not have a common goal. Plausibly, some multi-agent activities 
may be coordinated in virtue of agents typically having agent-neutral goals and high 
social tolerance, so that they are able to act in parallel in close proximity to each 
other, and thereby be exposed to the same action constraints and opportunities, 
potentially leading to them have the same goal (see Petit et al., 1992 on 
“coproduction”). But this would not amount to joint activity in the sense of a multi-
agent activity coordinated by what I call a joint goal. 
 
3.7.2 Ruling out “merely local” non-accidental coordination 
Recall that that the recognised action interdependence condition requires that there 
be recognised action interdependence in virtue of the fact that the agents have the 
common goal g. This means that the fact that coordination is non-accidental within 
the local context of a psychological or behavioural experiment may potentially 
mislead us. The participants’ actions may be non-accidentally coordinated as a result 
of the wrong cause. Consider Brownell et al.’s (2006) study that I presented in 
section 3.3.2. Their experiment was designed to test of the cooperative abilities of 1- 
and 2-years-old children. Recall that the dog-puppet mounted on top of the box was 
activated if and only if the two handles were pulled simultaneously, which in this 
case meant that one handle had to be pulled within three seconds of the other handle 
(see Figure 2 on page 92).77 A key issue for Brownell et al. was whether any 
observed coordinated behaviour, that is, any successful activation of the dog-puppet, 
“was coincidental or cooperative” (p. 811). They found that the successful 
activations of the 1-year-old dyads appeared to be accidental, but the 2-year-olds 
                                                
77 The cooperation task was actually administered in two versions. Besides the one 
where the children had to pull the handles simultaneously, there was a version in 
which they had to be pulled sequentially so that one of the handles (either of them) 
was pulled out after the other handle had been pulled out and left extended (but 
within three seconds after this happened). I will ignore the sequential version, since it 
is not important for my purposes.  
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successful activations were not. Hence, the activations of the 2-year-olds seemed to 
be the outcome of cooperative non-accidental interaction.  
 
Brownell et al. determined whether the successful activations were accidental or not 
in the following way: Video recordings of the dyads’ activity at the apparatus were 
coded according to whether their actions were “coordinated”, “communicative” or 
“uncoordinated”. For example, if a child pulled her handle when her peer was facing 
his own handle and had it within the reach of his arm, then this was coded as a type 
of coordinated behaviour that was called a “peer-proximal pull”. If the participants 
pulled within 3 seconds of each other, then this was coded as a “coordinated pull”. 
Types of uncoordinated behaviours included actions that interfered with the peer’s 
use of their handle as well as solitary pulls. The coding data was then used to 
compute three different ratios that indicated to what extent coordinated pulling was 
accidental or cooperative (for example, one ratio was computed by dividing all the 
coordinate pulls of the dyad with the sum of all the solitary pulls performed by the 
dyad members).78 The higher these ratios were, the more likely it was that the 
observed coordination wasn’t merely the outcome of each child trying to 
independently make the dog-puppet move and emit music, but that it was shaped by 
the children’s understanding of their partner’s contribution to the realisation of their 
supposedly common goal. 
                                                
78 These three ratios were the following, each answering a slightly different question 
that were pertinent to whether the successful activations of the dog-puppet were 
accidental or the result of cooperative coordination:  
(i) Q: How likely was it that a dyad pulled together compared to that the 
participants pulled individually?  
A: Dyad’s coordinated pulls ÷ Sum of solitary pulls in dyad;  
(ii) Q: Of all of a child’s handle pulls, did more of them occur when the peer 
was available as a partner than when the peer was unavailable?  
A: Child’s peer-proximal pulls (incl. coord. pulls) ÷ Child’s total sum of 
pulls (all kinds);  
(iii) Q: Were a child’s individual pulls more probable when a partner was 
available than when the child was alone at the task?  
A: Child’s peer-proximal pulls (incl. coord. pulls) ÷ Child’s solitary pulls 
when peer is off-task. 
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According to Brownell et al., if coordinated pulling were non-accidental, then the 
participants must have been exercising an ability to engage in joint action, that is, 
have a common goal.79 However, I think there is a problem with this line of 
reasoning. At least, an inference to a joint goal is not justified. The reason why has to 
do with something that Brownell et al. themselves highlight. In light of what was 
known about children’s social understanding, Brownell et al. expected (incorrectly) 
that even the 1-year-olds would succeed above chance level at this cooperation task. 
The prediction was motivated by the fact that infants at a very early age 
spontaneously engage in imitation, and Brownell et al. thought that imitation would 
probably be a sufficient mechanism for enabling successful simultaneous pulling.  
 
Let us suppose that contrary Brownell et al.’s actual results, the 1-year-olds did 
succeed in non-accidentally coordinate their pullings, and that it was imitation that 
enabled the coordination. If this was the case, then one agent’s handle pulling might 
merely have been an imitative response to the similar action performed by the other 
agent. Now, if the evolutionary function of imitation were to enable interpersonal 
coordination of actions toward a common goal, then the fact that one agent imitates 
another would at least be circumstantial evidence in support of the inference to the 
hypothesis that the agents have a joint goal. But mechanisms for imitation arguably 
evolved not to enable coordinated activity directed toward a common goal but to 
enable advanced forms of social learning that are exploitative rather than cooperative 
(Tomasello, 2009, p. xiv). Furthermore, bodily movements produced by imitation 
will typically not be directed at the same goal as the bodily movements of the model 
were directed toward (even if the model and the imitating agent may have a common 
goal-type). If you perform the action of raising your arm, and I imitate this action, 
then my action will be directed toward the goal of raising my arm, not of raising your 
                                                
79 Brownell et al. talk of “a shared goal” (p. 804) or “a joint goal” (p. 807). Those 
who have done similar studies of non-human primates adhere to the same logic (e.g. 
Chalmeau & Gallo, 1995; Chalmeau, 1994; Visalberghi, Quarantotti, & Tranchida, 
2000). 
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arm. In other words, imitation often occurs in contexts where agents do not have a 
common goal. 
 
Even if the performance of the 1-year-olds in Brownell’s study had been non-
accidentally coordinated, this would not have implied that this non-accidental 
coordination was driven by joint goal. They could each have acted on the goal “that I 
make the dog-puppet move and sing on my own” if their understanding of how the 
apparatus works was deficient. Or they could have had a common goal (“that we 
make the dog-puppet move and sing” or “that the dog-puppet move and sing”), and 
then automatic imitation would have led to a non-accidentally coordinated 
performance (in other words, that they had a common goal would not then have 
played any role in initiating or driving the coordinated pulling). Note that Brownell 
et al. explicitly designed the experiment in such a way that mere imitation would be 
sufficient to facilitate coordination for the 1-year-olds. So, in one sense, coordination 
would not have been accidental, but designed. But in the wild, outside the 
psychology laboratory, the children would have to rely on luck (rather than 
benevolent experimenters) to face tasks that require coordination that can be 
facilitated by imitation. What counts as “accidental” thus depends on what one takes 
the boundaries of the setting to be. Brownell’s experiment was designed to enable an 
automatic imitation mechanism to facilitate coordination.  
 
What I have argued is thus that what the evolutionary functions of the mechanisms 
are that facilitate successful coordination is sometimes of relevance in assessing 
whether success was the outcome of a joint goal or not. If an experiment is designed 
so that a mechanism such as automatic imitation can facilitate coordination, then the 
coordination may only be non-accidental within the local context of the experiment. 
In such cases, the coordination is non-accidental due to the intentions of the 
researchers designing the experiment, rather than intentions or goals or the 
participants. Note that subpersonal coordination mechanisms other than that which 
underpins automatic imitation may have evolved or developed specifically to enable 
interpersonal coordination of an activity directed toward a common goal though 
(Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). If it 
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can be shown that such mechanisms are involved in enabling non-accidental 
coordination, then that is defeasible evidence for the presence of joint goal. 
 
However, non-accidentally coordinated collective achievements of two or more 
agents certainly constitute defeasible evidence for a joint goal at work. It suggests 
that agents have an adequate understanding of the necessary contribution of the other 
agent, and that the agents have a goal that is at least extensionally in common 
between them. My sceptical conclusion regarding the (counterfactual!) results of 
Brownell et al. depends, of course, on the fact that there is an automatic imitation 
mechanism that an alternative explanation can appeal to. In species other than 
humans, this may not be the case. Note that it is fairly easy to rule out the imitation-
based explanation though. All one needs to do is to construct a task that requires 
different but complementary contributions from the participants, rather than similar 
and more or less simultaneous contributions.  
 
3.7.3 Reengagement and joint goals 
Before concluding this chapter, I want to consider an experiment that tests capacities 
that go beyond those required for sharing in a goal. The experiment is interesting 
because its result is one of the key findings that Michael Tomasello appeals to in 
support of the claim that young children but not chimpanzees engage in “true 
collaboration” (which is basically “shared intentional activity” in Bratman’s sense, 
see section 1.3.1). Felix Warneken, Frances Chen and Tomasello (2006) used 
subjects’ responses to interruptions in a joint activity as a litmus test of whether they 
could engage in genuine joint activity with others. If a subject understands that the 
co-participant’s contribution is required for successful task completion—and the 
subject wants to complete the task—then one should expect that the subject would 
try to reengage a co-participant who disengages from joint activity. 
 
Warneken et al. had 16-months-old and 24-months-old children, as well as three 
human-reared juvenile chimpanzees, face four different tasks together with an 
experimenter. Two of the four tasks were problem-solving tasks in which the 
child/chimpanzee and the experimenter had to cooperate in order to retrieve a 
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toy/piece of food. The other two tasks were social games without any concrete 
toy/food reward. Figure 4 shows the objects used in the tasks that the children 
engaged in together with the experimenter (the tasks for the chimpanzees were very 
similar but not identical). The upper row shows the objects used in the problem-
solving tasks, and the lower row the objects associated with the social game tasks. 
Both the problem-solving tasks and the social games required the participation of 
both the child/chimpanzee and the experimenter. For example, in the Elevator task, 
the task is to retrieve a toy from a container that can be pushed up and dropped down 
like an elevator (see the upper left photo in Figure 4). To succeed with this, one 
participant must push up the “elevator” from below, so that the other participant can 
reach the toy placed inside it. A participant cannot retrieve the toy on her own in this 
way. (Note that non-accidentally successful performance on this task cannot be the 
outcome of automatic imitative responses.) 
 
 
Figure 4 The tasks used for the children in Warneken et al. (2006). The chimpanzees had similar 
but not identical tasks. The tasks on the top row are problem-solving tasks where the 
participants could retrieve a toy or a piece of food if they coordinated their actions with the 
experimenter’s. The bottom row tasks were social games, where the participant together with 
the experimenter could make an object slide down a tube to make a rattling sound if it is caught 
with the tin can (left), or make a wooden block bounce on the trampoline (right).  
In some trials, the experimenter stopped performing his role within the joint activity 
for 15 seconds. For example, in the Elevator task, the experimenter let the elevator 
back down before the child had reached the toy or, if the roles were reversed, he 
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started to reach for the toy when the child has pushed up the elevator but then 
withdrew his hand. The researchers then looked at whether the child tried to 
reengage the experimenter and make him perform his role in the activity.  
 
Warneken et al. found the two following differences between young children and 
chimpanzees with regard to their responses to this type of interruption. First, (1) 
unlike the chimpanzees, the young children were motivated to engage in cooperative 
social games with the experimenter/partner for their own sake, irrespectively of 
whether this allowed them to take part in bringing about a “concrete goal” (p. 660), 
such as retrieving a toy or a piece of food.80 Secondly, (2) the children but not the 
chimpanzees tried to reengage the experimenter/partner if she interrupted and 
disengaged from an on-going joint activity, irrespectively of whether this was a 
social game or a problem-solving task (by, e.g., trying to push and move the 
experimenter or vocally instructing her to perform her role in the activity). The 
chimpanzees never made any such attempts. Instead, they either abandoned the 
activity or tried to perform the task on their own. Unlike the children, the 
chimpanzees never attempted to communicate with the highly familiar experimenter 
after the interruption (who they otherwise routinely directed gestures toward in order 
to get access to food). However, the chimpanzees were able to perform the 
cooperative problem-solving tasks successfully together with the experimenter as 
long as she was engaged in the activity.81 
 
                                                
80 Some studies suggest that other non-human primates (bonobos and gorillas) 
engage in social play for its own sake (on bonobos, see Pika & Zuberbühler, 2008; 
on gorillas, see Tanner & Byrne, 2010). 
81 In a follow-up study, Warneken, Gräfenhain and Tomasello (2012) used—on the 
one hand—tasks that children (21- and 27-month-olds) could perform individually or 
with the experimenter, and—on the other hand—tasks where the experimenter’s 
contribution was necessary. However, the children did not respond to interruptions 
differently in these two types of task, but made reengagement attempts in equal 
measure. This suggests, according to the researchers themselves, that the first 
difference that was found in Warneken et al. (2006) is genuine, and that the children 
are motivated to engage in joint activity for its own sake, and not just as a means to 
achieving their own individualistic goals. 
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Why didn’t the chimpanzees attempt to reengage a disengaged experimenter, despite 
the fact that they can reliably coordinate their activity with the experimenter in order 
to reach what is arguably a common goal? Tomasello (2009) argues that the 
differences between the human and chimpanzee subjects here boils down the fact 
that the children have the capacities to engage in “shared intentional activity”, 
whereas the chimpanzees do not. Children’s reengagement attempts are explained by 
the fact that when they are engaged in a joint cooperative activity, their activity is 
controlled by intentions or other goal-directed states that concerns not just their own 
activity but the activity of the experimenter as well (“that we J”). These goals will be 
frustrated if the other disengages from the activity, so we should expect that children 
try to reengage the experimenter after they disengage from the activity. According to 
Tomasello, that chimpanzees do not even attempt to reengage a partner when their 
contribution is necessary for task completion suggests that they don’t have the 
capacity to have goals with such we-content.  
 
However, note that if a chimpanzee has the to goal “to retrieve food” or “that I eat 
the food”, then this goal will also be frustrated if the other disengages from the joint 
activity. If the chimpanzee understands that the experimenter’s contribution is 
required for successful food retrieval, then it may seem that one should expect that 
the chimpanzee try to reengage the experimenter, even if it does not have the goal 
“that we retrieve the food”. When the experimenter disengages, then the chimpanzee 
(or the child) and the experimenter no longer have a joint goal. After all, the 
experimenter’s goal is to do nothing for 15 seconds, not to do his part of the 
retrieving the food/toy for the subject. This observation suggests to me that there is 
an alternative explanation of the difference between the children’s and the 
chimpanzees’ responses to disengagement. Perhaps the children are just more skilled 
than the chimpanzees are at attributing a larger variety of goals, including novel 
ones, to others. While chimpanzees understands that an experimenter can be 
manipulated to behave in a certain way, they might not understand that he can be 
manipulated by way of influencing his goals. Unlike chimpanzees, children may 
have the capacity to attribute goal-directed states such as desires to other agents (not 
merely the capacity that the chimpanzees share, to recognise the goal-directedness of 
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activities). Even when the experimenter disengages and stops acting entirely, the 
child can thus still think of the experimenter as a “carrier” of a wide variety of 
potential goals. For the chimpanzees, on the other hand, the goal that was previously 
held in common and which the chimpanzee recognised in the experimenter’s activity 
simply disappears when the experimenter disengages and sits still.  
 
3.8 Conclusions 
I have constructed an account that should be useful for understanding a kind of joint 
activity in which relatively cognitively unsophisticated agents can participate. I 
defined this kind of joint activity in terms of a sociopsychological structure that I 
called a “joint goal”. Two or more agents have a joint goal when they have a 
common goal and are cognitively positioned vis-à-vis each other so that they are able 
to benefit from this fact. I argued that agents do not need to represent a goal in the 
same way in order for it to be their common goal. Furthermore, a common goal need 
not have collective content (“we”-content): it need not have contents such as “that 
we catch the prey” or “that I do my part in our hunting of the prey”, but may be 
agent-neutral (“that the prey is caught”) or only implicitly identify the agent of the 
action (“to catch the prey”). These features of my account set it apart from e.g. 
Bratman’s account, and arguably, most accounts of joint activity that appeal to the 
notion of shared, joint or collective intention. Both features also help make my 
account less cognitively and conceptually demanding than Bratman’s account. 
Participants need not engage in Level-2 perspective taking in order to take advantage 
of the fact that they have a common goal, and they do not need to have the concept 
of “that we J”. Being an agent that has a joint goal with another agent does not seem 
to be too cognitively or conceptually demanding for, for example, young children or 
various kinds of non-human primates then.  
  
	   123	  
4 Socially extended intentions-in-action 
 
Recall that according to Bratman’s account of shared intentional activity, if you and I 
are engaged in such an activity J, then our J-ing must be the outcome of our shared 
intention to J. For us to have a shared intention to J, each of us must intend that we 
(continue to) J. If you and I are tangoing together, each of us must thus have had an 
intention of the form “I intend that we tango.” Following Christopher Kutz, we may 
call such ordinary intentions with collective content or we-content group-intentions 
(2000, p. 21). A group-intention is an intention that belongs to an individual 
participant, but whose content refers to the joint activity of all participants. 
Sometimes the presence of overlapping group-intentions is claimed to be a necessary 
condition for an activity to count as a genuinely joint one (Bratman, 1992, 1993; 
Pettit & Schweikard, 2006; Alonso, 2009). At other times, it is presented as at least 
present in a core class of cases (Bratman 1997, 2009a, 2009b; Kutz 2000).82 
However, appeals to group-intentions are problematic since the content of such 
intentions – “that we J” – appears to violate a widely accepted constraint on what can 
be intended by an agent. The constraint, which I call the exclusivity constraint, says 
that the performance of another agent’s action cannot be part of the content of one’s 
intention to do something (Searle 1983; Kutz 2000; Bardsley 2007; Bratman 2009a, 
2009b). This constraint appears to be logically implied by what Bratman calls the 
own-action condition on something being an intention, which says that one can only 
intend to perform one’s own actions (1997, p. 53, 2009b, p. 156). Assuming that an 
action can only belong to one agent, the exclusivity constraint follows from the own-
action condition.83 
                                                
82 Recall that Bratman is open to the possibility that shared intention may be multiply 
realizable, perhaps intentions “that we J” is not part of all realisations of shared 
intention (see footnote 9). Kutz (2000) writes: “Group-intentions are ordinary, 
instrumental individual intentions whose subject is the individual agent and whose 
object is a collective act or outcome: I intend that we will dance the tango. Clearly 
some paradigmatic forms collective action incorporate our action as the direct aim.” 
(p. 21) 
83 Arguably, the combination of the idea that genuine joint activity is characterised 
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As we saw in section 1.2.1, Bratman argues that his planning conception of intention 
allows him to be more liberal about what it is intelligible to intend (see also Pettit 
and Schweikard 2006, p. 21). In Bratman’s words, “the planning conception of 
intention supports the legitimacy of the appeal to my intention that we J.” (1992, p. 
331) The intentions of others can function appropriately in our plans since we are 
able to reliably predict that another agent will form a certain intention in many 
situations. This allows you, for example, to intend that I tell you the time by means 
of intending to ask me what time it is (Bratman 1997, p. 58). Simple examples like 
this show, convincingly I think, that the exclusivity constraint is not a constraint on 
the contents of plan-intentions.  
 
But some joint activities that adult participants spontaneously engage in do not 
involve the kind of deliberation and planning that is arguably required for a shared 
intention (in Bratman’s sense) to be formed. For example, you and I may be 
strangers who show up at a milonga where we spontaneously start dancing tango 
with each other upon merely making eye contact. Or we might be acquaintances who 
bump into each other on the street and fall into an informal conversation that moves 
from topic to topic in an improvised manner.84 While it is no doubt possible to 
assimilate such cases into Bratman’s planning framework (see e.g. 1999, p. 139), one 
might suspect that a more plausible account of such cases is possible outside it. In 
addition, consider joint activities in which participants are highly skilled at 
performing the activity and does not rely on their own skilful performance for 
success, but also rely on the skilful performance of the other participants with which 
                                                                                                                                     
by participants having group-intentions and acceptance of the exclusivity constraint 
is what motivates what Risjord calls “the standard picture” of joint action (see 
section 1.3.2). According to this picture, the jointness of a joint activity has its sole 
source in shared prior intentions that define roles and plans into which the ordinary 
individual non-joint actions can be fitted. 
	  
84 Bratman (2009a, p.150; also 1999, p.130) takes “our having a conversation 
together” as an example of the kind of “small scale shared intentional agency” that 
he is interested in. Kutz (2000) also mentions “conversing” as an example of a joint 
activity (p. 2). So does Gilbert (2006, p. 4).  
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they are interacting. Examples that come to mind include that of two professional 
dancers or ice skaters performing a dance together, or acrobats performing a well-
rehearsed coordinated stunt. In such cases, the coordination of action does not appear 
to go by way of the coordination of plan-intentions. There is simply no time for 
planning and practical reasoning to do any work. Note also that it is partly reliance 
on a planning conception of intention that makes Bratman’s account too conceptually 
or cognitively demanding to make sense of the joint activities of relatively 
cognitively unsophisticated agents such as young children and non-human animals 
(Tollefsen 2005; Pacherie 2007, p. 166; Pacherie and Dokic 2006, p. 110). 
Participants must be capable of both having group-intentions and recognising them 
in other participants.  
 
In this chapter, I will focus on how to best account for these skilful tightly coupled 
joint activities. To accommodate such activities, joint action theorists must either 
provide an account of joint activity that does not appeal to group-intentions at all, or 
argue that group-intentions and recognition of group-intentions are possible outside 
Bratman’s planning framework. By relying on John Searle’s account of intention and 
action (1983, ch. 3, see also 1980), I will show that the latter option is plausible, and 
argue that we can have what I call socially extended intentions-in-action. In some 
circumstances, agents cannot merely intend that we J, but can also perform an action 
which includes the performance of another agent’s action in its Intentional content.85 
That is, one can intend (us) to J in such a way that the own-action condition is met 
even if the content of the intention violates the exclusivity constraint.  
 
In the next section, I outline Deborah Tollefsen’s (2005) analysis of joint activity, 
which is primarily developed to deal with the joint activities of infants and toddlers, 
                                                
85 I will follow John Searle (1983) in writing ‘Intentional’ with a capital ‘I’ when I 
refer to Intentional content in the technical philosophical sense of the satisfaction 
conditions of mental states. In other words, not only intentions or actions have 
Intentional content, but so do beliefs, desires, hopes, etc. The Intentional content of a 
belief is the conditions under which the belief is true. The Intentional content of an 
intention is the conditions under which the action counts as having been successfully 
performed. 
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although she also suggest that it is applicable to many joint activities that adults 
engage in (see pp. 93–94). Her analysis follows the structure of Bratman’s account 
closely, but the participants’ intentions are Searlean intentions-in-action (Searle, 
1983) rather than Bratmanian plan-intentions.86 She thus takes something very 
controversial for granted, namely that an agent can have an intention-in-action with 
the content “something like ‘that we J’” (p. 93). In this chapter, I thus argue that 
what she here takes for granted is indeed possible. In section 3, I present the 
exclusivity constraint and the own-action condition in more detail. Sections 4 and 5 
contain the meat of the chapter. In section 4, I argue that we can have basic 
intentions-in-action that are “technologically extended”, and whose conditions of 
satisfaction thus range beyond movements of the agent’s body. In section 5, I argue 
that intentions-in-action in an analogous way can be “socially extended”, and that, as 
a consequence, the exclusivity constraint should not be accepted as an unconditional 
constraint on our intentions-in-action. While I raise some doubts concerning whether 
Tollefsen’s account is a plausible account of young children’s participation in joint 
activities, I argue that it is nevertheless fruitful for understanding joint activities 
where there is little room for deliberation and planning. Such activities will be ones 
where the participants are highly skilled at performing the joint activity. Finally, in 
section 6, I consider and respond to various objections to the idea that intentions-in-
action may be socially extended. 
 
4.1 Tollefsen’s account 
Let us again rehearse Bratman’s account of shared intentional activity. According to 
Bratman, a shared intentional activity is the result of a shared intention, and a shared 
intention is simply a pattern of “interlocking” plan-intentions of the participants 
about which they have common knowledge. For you and I to have a shared intention, 
the following conditions must be fulfilled (Bratman, 1993, p. 106): 
 
                                                
86 Searle (1990) has an account of what he calls “collective intentions-in-action” that 
is very different from Tollefsen’s account. I touch briefly on this account at the end 
of section 4.4. 
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We intend to J if  
(1) (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J. 
(2) I intend that we J in accordance with and because of (1a), (1b), and meshing 
subplans of (1a) and (1b); you intend that we J in accordance with and because of 
(1a), (1b), and meshing subplans of (1a) and (1b). 
(3) (1) and (2) are common knowledge between us. 
 
For our going to see a film at the Cameo together to be a shared intentional activity, 
our going must be preceded (and appropriately caused) by the intention of each “that 
we go see a film at the Cameo together”. Each must also intend this by way of—“in 
accordance with and because of”—the other’s intention (the intentional agency of 
each must be involved in our activity). Each of us must also intend that our subplans 
for carrying out our intentions should mesh. Suppose that I intend that we go see the 
new Woody Allen film, while you intend that we go see the new Wes Anderson film. 
If we know that our subplans clash and neither intends that we should try to agree on 
a film, then we clearly do not have a shared intention. Neither do we have a shared 
intention if our subplans happen to mesh with each other without us intending that 
they mesh. This is because a shared intention should fulfil the function of 
coordinating our activities and plans that are directed toward our common goal. The 
sociopsychological structure should thus be able to deal with nearby counterfactual 
cases. Our going to see a film together is not a shared intentional activity if we see a 
film together at the Cameo as a result of me deceiving you into thinking that the Wes 
Anderson film is screened in cinema “1” where the Woody Allen film is actually 
about to start. 
 
As Tollefsen (2005) points out, condition (2) can only be fulfilled if you and I are 
proficient mindreaders. We must not only be able to intend to mesh our plan-
intentions, but each must also be able to recognise that the other intends likewise. 
However, children do not appear to develop a robust representational “theory of 
mind” until between 3 to 5 years of age (Wellman et al., 2001). Given that what 1-to-
3-year-olds are doing together is appropriately described as joint activity, then this 
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seems to be of kind of joint activity in which condition (2) is not satisfied. Tollefsen 
(2005) calls this the mutual responsiveness problem. 
 
Arguably, the same problem will be encountered if Bratman’s account is applied to 
spontaneous joint actions that are performed on the fly, either within the framework 
of a joint activity (such as when a football player suddenly makes a pass play to a 
team mate within a game) or outside any such framework (such as when two 
strangers suddenly rush to help steady a third pedestrian that has just tripped and 
fallen between them). The mutual responsiveness problem arise in such cases not 
because the participants lack the concepts to have intentions with the kind of 
contents required by Bratman’s account, but because there is arguably no time for the 
participants to make the attributions of plan-intentions required in light of Bratman’s 
second condition. First of all, mental state attributions are holistic and 
underdetermined by behaviour, so there are a priori reasons for thinking that 
reasoning about the mental states of others is too computationally costly and time-
consuming to be useful for coordinating spontaneous or improvised joint actions  
(Apperly, 2011, Chapter 6; Morton, 1996; Zawidzki, 2008). Secondly, empirical 
research suggests that people do not engage in belief reasoning automatically 
(Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino, & Samson, 2006; Back & Apperly, 2010). 
Presumably, this is also true regarding reasoning about other mental states such as 
plan-intentions. 
 
According to Tollefsen, the mutual responsiveness problem can be avoided if 
conditions (1) and (2) are reinterpreted so that the intentions they refer to are 
intentions-in-action rather than plan-intentions. ‘Intention-in-action’ is a technical 
concept introduced by Searle (1980, 1983).87 It refers to the Intentional component of 
an action, which specifies the (typically) detailed and fine-grained conditions that the 
action’s movement component must meet in order for the action to be successful. 
                                                
87 Searle simply writes “intention in action”, without the dashes. I have added the 
dashes to emphasise that this is a technical concept of Searle’s. Note that I have also 
inserted dashes wherever Searle is quoted using this concept, so that it always reads 
“intention-in-action” in this thesis. 
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These conditions will typically be relatively detailed and fine-grained in comparison 
with the conditions of satisfaction of a future-directed plan to perform an action, 
according to Searle: “[I]n any real-life situation the intention-in-action will be much 
more determinate than the prior intention, it will include not only that the arm goes 
up but that it goes up in a certain way and at a certain speed, etc.” (1983, p. 93) One 
of the conditions of satisfaction is always that the intention-in-action itself is the 
cause of the action’s movement component. In other words, intentions are causally 
self-referential. Crucially for the argument in this chapter, the content that one 
accesses in one’s experience of acting is the content of the action’s intention-in-
action. But according to Searle, one can have an intention-in-action without having a 
conscious experience of acting (1983, pp. 91–92). What Searle has in mind here, I 
think, is that one may automatically perform an intentional action while one is 
focused on some other primary task or is daydreaming. For example, while thinking 
about how to formulate this sentence, I may scratch my head or take a sip of coffee 
without paying any attention to performing these actions. Typically, intentions-in-
action are expressed verbally in the form “I am A-ing” or “I am doing A” (1983, p. 
84). Deliberate actions also have what Searle calls a prior intention, but for actions 
that are not premeditated, this is the whole story. Prior intentions are expressed in the 
form “I intend to A” or “I will A” and have more coarse-grained contents than 
intentions-in-action (1983, p. 93). 
 
Tollefsen (2005) argues that intentions-in-action are perceptually overt by means of 
various behavioural cues such as “facial expression, extended hands, [or] expressions 
of cooperativeness.” (p. 93) The conditions of satisfaction of an intention-in-action 
are manifest in such cues, and according to Tollefsen children can “literally see these 
conditions.” (p. 91) If this is true, then an intention-in-action version of condition (2) 
can be met, even when the participants are children who lack sophisticated 
mindreading capacities (p. 93).88 This does not necessarily imply that they, or adult 
                                                
88 There is at least ample evidence showing that young children can distinguish 
animate agency from other movements, as well as that they can recognise what 
specific goal an agent’s behaviour is directed toward (Tomasello et al., 2005; 
Gergely & Csibra 2003). 
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human beings, can perceive Searlean intentions-in-action, but the evidence is at least 
consistent with this hypothesis. Furthermore, Tollefsen is not alone in interpreting 
the evidence in this way (see e.g. Pacherie, 2000, 2007; Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 
2003). I tentatively accept this interpretation of the evidence. In order for one 
participant’s intention-in-action “that we J” to be sensitive to the particular content 
of the other’s intention-in-action, namely “that we J”, they must also be able to 
recognise that an action is directed toward this particular type of goal. There is 
evidence that at least adults are able to distinguish between cooperative and non-
cooperative goal-directed movements. Becchio et al. (2010) demonstrate that 
subjects are able to discriminate between actions performed with cooperative intent 
and actions performed with competitive intent even if the actions are behaviourally 
very similar and directed toward the same target object. These discriminations appear 
to be solely based on the kinematics of the observed agent’s movement. 
 
However, as I have pointed out, Tollefsen’s modification puts the account in a real 
(rather than merely apparent) conflict with the exclusivity constraint.89 While agents 
may be able to recognise intentions-in-action with a content “something like ‘that we 
J’” (Tollefsen 2005, p. 93), how can they have intentions-in-action with such 
contents?90 Such contents are ruled out by the exclusivity constraint. While Tollefsen 
loosely refers to the content as “something like ‘that we J’”, intentions-in-action are 
intentions to perform an action, not intentions that some state of affairs comes 
about.91 From now on, I will therefore refer to the content of these intentions-in-
                                                
89 Insofar as one closely links Searlean intentions-in-action with mechanisms of 
“motor imagery”, then Elizabeth Pacherie’s proposed account of joint action in 
(2007) seems to be very similar to Tollefsen’s. Pacherie (2000) herself argues that 
empirical work on motor imagery throws light on Searle’s notion of intention-in-
action. However, Pacherie does not explicitly claims that participants must have 
intentions-in-action with a collective content like “that we J”. 
90 There are two brief references on to the possibility that such contents may be 
problematic: “Although I think there are troubling issues about this type of intention 
[…].” (Tollefsen, 2005, p. 83 n. 14) And later: “Aside from the difficulties with the 
notion of an individual intending that we J […].” (p. 93). But she does not spell out 
what these difficulties are, let alone how they could be overcome. 
91 Perhaps this is why Tollefsen qualifies the content specification with “something 
like”. 
	   131	  
action as “to J” rather than as “that we J”. At least on some conceptions of what it is 
to have an intention “that we J”, this does not amount a substantive change in 
content. For example, recall that according to Pettit and Schweikard (2006), a 
participant’s group-intention concerns a “joint performance”, and this “can be 
conceptualized just as a pattern of behavior in which our different efforts combine to 
effect a certain result.” (p. 29) The content is thus “conceptualized at the behavioral 
level” (ibid.). On such a conception of “that we J”, the content can equally accurately 
be represented as “to J”. 
 
4.2 The own-action condition and two constraints on the content 
of intentions 
Nicholas Bardsley refers to what I call the exclusivity constraint as “an 
uncontroversial constraint [...] that an individual’s intentions cannot be said to range 
over others’ actions”92, and he uses it to rule out analyses of shared (or collective) 
intention as inadequate (2007, p. 144). This constraint is indeed widely accepted and 
uncontroversial when it comes to what one can intend to perform. While one can 
intend that one’s guest leaves before midnight, one cannot intend to perform her act 
of leaving (Bratman, 1993, pp. 101–102, 2009a, p. 157). Bratman accepts that “what 
one attempts are [only] one’s own actions.” (1992, p. 330). In agreement with 
Bratman, Philip Pettit and David Schweikard state that “[i]t is true that I cannot 
intend to X, where X-ing is a joint performance. But I may still be able to intend that 
we X together.” (2006, p. 21) According to Bratman, the contents of what one can 
intend to do are constrained by the own-action condition on something being an 
intention, according to which “the subject of an intending is always the intended 
agent of the intended activity.” (2009a, p. 156) Group-intentions, then, should be 
glossed as “I intend that [we bring about some state of affairs]”, rather than as “I 
intend us to [perform some action]”. Accordingly, I take it that Bratman accepts the 
exclusivity constraint as an unconditional constraint on what one may intend to do. 
 
                                                
92 It is clear from the context that Bardsley is primarily referring to “intention-in-
action” here. 
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Other action theorists also seem to accept the exclusivity constraint as a constraint on 
what one can intend to do, among them Kutz (2000, pp. 21-22), Tuomela (2005), 
Brand (1984, pp. 99–100) and Searle (1983, p. 110). Kutz calls group-intentions 
“non-standard intentions” because they are not tightly linked to actions and “cannot 
be directly transformed from intentions that P to intentions to P.” (p. 21) He even 
suggests that group-intentions might best be thought of as “either expressing a hope 
that we will do something, or standing in for an individual intention to promote our 
doing something.” (p. 22) In effect, Kutz excludes the possibility that intentions to P 
may have content similar to group-intentions, presumably because he accepts the 
exclusivity constraint. Tuomela (2005) draws a distinction between “aim-intentions 
and “action-intentions”. The intentions that can be directed at a joint activity as a 
whole are aim-intentions according to Tuomela, and these concern the bringing about 
of a state of affairs rather than the performance of an action (2005, p. 334). An 
action-intention concerns the direct performance of an action: it is an intention to A. 
About the conceptual constraints on what one can have an action-intention to do, 
Tuomela says the following: “If the intention concerns the direct performance of an 
action (e.g. when an agent intends to open the window) the agent must himself bring 
about the satisfaction solely by his own action.” (2005, p. 329) While Tuomela 
sometimes talks about what he calls a “we-intention-in-action”, the object of these 
intentions-in-action are not the whole joint performance but only the individual’s 
contributing part of that performance (see Tuomela 2007, p.109). 
 
Brand claims that it is “impossible in a logical or conceptual sense” that an agent 
intends for another agent to perform an action (1984, p. 99). While he concedes that 
an agent could directly move another agent’s body, Brand claims that this “situation 
would be like one in which a mad physiologist stimulates [the other agent]’s brain so 
that his limbs move. [The other agent] would not be performing an action; rather 
something would be happening to him.” (1984, p. 100) Brand thus fails to see the 
possibility that an agent might directly intend to move another agent’s body even if 
this bodily movement is part of the other agent’s action.  
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Put in terms of Searle’s notion of intention-in-action, the own-action condition says 
that the content of one’s intention-in-action can only concern the event that, together 
with the intention-in-action itself, constitutes one’s action. This event of one’s own 
action is typically assumed to be one’s bodily movement. It is therefore helpful to 
introduce another possible constraint on the content of intentions-in-action, which I 
will call the own-body constraint. According to this constraint, the content of an 
agent’s intentions-in-action only concerns the agent’s own bodily movements. I will 
argue later that if the own-action condition is taken to imply the own-body 
constraint, then the condition will often be breached in cases where humans perform 
actions with tools.  
 
Searle clearly embraces the exclusivity constraint in some form. He claims that if 
there is “intervening Intentionality” in the causal chain between the tokening of an 
intention-in-action and the event that is the intention’s outcome, then that action 
cannot be successful. Searle illustrates this with the following example: 
 
Thus, suppose that unknown to me my arm is rigged up so that whenever I try to 
raise it, somebody else causes it to go up, then the action is his not mine, even 
though I had the intention-in-action of raising my arm and in some sense that 
intention caused my arm to go up. […] And that this is the right way to construe 
intentions-in-action is at least indicated by the fact that, when my intentions-in-
action make explicit reference to the intentions of other agents, then in general the 
actions become the actions of those agents. Thus, suppose I know how my arm is 
rigged up and I want it to go up. My intention-in-action then is getting the other 
agent to raise it, not raising it. My action is getting him to raise it, his is raising it. 
(1983, p. 110) 
 
The idea, then, is the following: In general, if I have an intention-in-action that 
includes in its conditions of satisfaction that it causes you to have an intention-in-
action that in turn causes an action A, then A is performed by you. This excludes me 
from also performing A. The action I perform is instead getting you to perform A. 
Searle thinks that this line of reasoning remains valid even when I am unaware of the 
mediating role of your intention-in-action. However, it is clearly not valid in all such 
cases. We can see this by considering one of Searle’s own examples (see 1983, p. 
98): Gavrilo Princip’s blow against Austria and vengeance of Serbia (performed by 
means of his killing of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914). 
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Insofar as “striking a blow against Austria” is an action at all, it is Gavrilo’s 
intentional action in spite of the fact that most of the links in the causal chain from 
intention-in-action to massive societal effects must have consisted of “intervening 
Intentionality”. Perhaps Gavrilo was in some sense aware of this intervening 
Intentionality, at least upon reflection. In that case, Searle’s line of reasoning is not 
even valid for some cases where an agent is aware of the mediating role of others’ 
intentions in the causal chain between intention-in-action and outcome. Given 
Searle’s choice of example in the quote above (raising one’s arm), it is reasonable to 
take the exclusivity constraint to hold only, or only hold unconditionally at least, in 
cases where A is a basic action. A basic action is an action A that an agent can intend 
to perform “without intending to do another action by means of which he intends to 
do A.” (Searle 1983, p. 100) In most circumstances, squeezing the trigger of a gun is 
a basic action, since one does not do this by means of intending to contract one’s 
muscles in the arm and hand in such a way that the trigger gets pulled. This is unlike 
the case when Gavrilo intends to strike a blow against Austria. He intends to do this 
by means of firing a gun against the Archduke. In the case of basic actions, it is hard 
not to accept the exclusivity constraint as a fundamental constraint. But I will argue 
in the next section that the constraint does not always hold, even if its scope is 
restricted to intentions-in-action of basic actions.  
 
To sum up, Tollefsen’s modification of Bratman’s account leads to a problem. By 
relying on the notion of intentions-in-action rather than plan-intentions, Tollefsen 
saws off the branch that allows the original account to avoid violating the exclusivity 
constraint. However, Tollefsen does not explain how individuals can have intentions-
in-action of the form “I am intending-in-action to J’”. I will now explain how this is 
possible. 
 
4.3 Technologically extended intentions-in-action 
My strategy will be to first argue that the conditions of satisfaction of the intention-
in-action of a basic action are not always restricted to only concern an agent’s own 
bodily movements. Human agents can have what I call basic but technologically 
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extended intentions-in-action. (An intention-in-action is “basic” if it is the intention-
in-action of a basic action.) After establishing this, I argue in the next section that 
basic intentions-in-action can also, contrary to the exclusivity constraint, be socially 
extended. In effect, I am arguing that what may make up “one’s own actions” is 
much less restricted than action theorists tend to assume. The own-action condition 
implies neither the own-body constraint, nor the exclusivity constraint.  The reach of 
an agent’s basic actions is not necessarily limited by the agent’s body surface, nor by 
another agent’s co-ownership of the action’s physical movement or event. 
 
As far as I can see, there is nothing in Searle’s characterisation of intention-in-action 
as such that restricts the conditions of satisfaction to range only over the agent’s 
bodily movements. I here seem to be in disagreement with Joëlle Proust (2003) who 
interprets Searle as embracing the own-body constraint. She claims that “an 
intention-in-action fails to represent any sort of further goal, such as ‘switching on 
the light,’ ‘breaking a vase,’ and so on. What it determines is, rather, a bodily 
movement.” (p. 106) It is true that Searle frequently writes that an intention-in-action 
causes (and presents itself as causing) “a bodily movement”, but I think this is a 
reflection of the choice of examples that he illustrates his theory with, such as raising 
one’s arm, rather than the expression of a general constraint that is supposed to be 
part of his theory. Indeed, he says explicitly that we can make “intentional bodily 
movements where the conditions of satisfaction of our intentions go beyond the 
bodily movements.” (1983, p. 99) However, Searle calls the intentions of such 
actions “complex intentions” (1983, p. 98). He characterises the self-reflexive 
content of the intention-in-action of a man who fires a gun in the following way: 
“This intention-in-action causes it to be the case that the trigger pulls, which causes it 
to be the case that the gun fires.” (1990, p. 409) While the extended “reach” of the 
action is to be found in the content of the intention, this reach is represented as 
extended, as pertaining to events beyond the agent’s immediate control. But there 
need be nothing complex (in terms of content) about intentions-in-action that reach 
beyond movements available to the agent considered as an unaided body. 
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Consider the well-known example of the blind man who explores his surroundings 
by moving and tapping a white cane in front of him (Merleau-Ponty, [1945] 2002, 
pp. 165–166). What, we can ask, is the blind man’s ‘experience of acting’? His 
experience is not that of manipulating his arm, wrist and fingers in order to cause the 
cane to move in certain ways, as if he was holding a cane for the first time in his life. 
Rather, the blind man simply taps the ground directly with the tip of the cane. The 
cane itself has faded out of his awareness and attention, just like our arms and hands 
are outside the focus of awareness and attention when we “use them” in action. We 
do not intend to move our joints, wrist and fingers in order to cause our hand to reach 
out and grasp an object, instead we simply reach out and grasp it directly. Similar 
things can be said about the perception involved in the skilled use of tools. The blind 
man’s perceptual experience is that of touching the ground at the tip of the cane: he 
touches the ground through the cane. The experience is not that of touching the cane 
in his hand in order to infer what the ground is like. Such extension of our capacities 
for perception and action is typical of fluent use of tools, where the tools become 
“transparent” to the user. Following Andy Clark (2008, p. 31), I think that the best 
picture of the agency involved in such cases is that “of an extended or enhanced 
agent confronting the (wider) world” rather than that of a bare biological agent 
facing a tool.  
 
Interestingly, neuroscientific findings suggest a subpersonal basis for the shift from 
phenomenological opaqueness to transparency. Maravita and Iriki (2004) argue that 
an agent’s so-called body schema – a neural representation of the agent’s body shape 
and posture – changes as the agent becomes fluent in using a tool to perform a task. 
This results in an extension of the agent’s peri-personal space (its proximal action 
space). Bimodal neurons in the body schema of Japanese macaques normally only 
fire when a macaque touches something with its hand or sees something near its hand 
(hence bimodal). But after a macaque has learned to use a rake to reach for and 
collect food, these bimodal neurons also fire when the macaque touches something 
with the rake or sees something in the space around the rake (Maravita & Iriki 2004). 
Behavioural experiments suggest that such an extension of peri-personal space is 
also an effect of tool use in adult human subjects. In some neuropsychological 
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patients, so-called “visual-tactile extinction” (see di Pellegrino, Làdavas, & Farné, 
1997) has been taken to indicate the boundary of peri-personal (or peri-hand) space. 
If a single tactile stimulus is presented to such a patient on their contralesional 
hand,93 which is hidden from view on a table in front of them, then they have no 
problem detecting the stimulus. The same thing happens if they are simultaneously 
presented with a distracting visual stimulus on the ipsilesional side of their body, but 
not close to the ipsilesional hand. However, if the visual stimulus is presented 
immediately adjacent to the ipsilesional hand, then their performance in detecting the 
tactile stimulus drops significantly: the tactile stimulus is extinguished. Farné et al. 
(2007) studied one such patient’s susceptibility to visual-tactile extinction before and 
after having used a rake to collect objects placed on a table. After tool use the space 
in which distracting visual stimuli resulted in extinction of the tactile stimuli was no 
longer restricted to the space immediately adjacent to the patient’s ipsilesional hand, 
but extended into space where the rake’s axis and tip had been.  
 
While not conclusive, these parallel results suggest that extension of visual-tactile 
extinction is due to an extension of the patient’s peri-personal space. This extension 
is induced by active tool use and encoded in the body schema (see Holmes et al. 
2007 for some doubts). Thanks to the plasticity of the body schema, tools become 
incorporated into the suit of resources at hand that the cognitive system simply takes 
for granted (see Clark 2008, sect. 2.5). On this interpretation, these taken-for-granted 
resources define the agent’s proximal action space. It should be noted though, that 
some behavioural experiments on adult human subjects are in tension with this 
extended body schema hypothesis (see Holmes, Calvert, & Spence, 2004; Holmes, 
Sanabria, Calvert, & Spence, 2007).94 
                                                
93 The contralesional hand is the left (right) hand if the lesion is in the right (left) 
hemisphere. The other hand is the ipsilesional hand. 
94 For example, Holmes et al. (2007) studied the effect of tool use on subjects’ 
perception and action capabilities by comparing under what conditions and to what 
degree a visual distractor stimulus induced so-called “visual-tactile interaction”. 
Visual-tactile interaction was measured by the effect that the visual distractor (one or 
two flashes) had on a subject’s ability to discriminate between two tactile target 
stimuli (one or two vibrations felt through a stick). They found that visual-tactile 
interaction was more marked when (i) subjects held a single stick in their right hand 
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My argument is not hostage to any particular interpretation of these experimental 
results. But if the extended body schema hypothesis were confirmed, then it would 
demonstrate an interesting isomorphism between the personal-level phenomenon of 
“transparency in use” and its subpersonal underpinning. Personal-level 
phenomenology suggests that tool-using actions are often basic actions, just like 
bodily actions such as raising one’s arm, and if the extended body schema hypothesis 
is correct, then this may be correlated with the tool’s incorporation into the 
subpersonal representation of the agent’s bodily action capacities. However, the 
phenomenological observations about tool use would not be undermined if this 
particular hypothesis were rejected. Within the framework of Searle’s theory of 
intention and action at least, the phenomenology of action should be taken seriously. 
After all, the content of the intention-in-action is the content that is accessed when 
one has the experience of acting. 
 
Searle makes some observations that fit this take on transparent tool use. First, he 
notes that what counts as a basic action is relative to an agent’s skills (1983, p. 100). 
Hence, a skilled tool user can act on the world through the tool without having to do 
this by means of intending to manipulate the tool. Secondly, Searle does not want to 
restrict the kinds of causal chains that can be involved in the execution of an 
intention-in-action to those occurring within the body (see 1983, p. 110). If I have an 
intention-in-action to raise my arm that causes my arm to raise, then this counts as 
my intention-in-action being carried out successfully, even if someone, unbeknownst 
to me, has rewired my brain so that the motor commands from my brain go half way 
                                                                                                                                     
to discriminate target stimuli presented on the same (right) side, compared to when 
(ii) the subjects held the stick in their right hand to discriminate target stimuli 
presented on the other (left) side (so that the axis of the stick crossed the body’s 
midline), and compared to when (iii) subjects either held a single stick in their right 
hand or held one stick in each hand to alternate between discriminating target stimuli 
presented on their right side and on their left side. Holmes et al. (2007) suggest that 
these results can be explained by appeal to a general effect that maintained spatial 
attention toward one side of the body has on visual-tactile interaction on that side (it 
becomes more likely). If the body schema encodes an extended peri-personal or peri-
had space after tool use, then it is not clear why the degree of visual-tactile 
interaction should vary between these experimental conditions. 
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around the world via the internet before reaching the effectors. In effect, there is 
nothing in Searle’s account that precludes that the causal chain between an intention-
in-action and the movement it represents extends beyond the agent’s body. Besides 
Searle’s habit of calling the intentions-in-action of tool-using actions “complex”, 
there is nothing in his account that precludes the possibility of basic but 
technologically extended intentions-in-action. 
 
I conclude that the contents of an agent’s basic intentions-in-action are not 
constrained by the own-body constraint. I do not claim that the own-body constraint 
on the content of basic actions is explicitly accepted by many action theorists, but the 
idea that basic actions are bodily movements seems to be a tacit and unexamined 
assumption in much philosophy of action. For example, Davidson claims “that all 
primitive actions are bodily movements”, where ‘bodily movements’ is “openhanded 
enough to encompass such ‘movements’ as standing fast, and mental acts like 
deciding and computing.” (1980, p. 49) This assumption may be one source of 
resistance among action theorists to the possibility of intentions-in-action “to J”. 
However, at least within the framework of Searle’s theory of intention and action, 
the assumption should be rejected.95 
 
Since the phenomenon of ‘transparency in use’ has been used to argue for the view 
that the vehicles of the contents of perception and action extend beyond the 
biological boundary of the human (or macaque) organism (Clark, 2008, Chapter 2; 
see Rupert, 2009, Chapter 8 for a critique of this kind of argument), it is worth 
pointing out that widening what counts as permissible contents of an agent’s basic 
intentions-in-action does not depend on accepting such “vehicle externalism” 
(Hurley, 1998). The question of whether or not to accept the own-body constraint is a 
matter of what content it makes sense for an intention-in-action to have, given the 
kind of mental state that an intention-in-action is. It is not a matter of whether the 
vehicle of the intention-in-action may extend beyond the body surface of the agent. 
Neither is it a matter of whether the environment of the agent plays a role in fixing 
                                                
95 For a thorough discussion about basic actions and the use of tools, see Pols (2011, 
Chapter 3).  
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the content of its intentions-in-action. In other words, rejecting the own-body 
constraint does not depend on accepting either vehicle externalism or content 
externalism. The same can be said with regard to rejecting the exclusivity constraint. 
 
4.4 Socially extended intentions-in-action 
In order to reject the exclusivity constraint as an unconditional constraint on what 
one can intend to do, I will appeal to considerations similar to those that make 
rejection of the own-body constraint plausible. In other words, I will argue that 
intentions-in-action can be socially extended, not only technologically extended. 
 
What motivated my notion of basic but technologically extended intentions-in-action 
was the phenomenon of transparency in skilled tool use. Do people experience a 
similar shift from opaqueness to transparency with increased participation in a joint 
activity? I think this sometimes happens. Consider the example of two skilled ice 
skaters performing a figure dance. From an adopted first-person perspective, Axel 
Seemann (2009b) characterises their sense of joint control in the following way: 
 
[I]t isn’t that I experience myself as being in a position to determine your doings by 
my actions. It is, rather that the experience really is one of us controlling our doings. 
And this experience is an embodied one: in the most obvious kind of case, such as 
the example of the figure dancers, our bodies really seem to form an experiential 
unit. The awareness I enjoy of your body in a dance is quite unlike the sensation of 
your flesh pressing against mine that I might be exposed to in a crowded subway 
carriage. Your body seems to form part of our joint interface with the world. (2009a, 
p. 508) 
 
To my ears, Seemann’s observation here rings true. Like in the case of skilled tool 
use, agents sometimes experience each other as transparent extensions of their own 
activity. The coordination of actions recedes to the background of attention and the 
agents experience themselves acting as one attending to their joint activity. The 
intentions-in-action here are basic, they are not executed via the execution of other 
intentions, whether one’s own or those of one’s co-agent.  
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My claim here is not that the whole activity – the entire dance on the ice for example 
– is part of the content of the participants’ basic intentions-in-action, but rather a 
move or turn within that activity. The following joint move may be part of each 
intention’s content: As one of the dancing ice skaters traces a curve on the ice, he 
lifts his partner up into a position where she has one leg held above her head and the 
other leg stretched out parallel to the ice (a so-called full Biellmann position). Here, 
the intention-in-action of each of the skaters will be dependent on the intention-in-
action of the other, and the move as whole will be a basic action for each of them. 
The bodily movements of their partner will be part of the conditions of satisfaction of 
the intentions-in-action of each of them. Furthermore, the self-reflexive condition 
that an intention-in-action causes the movement or event that is specified in its 
content is satisfied for both of them. The intention-in-action of each skater causes not 
just their own bodily movements, but also the bodily movements of the other. After 
all, in the absence of their intention-in-action, the movements of the other would not 
be performed. 
 
I have argued that the notion of ‘socially extended intentions-in-action’ is 
intelligible. It is also a useful notion, since it captures the kind of intentions-in-action 
that participants engaged in some skilful joint activities have, such as figure skaters 
or dancers. One mark of such joint activity would be that the participants have 
socially extended intentions-in-actions that overlap. This is one way in which we 
might understand the idea that intentions-in-action could have the content “to J” that 
is part of Tollefsen’s account. It is also an alternative way of elaborating Searle’s 
analysis of intention-in-action in Intentionality (1983) to deal with joint activity, 
which is different from Searle’s (1990) own account of what he calls “collective 
intentions-in-action” (p. 410).  
 
Searle thinks that when agents are acting jointly, each agent has a special kind of 
mental attitude, a “collective intention-in-action”, that has the form “We are A-ing”. 
It is thus different from a group-intention, which introduces the collectivity (the 
“we”) into an account of joint action via its content. Searle’s “collective intention-in-
action” does not represent our A-ing as a joint activity; our A-ing is a joint activity 
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because each of us has a “we-mode” intention-in-action to A. Interestingly, Bratman 
(2009a, pp. 156–157) suggests that the reason Searle makes the move of positing this 
new kind of attitude is precisely that he endorses the own-action condition (and, I 
would add, that he accepts the exclusivity constraint). If the own-action condition is 
constitutive of what it is for a propositional attitude to be an ordinary “I-mode” 
intention, then the attitude that is characteristic of joint activity cannot be such an 
intention, but must be some other kind of intention-like attitude. However, like 
Bratman and others, I do not endorse the own-action condition for plan-intentions, 
nor do I endorse the exclusivity constraint for intentions-in-action. I thus see little 
reason to posit such a new intention-like attitude. I will hence not discuss Searle’s 
own view of joint action further (for further criticism of Searle with which I agree, 
see Pacherie, 2007).  
 
4.5 Objections and rejoinders 
One initial objection to socially extended intentions-in-action might be the following.  
The sources of knowledge about our own and others’ actions are different in 
important ways. We have no proprioceptive information about the bodily posture or 
movements of others. To the extent that such information is required for carrying out 
intentions-in-action and for monitoring the dynamic unfolding of action, there is 
reason to doubt that intentions-in-action can be socially extended. But no such 
proprioceptive information is available in tool use either, so such information does 
not seem to set a limit to what can part of the content of basic intentions-in-action.96 
 
However, evolutionary considerations suggest that the boundary of the biological 
organism has an epistemic importance which at least makes it unlikely that extended 
intentions-in-action are prevalent. Even if vision is important for awareness and 
knowledge of our own actions, it has been argued that proprioceptive information 
                                                
96 Indeed, in circumstances where proprioceptive and visual information about our 
own actions are in conflict, our conscious reports about our own bodily movements 
seem to rely more on vision than proprioception, as for example the ‘rubber hand 
illusion’ demonstrates (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). 
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has a kind of privileged status in our subpersonal cognitive machinery that is not 
enjoyed by perceptual information about the extra-bodily environment. In arguing 
against the hypothesis of extended cognition (or vehicle externalism), Kim Sterelny 
(2004) draws attention to the fact that an organism is a conglomeration of parts that 
have evolved together and thus become co-adapted to each other over time. 
Evolution has ensured that the internal “environment” of the organism is a friendly 
one: Information exchange is reliable, trustworthy and efficient. “[O]ver 
evolutionary time”, as Sterelny (2004) puts it, “the internal informational 
environment of an agent will become more transparent.” In contrast, the external 
environment is a “shared and sometimes contested space” inhabited by other agents 
who are potentially out to deceive and manipulate the organism. Hence, while there 
is selection pressure on perceptual systems to become more reliable and efficient, it 
is unlikely that external resources, such as tools, public information, or (I would add) 
other agents become as transparent to us as our internal resources. This is because 
perceptual systems pick up information from an epistemically hostile environment. 
But as Clark (2008, p. 103) points out in reply to Sterelny, these evolutionary 
considerations do not show that technological extensions of cognition are impossible, 
just that we should be sceptical about their prevalence.  
 
Given that Sterelny is correct in characterising internal information flow as 
trustworthy and reliable, and external information flow as always potentially noisy 
and deceptive, technologically extended intentions-in-action ought to be quite rare, 
and arguably, socially extended intentions-in-action ought to be even more rare. The 
possibility of defection and deception is much greater in the case of other agents than 
in the case of tools. The objection, then, is that a socially extended intention-in-
action will depend on the absence of a kind of vigilance and double-checking that we 
should expect to be the norm in interaction with other agents. However, like in the 
case of technological extension, these considerations do not show that socially 
extended intentions-in-action are impossible, just that that we should be sceptical 
about their prevalence. In addition, the epistemic difference between the internal and 
the external environment should not be exaggerated.97 If, as Sterelny himself 
                                                
97 In a more recent paper, Sterelny (2010) comments on his earlier argument against 
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believes (see 2003), group selection has played an important role in the evolution of 
our pervasive tendency to cooperate, then human groups are in a sense made up of 
co-adapted parts that have evolved together.98 Furthermore, my argument crucially 
depends on the phenomenology of participation in joint activity. In cases where an 
agent experiences his or her participation in a joint activity as transparent, then that 
should be reflected in the content of his intention-in-action. I am assuming here that 
Searle is right to identify an agent’s experience of acting with the content of the 
agent’s intention-in-action: The content of one’s experience of acting just is the 
content of one’s intention-in-action. 
 
However, perhaps the experience associated with a socially extended intention-in-
action is always mistaken or illusory. One might grant that a basic intention-in-action 
may have conditions of satisfaction that makes it socially extended, but argue that, in 
fact, the self-reflexive condition that the intention-in-action causes a jointly 
performed movement or event will never be satisfied. This would account for the 
phenomenological observations that I have been swayed by, but would arguably 
make socially extended intentions-in-action less interesting since they would not be 
appropriately causally connected to the (joint) activity. But it is not clear why one 
should think that the self-reflexive condition couldn’t sometimes be satisfied. After 
all, an intention-in-action is just supposed to be one in a host of necessary factors that 
bring a movement or event about. The agent’s body and the world must cooperate for 
the right things to happen even in the case of ordinary solo action. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
the extended cognition hypothesis. He submits that his “initial contrast [between the 
internal and external environment] was overdrawn” and that his “earlier ideas on the 
importance of contested space were overinfluenced by Machiavellian models of 
social interaction.” (p. 474) 
98 Less controversially, infants and toddlers are profoundly dependent on their 
caregivers and the group into which they are born. Even if there are cognitive 
mechanisms in older children and adults with the function of double-checking and 
vetting during joint activity, it does not seem plausible that such mechanisms are 
operating in young children, at least not during interaction with close kin or other 
familiar individuals. 
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One could object that socially extended intentions-in-action cannot have a joint or 
shared activity as its content. I have argued that the bounds of what counts as one’s 
own basic actions are wider than action theorists have thought, but this does not 
make those actions joint or shared. Hence, the objector continues, I have not here 
gone to the heart of what is philosophically puzzling about shared intention, namely 
how the question of whether to do this or that can be a matter for us to settle 
together. As David Velleman (1997) points out, I can only intend to do something 
that is up to me to settle. But if it is up to me to settle whether or not to do 
something, then it cannot simultaneously be up to you. The puzzle is how an agent 
can exercise control over something while at the same time delegating this control to 
someone else. 
 
What I am proposing here is not a solution to this puzzle. I am not making a proposal 
about how agents can share a future-directed intention or decision to engage in a 
joint activity, I am rather trying to suggest what characterises some joint activities, 
irrespectively of whether the participants jointly chose to enter the activity. I take it 
that some joint activities that are characterised by what Bratman calls “mutual 
responsiveness in action”, but not necessarily by “mutual responsiveness of 
intentions” (see 1992, p. 339). What is joint is control and guidance of the unfolding 
of the joint activity, not a choice about whether or not to initiate it. As Bratman notes 
one’s “plans will typically be at a level of abstraction appropriate to [one’s] habits 
and skills.” (p. 31) In many habitual and entrenched joint activities, this level of 
abstraction will arguably be found at a level that is above the level at which mutually 
responsive motor action occurs. This does not merely involve skilful joint 
manoeuvres like those performed by the dancing ice skaters, but also mundane joint 
actions that are performed habitually, such as when to people meet and shake hands 
or do a “high five”. 
 
That it is possible for participants’ intentions-in-action to be socially extended does 
not, of course, establish that the intentions-in-action of infants and toddlers can be 
socially extended. Indeed, infants and toddlers do not appear to be in a good position 
to establish the kind of fluent expertise that makes coordination during joint activity 
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transparent.  For this reason, I doubt that an account based on socially extended 
intentions-in-action, which I suggest that Tollefsen’s account is, is applicable to 
children’s joint activities in general, including cases such as two toddlers building a 
block tower together or engaging each other in social pretend play. But perhaps the 
conditions needed for two children, or a child and a caregiver, to have overlapping 
socially extended intentions-in-action do obtain in some simple forms of social play 
that involve repetition and predictable turn taking. This seems especially plausible in 
asymmetrical joint activities where a child is playing with an adult, since an adult co-
participant is typically more disposed to be controlled and “manipulated” by the 
child than a peer will be (the adult can thus make up for the child’s lack of fluent 
expertise).99 Given the role of phenomenology in my argument for the possibility of 
socially extended intentions-in-action, and the difficulty of accessing what infants 
and toddlers experience, it is hard to draw any firm conclusion about what the role, if 
any, socially extended intentions-in-action might play in young children’s 
participation in joint activities. The conclusion that such intentions-in-action have a 
role to play in some joint activities with adult participants, however, is much more 
secure. 
 
Even with adult participants, the kind of sustained experience of fluency described 
by Seemann is the exception rather than the rule. As Kutz (2000) points out, “the 
complexity arising from problems of coordination renders collective activity salient, 
making it stand out against a background of unreflective, self-regarding activity.” (p. 
12) In line with my reflections on Sterelny’s earlier argument against extended 
cognition, he also notes that the possibility of free-riding makes joint activity 
unlikely to become automatised and unreflective (p. 13). However, Kutz grants, in 
line with what I have been saying, that “well-rehearsed joint action may require no 
conscious deliberation or reflection.” (p. 12) Indeed, in the case of some joint 
actions, such as when the ice dancers perform their well-rehearsed joint move, 
                                                
99 In a footnote, Tollefsen raises the intriguing possibility that, in light of young 
children’s profound dependency on their caregivers, their intentions-in-action are 
actually socially extended as a rule rather than as an exception (2005, p. 93 n. 24). 
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conscious deliberation and reflection will not even be possible given the speed and 
timing requirements that must be met to avoid failure (and most likely, injury). 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
I have pointed out that couching Bratman’s account of shared intention in terms of 
participants’ intentions-in-action in order to avoid the mutual responsiveness 
problem, as Tollefsen (2005) does, is problematic. Such an account requires 
participants to have intentions-in-action with the content “to J”, but unlike plan-like 
intentions “that we J”, such intentions really do violate the exclusivity constraint. 
According to this constraint, one’s intentions-in-action cannot range over the actions 
of another agent. I have argued that this constraint should not be accepted as an 
unconditional constraint on the possible contents of intentions-in-action. There is 
nothing in Searle’s analysis of intention-in-action per se that precludes the contents 
of one’s basic intentions-in-action to range beyond one’s bodily movements, and the 
phenomenon of transparency during skilful tool use indicates that intentions-in-
action often actually do have such wide-ranging contents. Thus, the own-action 
condition does not imply what I have called the own-body constraint. By analogy 
with such technologically extended intentions-in-action, phenomenological 
considerations also suggest that intentions-in-action can be socially extended. This 
means that the bounds of what counts as one’s own actions are wider than action 
theorists typically assume. Neither technologically extended, nor socially extended 
intentions-in-action, fail to fulfil the own-action condition. As a result, the 
exclusivity constraint should be rejected. Two agents can have socially extended 
intentions-in-action with overlapping contents, so that they both guide and monitor 
the unfolding of their joint activity. 
 
While I have expressed doubt regarding Tollefsen’s account as a plausible account of 
young children’s joint activities, I believe the account fills a lacuna in the philosophy 
of joint action. Bratman (1992) mentions that “mutual responsiveness in action” is a 
defining feature of joint activity, but he does not have much to say about this feature. 
Tollefsen’s account – supported by my notion of socially extended intentions-in-
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action – specifies an interpersonal pattern of mental states which I suggest is 
characteristic of some skilful or habitual joint activities or actions that involve tightly 
coupled mutual responsiveness in action. However, a potential objector might say the 
following about my application of Tollefsen’s account to the skilful or habitual joint 
activities of planning agents such as adult human beings: “What you have provided 
is merely a notational variant of Bratman’s account. The account captures a special 
limiting case that Bratman’s account of shared intention is applicable to, namely the 
case where the plan-intentions mentioned in conditions (1) and (2) are present-
directed rather than future-directed. The intentions in Bratman’s first condition is 
intentions ‘that we J now’ rather than in ‘that we J [at some future time t]’. You have 
been misled to think that Bratman’s planning conception of intention requires that 
the intentions in his account must concern the future, but this is a mistake.” Given 
Bratman’s expansive notion of planning, this objection goes, even spontaneous, 
habitual or improvised joint actions are in some sense planned. In the next and final 
chapter, I show why such an expansive notion of planning should be resisted. 
Furthermore, even if it is accepted, there are good reasons for thinking that the 
intentionality of both individual and joint action cannot be reduced to the 
intentionality of intentions.  
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5 Action coordination without or beyond planning 
Examples of joint activities in the philosophical literature include: lifting a heavy 
sofa together, travelling to Chicago together, playing chess, dancing a tango, painting 
a house together, singing a duet, playing basketball, walking together, washing the 
dishes together, executing a pass play in football, preparing a hollandaise sauce 
together, performing an outdoor ballet, and having a conversation (Bratman, 1999; 
Gilbert, 1990; Kutz, 2000; Searle, 1990; Tollefsen, 2005; Tuomela & Miller, 1988; 
Velleman, 1997). When they occur, many of these activities will typically be the 
result of advance planning. A basketball game will probably take place because the 
players planned to play at a certain time, one of them booked a court, and so on. 
Most travellers who go to Chicago will have planned the trip long in advance, and 
two people who are painting their house together will typically deliberate about 
which colour to pick days or even weeks before the day on which the painting 
commences. However, some of these activities may also be initiated spontaneously, 
in response to the situation of the here and now (it is difficult to imagine how the 
performance of an outdoor ballet and the joint painting of a house could be initiated 
spontaneously though!). For example, we might fall into a conversation about we did 
last weekend when we by chance meet each other on the street. Our joint lifting of a 
sofa might be performed in response the following situation: We are about to watch a 
film on television, and we both realise that wall-mounted flat screen is a bit too far 
away from the sofa to make for a good viewing experience. As you grab hold of one 
end of the sofa, you glance at me and mutter, “we better move this”. I immediately 
understand what should be done, and I grab hold of the other end, and we together 
move the sofa closer to the screen. This joint action would not be the outcome of 
planning in any ordinary sense. 
 
Within the envelope of a joint activity that is the outcome of planning, participants 
will often have to perform joint actions spontaneously and in an improvised manner. 
Consider the pass I play to you during the second half of a football game that we 
both participate in. Due to the complexity and unpredictability of the game, it would 
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be useless for me to try to make a plan-like commitment to make the pass play, since 
it will be impossible to predict in when and under what circumstances the right 
opportunity will arise. To reliably achieve such a coordinated action, it will arguably 
not be sufficient that we have meshing plan-intentions to perform the pass play. Or 
consider the example of you and I washing dishes together. Within this activity, there 
will be joint actions that have to be performed with spontaneity and in an improvised 
fashion. If you hand me a glass that you have just rinsed so that I can dry it with a 
cloth, then my grasping of the glass and your release of it will have to be 
coordinated. Suppose that when you hand me a heavier object, such as a saucepan 
that you have just rinsed, you discover that I’m not able to hold the pan steady as you 
release your grip on the pan. If this would happen, you would probably be able to 
quickly return your hand to the pan and help me to steadily put it down. What is 
required for such feats of coordinated action is not only that the performance of each 
of our actions are mutually responsive to the other’s action performance, but also that 
these performances are appropriately responsive to our common goal as well as to 
features of the environment (such as the shape, location and weight of the glass and 
the saucepan). Coordination that goes beyond deliberating and settling on plan-like 
commitments will thus often be required even if the joint activity as a whole is the 
outcome of advance planning. As Bratman himself points out, shared intentional 
activities are characterised not only by mutual responsiveness in intention, but also 
by “mutual responsiveness in action” (1992, p. 339). 
 
The overall focus of this chapter is on providing some answers to the following 
question: How do participants successfully coordinate their actions in a joint activity 
in the absence of plans or beyond what their plans specify? The focus is on the 
second lacuna that I highlighted in chapter 1, namely how participants achieve 
mutual responsiveness in action. What I provide here is of course a very selective 
overview of research that is relevant to my question. It should not be taken as 
anything like an exhaustive review.100 
                                                
100 The empirical work I review here is highly selective. For a comprehensive 
overview of the empirical work on joint action, see Knoblich, Butterfill and Sebanz 
(2011). 
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The structure of the chapter is the following. I the next section, I consider what 
“planning” and “planned action” are in light of Bratman’s planning theory of 
intention and intentional action. While I criticise Bratman for employing a too 
expansive notion of planning that obscures the difference between future-directed 
intentions (plans) and present-directed intentions (or intentions-in-action), I grant for 
the sake of this chapter’s argument that there are present-directed plan-intentions and 
that that all intentional actions (including spontaneous ones) are the outcome of some 
kind of plan-intention. In the remaining two parts of the chapter (sections 5.2 and 
5.3) I then aim to demonstrate—by reviewing empirical work on motor control and 
coordination in both individual and joint action—that even if we would grant that all 
intentional actions involve plan-intentions, the purposiveness and intentionality of 
those actions cannot be reduced to the contents of plan-intentions. When it comes to 
individual action, I argue for this claim in section 5.2.1, where I review empirical 
work on motor planning and motor control. A similar argument for joint action is 
made in section 5.3.1, where I present some empirical work on planning and control 
mechanisms for joint action. In sections 5.2.2 and 5.3.4, I consider the role of self-
organisation in bodily coordination and control, within the individual (5.2.2) and 
across individuals (5.3.2). Considered together, the empirical work reviewed here 
shows that what Risjord calls “the standard picture” of joint activity is wrong. 
According to this picture, joint activity is imbued with joint intentionality only in 
virtue of a shared intention that distributes tasks and roles between the participants 
(see section 1.3.2).  
 
5.1 Planning and action control 
When we say that we planned to perform an action F, we normally mean that we 
decided to perform F before the time of action arrives. We commit and prepare in 
advance for carrying out the action. However, when I here write of an action F that it 
was planned, what I mean is simply that the action is the outcome of a plan-intention, 
that is, a plan-like commitment to act.101 This notion of planned action is clearly not 
                                                
101 This will typically be a plan-like commitment to F, but it need not be. Bratman 
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an everyday notion. While Bratman thinks that the features that are constitutive of 
the mental state of intention are most perspicuous in light of the role that future-
directed intentions plays in our agency, plan-like commitments to act, or plan-
intentions for short, may also be present-directed. Such a present-directed intention 
to F, furthermore, can be formed or acquired without having been preceded by a 
future-directed intention to F. Suppose that I am queuing at the checkout line in a 
supermarket and I suddenly spot a basket beside me that is full of my favourite kind 
of chocolate bars. If I just decide to buy one without first deliberating about it and 
immediately reach out and grab it, then this will be an action of mine that is guided 
by a present-directed intention, a plan-like commitment to F now. What makes the 
action intentional is, according to Bratman, the plan-intention that caused the action 
(in the appropriate way).102 Clearly, the notion of planning at work here is much 
broader than the folk notion.  
 
According to an everyday notion of planning, what I plan to buy in the grocery store 
are the items that appear on my shopping list, rather than the chocolate bar that I 
spontaneously decide to while waiting in the checkout line. Planned actions are 
actions that one has settled on performing in advance. Of course, as I reach out to 
grasp and put the chocolate bar in my shopping basket, I represent the goal that my 
action is directed toward, and this representing occurs in advance of the represented 
outcome actually being brought about, just not very far in advance. If representing a 
goal in this way counts as having plan, then we should say that all actions that are the 
outcome of an intention-in-action are planned, even if the intention-in-action and the 
                                                                                                                                     
argues that for an agent to intentionally F, the agent must either have intended to F 
or have intended to G, where F is in what Bratman calls G’s “motivational potential” 
(1984, 1987, Chapter 8). Bratman does not give a specification of the conditions 
under which F is in G’s motivational potential, but his view is opposed to what he 
calls “The Simple View”, according to which an agent intentionally Fs only if the F-
ing is an outcome of an intention to F.  
102 This explication of intentional action in terms of action caused by a plan is by no 
means an idiosyncratic feature of Bratman’s theory, but is also characteristic of 
theories of action proposed by, for example, Alvin Goldman, Myles Brand and 
Alfred Mele (see Preston, 2013, Chapter 2). 
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bodily movement was not preceded by a prior intention. On Searle’s view of action, 
this would mean that all actions are planned actions.  
 
However, I think there are good reasons for distinguishing between present-directed 
intentions (intentions-in-action) on the one hand, and future-directed intentions 
(plan-intentions, prior-intentions) on the other hand. As David Velleman (1991, 
2007) points out, the functional role and the norms that Bratman identify the mental 
state of intention with make the idea of intentions that are present-directed 
problematic. With the exception of the demand that intentions should control 
conduct, the norms of rational planning that Bratman takes to be constitutive of 
intentions seems to be either inapplicable to present-directed intentions or to be 
superfluous for the purpose of acting in the present. The demand for means-end 
coherence is not applicable since there is no room for planning or deliberation (I do 
not consider various means for retrieving the chocolate bar before I settle on 
reaching for it and pick it up). On the other hand, the demand for consistency is 
superfluous since one will not—if one has been a rational planner—have any 
intentions that conflict with the present-directed intention. If one had, then the 
present-directed intention could not have formed in a rational fashion without 
deliberation and reconsideration. If I was on a diet and had settled on not buying any 
chocolate prior to entering the supermarket, then I would presumably not have 
formed a present-directed intention to get the chocolate bar (off course, I could have 
given in to temptation and bought the chocolate bar anyway, but in that case, I would 
have bought the chocolate bar despite my resolution not to do so, rather than because 
I reconsidered and rescinded my resolution). But in the absence of any such 
conflicting intentions, the mental state that guides my action of getting the chocolate 
bar can play no role in rationally coordinating my action with my intentions. The 
reason that the role and norms of intentions are most perspicuous in the case of 
future-directed intentions may thus be that these are the only intentions that exist 
(given Bratman’s conception of intention). Arguably, Searle’s distinction between 
prior intentions and intentions-in-action has the advantage of not lumping together 
what appear to be two kinds of states that play different roles in the exercise of our 
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agency. The distinction also has the advantage of respecting a folk psychological 
distinction between planned and spontaneous action. 
 
Bratman grants that it is possible that not all our voluntary and purposive actions are 
caused by present-directed intentions, but he suggests that such actions may actually 
be the outcomes of “long-standing personal polic[ies]”, plan-like conditional 
commitments to respond in a certain way if one is in a certain type of situation 
(1987, p. 126). He considers his action of reaching up and catching a ball that 
someone unexpectedly throws towards him for example. While he concedes that this 
action seems to be too automatic and unreflective to be the outcome of a plan-like 
commitment to act, he suggests that it may be the outcome of his previously adopted 
“policy of protecting myself from flying objects” (1987, p. 126). Bratman does not 
commit to the claim that such a treatment is possible for all apparently spontaneous 
actions, but the move allows him to expand the explanatory scope of his planning 
theory of intention and intentional action. As far as I can see though, maximising 
explanatory scope is the only motivation for generally treating spontaneous actions 
as the outcome of personal policies in this way. The downside of such a treatment is 
that it more or less eliminates the idea that some actions are performed in a genuinely 
spontaneous manner. 
 
While I think there are good reasons to doubt that Bratman’s planning theory of 
intention and intentional action is suitable for making sense of spontaneous action, I 
will for the sake of argument accept that when we perform intentional actions, these 
actions will always be the result of a present-directed plan-intention (which may or 
may not have been preceded by a future-directed intention or personal policy). 
Furthermore, I will for the sake of the argument accept that this applies both to 
individual action and to joint action. So even spontaneous joint actions, such as a 
sudden pass play that two footballers make, are the outcome of a shared intention. 
The point that I want to make in this chapter is that even if we concede this, 
individual action control or joint action control still cannot be fully understood in 
terms of processes of forming, acquiring, revising or rescinding intentions. 
Bratman’s claim that “intention and action are not separately controlled by the agent, 
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but rather the agent’s control of here action goes by way of her intention” (1987, p. 
55) will have to be qualified. At the very least, the research I review in this chapter 
shows that Bratman’s theory is incomplete in significant ways. 
 
5.2 Online control and coordination of individual action 
In this section, I argue that successful performance of individual action cannot 
merely be the result of a straightforward execution of a plan-intention. Consider what 
is required for successful performance of a simple bodily action, such as reaching out 
and grasping a cup. On a naïve picture of action control, what enables this 
performance is an intention to grasp the cup, which in detail represents the 
movement trajectory of the hand, the angle adjustments to be made to the arm, hand, 
and finger joints, as well as what force to exert once the fingers touch the handle of 
mug. This detailed plan then results in a sequence of motor signals that triggers 
neuromuscular changes that result in the intended action being performed. Since this 
type of control is carried out without guidance from feedback, it is called ‘open-loop 
control’ (feedback would close the loop). However, given the required degree of 
accuracy, the degrees of freedom involved, and the context-sensitive nature of the 
appropriate sequence of motor signals, this is not a computationally viable way of 
controlling actions.  
 
It may seem that the solution is to rely on sensory feedback to fine-tune the 
movement on the fly, and thus obviate the need to plan all the details of the 
movement in advance. But this gives rise to a problem. While we clearly do rely on 
sensory feedback in monitoring and guiding most of our everyday activities, our 
motor system does not have time to wait for sensory feedback before adjusting the 
movements involved in most of our bodily actions. There is not enough time for such 
“closed-loop control”. Arguably, there is also not enough time for action control to 
go by way of control of present-directed intentions. For a neural signal to propagate 
from motor cortex to the muscles and back through proprioceptive sensory pathways 
takes between 250 and 400 ms (Denier van der Gon, 1988; Itō, 1984; quoted in 
Grush, 2003, p. 76). Such a delay is too long for effective online control of, for 
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example, the fast movements that Bratman performs when he reaches out and 
catches the ball that was unexpectedly thrown at him, or the movements that I 
execute as I quickly swoop down my hand to catch a glass that has just slipped out of 
your hand.  
 
5.2.1 Emulator-based action control 
According to various current theories of motor control, the control dilemma just 
described is solved by what is called ‘pseudo-closed-loop control’. The basic idea is 
that we use “internal models” to generate simulated feedback during action 
execution. This simulated feedback is used to make adjustments on the fly during 
execution (Desmurget & Grafton, 2000; Grush, 1997, 2004; Jeannerod, 1994; 
Wolpert, Miall, & Kawato, 1998). In pseudo-closed-loop control, the motor 
command from the brain is thus not only propagated to one’s muscles, an “efference 
copy” of this command is also sent to a subsystem that I will call an “emulator” 
(following Grush, 1997). The emulator simulates the input-output mapping of the 
controlled system. If I am about to throw a ball at Bratman, then my arm is the 
controlled system. The emulator implements a “forward model” that computes the 
effects of the propagation of the motor signal to the controlled system. If the model is 
accurate, then it implements the same input-output loop as a closed-loop control 
system would have implemented. Since the machinery underpinning the emulator is 
in the brain rather than in the peripheral nervous system, the emulator can deliver the 
simulated feedback to the controller in time for anticipatory adjustments to be made 
before and during action execution (because the feedback signal does not need to 
travel such a long distance). In this way, we are able to perform smooth and precise 
movements despite the sluggish “wetware” that implements our action control 
system. The simulated feedback can also be used “offline” when we imagine 
ourselves performing an action from the first-person perspective (as a climber might 
imagine a move she’ll have to make later when she starts to climb the route that she 
is facing). That the simulated feedback used during online motor control is also used 
during such motor imagery is suggested by the fact that the activities of actually 
doing something and of imagining doing are constrained in very similar ways, so 
	   157	  
that, for example, the time it takes for someone to walk a certain distance is the same 
as the time it takes for the same person to imagine walking that distance (Decety, 
Jeannerod, & Prablanc, 1989; for discussion, see Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002, pt. 2; 
Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2012). It is also suggested by the fact that the same cortical 
areas are involved both in motor control and in motor imagery (Parsons et al., 1995; 
Stephan et al., 1995). 
 
While forward models enable smooth and precise movement execution, they cannot 
ensure that the executed movement is appropriate given the agent’s beliefs, goals and 
situation. This depends on whether the motor signal received by the forward model is 
the appropriate signal in the first place. Delivering appropriate input to the forward 
model requires “motor planning”; that is, it requires computing which motor signals 
to send to the effectors in order to bring about a certain outcome (the action goal). It 
has been suggested that an emulator can perform this motor planning too by 
implementing what is called an “inverse model”. An inverse model takes a 
representation of a desired outcome as input and computes what the appropriate 
motor command is for performing an action that is likely to bring that outcome 
about. 
 
Now, the workings of emulation-based motor planning and motor control processes 
are not something we normally have reflective access to. This indicates that these 
processes do not go by way of control over present-directed intentions (that is, by 
way of the formation, acquisition, revision or rescindment of such intentions). While 
the motor imagery can be under conscious control, the online use of the simulated 
feedback of forward models in action control is not something we have reflective 
access to or conscious control over. (Of course, we do have conscious control of the 
offline use of motor imagery for action planning, as the preceding example of the 
climber’s imaginative rehearsal of her future move shows.) But even if we did have 
reflective access and conscious control over these processes, there is good reason to 
think that what we in that case have access to and control over is not present-directed 
intentions. This is because the goal representations that are used by the emulators are 
arguably coded in a different format from the goal representations of plan-intentions 
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(Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2012; see also Pacherie, 2008 on “M-intentions”). The plan-
intentions that are inputs and outputs to personal-level planning and deliberation are 
propositional in format. This is what allows them to interact with other propositional 
attitudes like beliefs and desires during practical reasoning. This is also what allows 
us, as Butterfill and Sinigaglia point out, to intend outcomes that can only be picked 
out with quantification and identity, such as “that one cross seven distinct bridges in 
48 hours without yet specifying which bridges or hours.” (p. 12) But the 
representations involved in motor planning and control are in a format that is unable 
to encode such contents. Recall that emulators are involved in motor imagery as well 
as online motor control. Based on this commonality of neural resources, Butterfill 
and Sinigaglia argue that we can draw conclusions about the format of the 
representations involved in motor planning and control from premises about what it 
is possible for us to experientially imagine ourselves doing (from a first-person 
perspective). Since it is arguably impossible to experientially imagine oneself 
performing the activity of crossing seven distinct bridges in 48 hours without yet 
specifying which bridges or hours (as opposed to propositionally imagine that one 
does it), the format of the representations used in motor planning and control cannot 
be propositional in format. If the representations had that format, then we should 
arguably be able to engage in such imaginings. Furthermore, it seems that one cannot 
experientially imagine doing something biomechanically impossible either. For 
example, the climber cannot in this way imagine herself reaching up from the ground 
to grab the hold at the top of the ten-meter high rock face that she is standing in 
front.103 However, one can surely propositionally imagine that one performs such a 
biomechanically impossible action, and as long as one didn’t believe that it was 
biomechanically impossible, then one could also intend to perform that action. This 
suggests that the format of the representations involved in emulator-based motor 
planning and control cannot be propositional in format. The different constraints on 
                                                
103 As Currie and Ravenscroft (2002, pp. 77–78) note, we may visually imagine that 
our body changes shape and configuration in a biomechanically impossible way. 
This may be difficult to distinguish phenomenologically from imagining doing 
something that is biomechanically impossible. However, this does not mean that 
motor imagery and visual imagery are not two distinct forms of experiential 
imagining. 
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what one can intend and what can be represented by the motor system show that 
emulator-based motor planning and control is not mediated by control of present-
directed intentions. 
  
It may be objected that the whole control problem that ‘pseudo-closed-loop control’ 
is supposed to solve is based on the assumption that the main sensory feedback that 
one gets about the execution of one’s action is proprioceptive. However, in many 
cases, one also receives exteroceptive sensory feedback that carries information 
about one’s movement. This may arrive after a much shorter delay than 
proprioceptive feedback. After all, visual feedback will arrive to the retina with the 
speed of light. This, one might think, will provide time for reflective access and 
conscious control of even the fine-grained details of action control. Indeed, it is true 
that visual input typically plays a key role in enabling the motor control system to 
reliably estimate the current state of the body during action execution (see footnote 
96). However, even such closed-loop aspects of motor control actually occur outside 
the agent’s conscious awareness. This is vividly illustrated by an experiment that 
Pierre Fourneret and Marc Jeannerod (1998) carried out. Fourneret and Jeannerod 
instructed subjects to trace a straight line toward a target on a graphic tablet using a 
stylus held in their right hand. The movement of their hand was obstructed from the 
subject’s view by a mirror placed in horizontally above the tablet, but they could see 
the reflection of a real-time visualisation of the stylus’ trajectory in the mirror (from 
a computer screen that was placed straight above the mirror).  
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Figure 5 The set up of Fourneret and Jeannerod's experiment (figure from Fourneret and 
Jeannerod 1998). 
In one session, the subject’s task was to pick which one of thirteen different vectors 
on a card that best represented the actual hand movement that they had performed 
toward the target. In another session, the subject was instead afterwards asked to, 
with their eyes closed, recreate the line they had drawn. What the subjects did not 
know was that on some trials, the trajectory they saw reflected in the mirror was 
displaced to the left or the right by an angle of 2, 5, 7 or 10 degrees by the computer. 
The subjects had no problem correcting for the displacement introduced by the 
computer, so that they always traced a line on the screen/mirror that ended straight 
on target. Of course, in these trials with displacement, the line that was actually 
traced by the subject’s hand underneath the mirror would not have been straight 
since it included movements that compensated for the computer’s displacement. But 
when asked to estimate or recreate the movement trajectory that their arm had 
actually traced beneath the mirror, they estimated or recreated that trajectory as 
straight or almost straight (when the displacement was 10 degrees, the average 
estimated displacement was 2.5 degrees). Figure 6 shows an example of how the 
trajectory actually drawn and the trajectory that was seen by the subject could differ. 
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Figure 6 The performance of one subject on a trial where the computer introduced a 
displacement of the displayed trajectory (from Fourneret and Jeannerod 1998). 
 
Given these incorrect estimates, the subjects seem to have been unaware of the 
corrections that must have been made by the motor control system in order to cancel 
the displacement introduced by the computer. This suggest that even when action 
execution is monitored and guided by closed-loop control processes that involve 
visual feedback, the loops normally doesn’t go by way of the agent’s conscious 
awareness and control of present-directed intentions. Note that this is just one 
illustration of how visually guided motor control appear to be partly encapsulated 
from processes of planning, reflection and conscious control. The empirical data that 
supports Milner and Goodale’s (2006) so-called “two visual systems” hypothesis 
also indicates that visually guided motor control often proceeds without any 
interference or guidance from conscious awareness.104 Such data also put pressure on 
Bratman’s treatment of spontaneous actions as the outcome of personal policies, as it 
suggests that control of action sometimes simply bypasses systems for planning and 
reasoning. 
 
                                                
104 According to the “two visual systems” hypothesis, there are two more or less 
distinct streams in the brain that process input from the retinas. A ventral processing 
stream supports visual categorisation, reasoning and planning, whereas the largely 
independent dorsal processing stream supports visually guided motor control. 
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5.2.2 Intrapersonal coordination by self-organisation 
The emulator-based pseudo-open-loop control model is a solution to a problem 
created by the demands on speed and timing that the real world puts on action 
control systems. Another problem for coordination and control arises from the sheer 
number of different component parts of the body that must be put into appropriate 
relations with each other for an action or activity to be performed successfully. If one 
reduces the problem to that of merely relating the body’s hinge joints (elbows, knees, 
etc.) to each other in appropriate ways, then we have about a hundred degrees of 
freedom to deal with when we perform an action that involves the whole body 
(Turvey, 1990). (Note that this includes most of the bodily actions we perform, as 
various compensatory changes must almost always be made to retain balance and 
stability when we move a part of our body.) Given limited computational resources, 
a cognitive system must therefore be designed to keep the number of independent 
variables under executive control to a minimum.  
 
According to one hypothesis, bodily coordination and control is achieved by 
exploiting the formation of so-called “coordinative structures” or “synergies”—
structures formed by neural and muscular components that temporarily function as 
self-organising units of coordination in the execution of some specific task. Motor 
“plans” can then refer to simple control variables that cause whole coordination units 
to adaptively self-organise rather than to adjustments of body segments or joint 
angles (Turvey, 1990, p. 942). As an example, work by Bonnard and Pailhous (1991) 
suggests that when people are trying to intentionally control their walking speed, 
they do this by simply modifying the force exerted in their steps until the rhythmic 
beat (the cadence) of the walking fits the beat that they associate with the desired 
speed. This works because the components of the system that is achieving the 
walking self-organise so that cadence reliably tracks speed (in the face of various 
circumstances, so that the system automatically adapts if the walker puts on heavy 
boots or a backpack for example). Compensations in terms of the duration of 
different phases of the strides are here achieved without any need for centralised 
control. The intentional control of the walking speed can thus be achieved by 
present-directed intentions to walk with a certain speed, and this has the effect that 
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the agent increases or decreases the force exerted in their steps. The feedback that the 
agent then gets from the resulting cadence can then be compared to the goal speed in 
order to determine whether more or less force should be exerted in the agent’s steps 
(other feedback such as optic flow is probably used as well, although in Bonnard and 
Pailhous’ experiment, the subjects were walking on the treadmill so they could not 
rely on such visual feedback). We are not normally aware of the other changes in 
organisation of the walking cycle that occur as a consequence of this control loop. 
Self-organisation of coordinative structures is thus an adaptive aspect of action 
coordination that typically occurs without conscious awareness and outside the 
control of present-directed intentions.  
 
Self-organisation has primarily been studied within the framework of Dynamical 
Systems Theory (DST), a very general theory for describing and explaining how 
various kinds of complex systems change over time. To clarify the difference 
between self-organisation and centralised control, I will here introduce some basic 
aspects of a DST-approach to bodily coordination. From the point of view of DST, 
the body in action is a complex and partly self-organising system that changes over 
time. To say that the body in action is self-organising is to say that the order of the 
system is not prescribed or specified by something outside the body itself, nor by 
some component within it. When applying DST to the behaviour of a system, one 
looks for different global behavioural modes of the system, and then tries to relate 
transitions between these modes to changes in one or several ‘control parameters’. 
The different global behavioural modes are also referred to as different values of an 
‘order parameter’ or ‘collective variable’. 
 
Dynamical systems research on bodily coordination has almost exclusively focused 
on rhythmic movements. In all rhythmic movement, several oscillators (say, 
swinging limbs or fingers, postural sway movements, rocking chairs, or swinging 
handheld pendulums) become entrained to each other, synchronised in-phase (>>, 
<<) or anti-phase (><, <>). The rhythmic limb movements that are produced by 
humans and by other animals exhibit the same properties as the rhythmic movements 
that are produced by various inanimate physical systems. These movement patterns 
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can all be modelled as coupled oscillators, which can be succinctly characterised by a 
simple equation that express the relation between oscillation frequency (control 
parameter) and the relative phase difference (order parameter) between the 
oscillators (known as the Haken-Kelso-Bunz (HKB) equation). The equation 
predicts, for example, that anti-phase coordination of two rhythmically moving limbs 
or fingers will make a transition to in-phase coordination as the rhythm frequency 
increases. In-phase and anti-phase coordination are both attractors in the state space 
of the dynamical system made up of the moving limbs, but the in-phase attractor is 
stronger. 105 One can observe this phenomenon by following these simple 
instructions: Start to move both of your index fingers rhythmically in anti-phase 
coordination at a low frequency. Now, slowly increase the frequency with which you 
move your fingers. At some point, you will switch into in-phase coordination. The 
HKB-equation predicts that these are the only two stable relative phase modes. The 
model also makes two more specific predictions, which have been confirmed in 
various studies of bimanual coordination, such as in the finger-wriggling paradigm 
just described (Kelso, 1995, pp. 58–59). First, it correctly predicts that there will be a 
nonlinear increase of fluctuations in the order parameter near the phase transition 
(so-called “critical fluctuations”). Secondly, it correctly predicts that when the 
system is near a phase transition, it will take much longer for it to relax back into its 
current phase if the system is perturbed from the outside (so-called “critical slowing 
down”). 
 
An example of a real world form of bodily coordination that has been elegantly 
explained by concepts and principles from DST is the gait and the switches between 
                                                
105 Dynamical systems are conceptualised as occupying a state or phase space that 
represents which states or phases (of the order parameter) that the system can occupy 
given a certain control parameter value. Stable states from which the system is 
unlikely to be perturbed from are called “attractors” and are represented as being at 
the bottom of valleys in the state space landscape. The area in the state space from 
which the system will move into an attractor is the attractor’s “basin of attraction”. 
States that the system will move away from are “repellors” and are the hills of the 
state space landscape. In the case of the horse’s locomotion system, when the horse 
is moving slowly forward, there is only one attractor, the attractor for walking. As 
the speed increases, however, the state space will gradually start to change so that 
eventually, another attractor, for trotting, will pull the system into a new gait mode. 
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gait modes that quadrupeds exhibit when they change speed (see Schöner, Jiang, & 
Kelso, 1990). For example, take the system of a horse in locomotion. The horse has 
at least three types of gait (walk, trot, or gallop) with each type typically being used 
within a certain speed range. When the horse moves slowly, it tends to walk; when it 
moves at moderate speed it trots; when it moves very fast, then it gallops. As it 
happens, horses tend to use the gait type that consumes the least energy given current 
speed. We can imagine the horse’s “choice” of gait (walk, trot, or gallop) at different 
speeds as the outcome of a control switch that puts the horse in a different gait when 
it passes certain speed thresholds. For example, when the horse reaches a certain 
speed while walking, the switch signals the relevant parts of the neural systems that 
underpin the horse’s locomotion to go into “trot-mode”. Such a centralised control 
solution to the problem of choosing the gait that optimises energy consumption is 
clearly not self-organised. The explanation that appeals to self-organised 
coordination instead falls back on very general principles and concepts from DST to 
succinctly describe the system’s behaviour and predicts its evolution. The system’s 
behaviour consists of the gaits and gait transitions as a function of speed. The order 
parameter of the system is the gait mode, and the control parameter is the horse’s 
speed. Note that the order parameter only has three stable states (also called 
‘phases’), while the control parameter is continuous. When the speed gradually 
changes, the order parameter is instead stable until some critical point when the horse 
suddenly switches to a new gait. This switch between different order parameter 
values is called a phase transition or a bifurcation. It is plausible that under normal 
circumstances, a horse does not purposefully control its gait but merely its speed 
(and we might speculate that just as a human being uses cadence to determine current 
speed, a horse might use both its gait mode and cadence to determine its current 
speed).106 
 
Proponents of a DST approach in cognitive science often pit it in opposition to 
representational approaches (such as the common coding theory, which is introduced 
                                                
106 Note that there are no critical fluctuations between a horse’s gait modes when the 
speed is near a phase transition. Kelso suggests that this is because there are special 
neural mechanisms that stabilise the gait to avoid these fluctuations (1995, pp.72-74). 
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in section 5.3.1). But note that explanations based on dynamical models like the 
Haken-Kelso-Bunz equation are not incompatible with explanations that appeal to 
internal representations and information processing. Dynamical models are supposed 
to be completely neutral about what the mechanisms underpinning a system are. In 
other words, these mechanisms may well be in the business of manipulating internal 
representations and processing information. Nevertheless, the research done under 
the auspice of DST should at least make us cautious not to prematurely appeal to 
representation and prediction in explaining various forms of coordination, such as 
synchronisation of rhythmic movements for example. The principles of DST have 
been used to make sense of self-organisation in a wide range of systems, including 
weather systems, the formation of snowflakes, galaxies and all kinds of organic 
forms (Thelen & Smith 1996, p.50). None of these, arguably, are information 
processing systems. If even simple pendulums entrain—that is, their cycles become 
coupled through phase interlocking—then there is no reason to think that 
entrainment in bodily coordination must be mediated by mechanisms that trade in 
representations. 
 
To sum up, in the case of individual action, there are clearly levels of motor control 
and coordination that do not occur by way of the agent’s control of present-directed 
intentions. Both the formation of self-organised coordinative structures and fine-
grained centralised motor control (based on the integration of real and simulated 
feedback) allow an agent’s bodily movements to quickly adapt to the changing and 
uncertain circumstances of action execution. These means of coordination and 
control are “intelligent” in the sense that they enable an agent’s actions to be 
performed in an appropriate way given the context and the agent’s goals. In addition, 
the representations of outcomes that are involved in emulator-based motor planning 
and control also lend purposiveness to the actions themselves. As Butterfill and 
Sinigaglia (2012, p. 6) point out, if a representation represents the outcome of an 
action and reliably increases the likelihood that this outcome is brought about, then 
the action is at least partly purposive in virtue of this representation (this is why 
intentions are typically taken to make actions goal-directed). However, neither self-
organisation nor motor planning and control are normally under the control of one’s 
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plan-intentions. Part of what makes our activity and our actions appropriately related 
to our goals and intentions are thus not represented in our intentions: The 
intentionality of individual action outstrips the intentionality of our intentions.  
 
5.3 Online control and coordination of joint action 
For the same reasons that control and planning of individual action cannot be 
exhaustively explained by an agent’s control of her intentions, control and planning 
of joint action cannot be exhaustively explained by appeal to such control of 
intentions either. When you and I successfully do a “high five”, what the correct 
force, joint angle adjustments and so on are for each of us depend on the details of 
the other’s movement. This suggests that each of us must represent and predict not 
only our own action, but also the other’s action (dyadic coordination). Furthermore, 
we have to be able to (triadically) coordinate our actions based on these predictions 
in relation to our common goal of doing a high-five (in such a way that our palms are 
slapped together to make a satisfying loud sound without either of us injuring our 
hand) (Knoblich & Jordan, 2002; Sebanz et al., 2006).  
 
Subpersonal control structures and representations play an important role in enabling 
the successful performance of such mundane joint actions. First of all, as we have 
seen, such structures and representations enable the participants to successfully 
execute the individual actions that are component parts of the joint action. Secondly, 
the emulator-based systems for motor planning and control also enable the agent to 
recognise and predict of the actions of others. Finally, there are subpersonal 
mechanisms that are dedicated for enabling triadic coordination in the context of 
joint activity (between several participants in relation to a common goal). The 
existence of such mechanisms suggests that actions are jointly purposive not only in 
virtue of the content of plan-like intentions but that they may also be jointly 
purposive in virtue of the contents of representations processed in subpersonal 
systems for motor planning and motor control (in the same way that an individual 
action is individually purposive in virtue of the goal representations that are 
processed during motor planning and control). Results in cognitive psychology and 
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cognitive neuroscience thus not only supports the view that the intentionality of 
individual action outstrips the intentionality of intention, the “joint intentionality” of 
joint action also outstrips the intentionality of “shared intentions”. 
 
In the second subsection, I go on to review some research that suggests that the 
formation of self-organised coordinative structures may have a role to play not only 
in intrapersonal bodily coordination and control, but also in interpersonal bodily 
coordination and control during joint activity. 
 
5.3.1 Emulator-based action control and common coding 
When one is performing a joint action together with someone else, one’s motor 
control and motor planning must be adaptive to what one’s co-participant is doing or 
is about to do. In order to do this, one would be well served by capacities for 
representing and predicting the actions of others. According to the so-called 
“common coding theory”, such capacities are underpinned by the same neural system 
and representational format that enables planning and monitoring of one’s own 
action (Hommel, 2009; Prinz, 1997). Various behavioural studies and phenomena 
can be explained by this theory. For example, common coding may be responsible 
for the so-called “chameleon effect”, the tendency of people to unconsciously adopt 
the posture, gestures and manners of people they interact with. This tendency seems 
to be independent of why people engage in interaction and whether they have any 
special positive attitude toward their interlocutor before the interaction (Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999). Behavioural experiments also show that response reaction times 
shorten when participants concurrently see someone else perform the response 
action, whereas they grow longer when they see someone perform a different action 
(e.g. Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; 
Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000). Such phenomena indicate some kind of 
direct perception-action influence that could be the result of common coding. As 
Sebanz et al put it, “observing an action leads to corepresentation”, which may lead 
to facilitation or impairment of action execution, depending on whether the observed 
and performed action are congruent or not (2005, p. 1234). According to the 
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common coding view, this is a consequence of the fact that perception and 
performance of action are underpinned by a shared representational system, where 
actions are coded in terms of their perceptual effects (Hommel, 2009; Prinz, 1997). 
Formulated in terms of the emulation framework of motor control and motor 
planning that I presented in section 5.2.1, forward and inverse models might thus not 
only subserve the prediction and planning of one’s own actions, but also the 
prediction of others’ actions and the retrodiction of their prior goals (Gärdenfors, 
2007; Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003).  
 
Along with the behavioural evidence for common coding, there are converging 
neurophysiological findings that support the view. So-called “mirror neurons” are a 
possible neural correlate of the common sensorimotor action code. Pellegrino et al. 
(1992) discovered that there are bi-modal neurons in the ventral premotor cortex of 
macaques that fire both when the macaque observes an experimenter performing an 
action of type F (e.g. a reaching-and-grasping of a small object, say) and when the 
macaque itself performs an action of that same type F. By plausible extrapolation, 
mirror neurons exist in the human premotor cortex as well. There are many different 
accounts of the role of mirror neurons, but according to at least one proposal, their 
primary function in action observation is to predict the continuation of an observed 
action (Fogassi et al., 2005; see Jacob, 2009 for discussion). Clearly, such 
predications can play an important role in facilitating coordination in a joint activity. 
 
But note that part of the behavioural evidence for the common coding view was that 
the execution of one’s own action is impaired (slowed down) if one is 
simultaneously observing another agent perform a different action. A system that 
leads to such interference effects may clearly hinder rather than help in the context of 
a joint activity. When the actions that the participants need to contribute to the joint 
performance are all of the same type, corepresentation may of course improve 
performance (this may be the case for example, when two people do a “high five” or 
when they lift and carry a sofa together). But in many joint activities, the 
contributions of the participants will instead be of different but complementary types. 
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When I tilt the moka pot to pour coffee in the mug you are holding up, we normally 
don’t want you to start tilting the mug to one side and pour the coffee on the floor! 
 
In recent years, cognitive neuroscientists have found “counter-mirror neuron” 
activity in human subjects, and these may play a role in mediating coordination in 
joint activities that require participants to perform complementary actions (Catmur, 
Gillmeister, Bird, Liepelt, & Brass, 2008; Heyes, 2010; Newman-Norlund, van 
Schie, van Zuijlen, & Bekkering, 2007). A counter-mirror neuron fires when a 
subject observes a certain type of action (e.g. someone else grasping an object), and 
when one performs another type of action that is associated with that observed action 
type (e.g. the subject herself releasing an object). Many have taken the findings of 
counter-mirror neurons to show that people have two kinds of bimodal neurons, one 
type that are used to represent and simulate the actions of others (mirror neurons) and 
another type that is used to represent and simulate appropriate responses to the 
actions of others (counter-mirror neurons) (e.g. Newman-Norlund et al., 2007; 
Knoblich & Sebanz, 2008, p. 2026). But it may be that mirror and counter-mirror 
neurons are just bimodal neurons that gets trained through associative learning 
during development to respond in different ways to perceived actions (see Heyes, 
2010 for this “associative hypothesis”). Mirror neurons could get their mirroring 
properties as a result of a developing child having perception-action links forged 
while interacting with adults who imitate them for example, or while observing 
themselves moving in front of mirrors, or as a result of participating in games, sports 
and dances where they perform similar actions simultaneously with others. But other 
types of social interaction would produce other perception-action links between 
complementary actions. If this associative hypothesis is correct, then the common 
coding theory may be true not because it correctly characterises a basic architectural 
feature of the human cognitive system, but because a common code is a reflection of 
the kind of social interactions and the kind of environment in which humans 
typically develop. Whether or not this hypothesis about the origin of the mirroring 
and counter-mirroring properties is true, various kinds of bimodal neurons may 
clearly play a role in mediating habitual and entrenched forms of coordination in the 
context of joint activity. But if the common coding theory is generally correct about 
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the architecture of our perception and action systems, then we should expect there to 
be mechanisms that allow participants involved in joint activities to cope with 
potential interference effects. 
 
5.3.2 Shared task representations 
Sebanz et al. (2005) hypothesize that representations and predictions or one’s own 
and other’s actions are kept apart but coordinated through what they call “higher-
level task representations” in the context of joint activities (see also Atmaca, Sebanz, 
Prinz, & Knoblich, 2008). The idea is that, in some circumstances, participants not 
only represent the actions of co-participants, but also the tasks that they themselves 
and their co-participants are expected to perform. Each participant would then not 
only represent and predict their own tasks and actions for the purpose of controlling 
their part of the joint action, but they would also represent and predict the tasks and 
actions of their co-participants. 
 
The hypothesis receives support from behavioural experiments that demonstrate 
interference effects not only when a participant sees a co-participant perform an 
action that is incongruent with their own action, but also when they see a stimulus in 
the environment that a co-participant is expected to respond to with such an 
incongruent action. In a simple but ingenious experiment, Sebanz et al. (2003) first 
presented individual participants with a two-choice reaction time task. The subjects 
were seated facing a computer screen that displayed the stimuli that they had to 
respond to using two buttons that were placed beside each other in front of them. In 
each trial of the experiment, a hand with an index finger that was pointing to the 
right, to the left or straight ahead was presented to the subject. There was also a ring 
on the hand’s index finger that was either red or green. The task of the subject was to 
push one of the buttons (say, the right button) when the ring had one colour (say, 
red), and the other button (left) when the ring had the other colour (green). The 
direction of the pointing finger was a feature of the stimulus that was task-irrelevant. 
Experiments with similar two-choice tasks with task-irrelevant spatially associated 
stimulus features have consistently shown that responses that are spatially 
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compatible with the task-irrelevant feature (say, stimulus feature: right-pointing 
finger; response: press right button) are performed quicker than when that feature is 
spatially neutral. Responses that are spatially incompatible with the task-irrelevant 
feature (stimulus feature: left-pointing finger, response: press right button) are on the 
other hand performed slower compared to when that stimulus is spatially neutral. 
However, this spatial (in)compatibility effect disappears in “go-nogo” conditions 
where the subject only has to respond with one type of action to one type of stimulus 
(e.g., “press the left button if the ring colour is green, otherwise do nothing”). In 
other words, a two-choice task with spatially associated choices (press the right or 
the left button) is required for the spatial (in)compatibility effect to occur. 
 
The task just described is a version of the so-called Simon task (Simon & Rudell, 
1967), which was replicated by Sebanz et al. (2003, Experiment 1) with the expected 
results. Crucially, Sebanz et al. added a third condition in which the two-choice set-
up was presented to pairs of subjects, with each member of the pair being responsible 
for one button. Note that with this setup, each subject performed a task that is exactly 
like the task performed by participants in the individual “go-nogo” set-up.  
 
 
Figure 7 The social Simon task. Considered individually, each member of the participant dyad 
performs a task that is equivalent to the "go-nogo" condition in the non-social Simon task. The 
pointing direction of the index finger on the screen is the task-irrelevant stimulus, while the 
colour of the ring on the same finger is the task-relevant stimulus. (Figure from Sebanz et al., 
2003) 
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If each member of the pair is considered separately, then we should expect that the 
performance of each member should roughly be the same as the performance of the 
individual participant performing the “go-nogo” version of the original Simon task, 
that is, there ought to be no interference effect. But the spatial (in)compatibility 
effect actually reappeared in this social version of the Simon task. This suggests that 
each participant was considering herself faced with the two-choice task with spatially 
associated choices again, but with control of the one button delegated to her co-
participant (but still under her supervision and monitoring). Sebanz et al.’s (2005) 
explanation of this “social Simon effect” is that a participant’s predictions of their 
own and the other’s actions interact with a representation of the tasks that they and 
their co-participant are facing (a “shared”107 task representation). According to this 
explanation, when a subject perceives the co-participant’s relevant stimulus feature, 
the representation of the co-participant’s task rule is activated and this in turn 
triggers a simulation of the co-participant’s expected response.108 Because of 
common coding, the triggered simulation interferes with the participant’s planning 
and execution of their own response. 
 
Note that the stimuli were presented one at a time, so there was no simultaneous 
execution and observation of action. The subjects sat beside each other in front of the 
screen and took turns performing their respective task, and there is nothing in the 
task that requires the subjects to have a common goal. There is no actual 
interdependence between the actions of the two participants. So if Sebanz et al.’s 
interpretation of the social Simon effect is correct, then a “shared task 
representation” seems to be automatically created in each participant, even if such a 
                                                
107 “Shared” in the sense of replicated in each participant. 
108 It is actually not required that the participant perceives the co-participant’s action 
for the spatial (in)compatibility effects to occur. Sebanz et al. (2003, Experiment 2) 
carried out an experiment where the participants performed the social Simon task 
without any auditory or visual feedback of their co-participant’s action but the spatial 
(in)compatibility effect occurred nevertheless. In at least one variant of Sebanz et 
al.’s experiment (Tsai, Kuo, Hung, & Tzeng, 2008), the (in)compatibility effects on 
reaction times were exhibited even when participants merely believed that they were 
in a joint action context, without being able to observe a co-participant at all 
(however, a study by Welsh et al. (2007) seems to contradict this). 
	   174	  
representation hinders more than it helps in the context of the experiment (and serves 
no actual coordinative function).  
 
Sebanz et al.’s explanation of the social Simon effect that I have presented here—
based on shared task representations plus corepresentation—is of course not the only 
possible explanation. The empirical findings are, as empirical findings are, open to 
alternative interpretations. For example, Wenke et al. (2011) argue that that the 
interference created by the task-irrelevant stimulus feature (the direction of the 
pointing finger) is automatically treated as a cue regarding whose turn it is to act. On 
this view, the (in)compatibility effect is an effect of the (in)compatibility of agents 
rather than of responses. When a participant sees the stimulus that she is supposed to 
respond to, but also sees a finger pointing toward the other participant, this interferes 
with the process of identifying which of the two agents—herself or her co-
participant—that is supposed to respond. Wenke et al.’s competing explanation of 
the social Simon effect is of course compatible with the existence of shared task 
representations, but if correct, it undermines the motivation to posit such 
representations to explain the social Simon effect. 
 
It is hard to know to what extent something like shared task representations would be 
useful in joint activities outside the psychology laboratory. In the social Simon task, 
participants are literally being given tasks rules that associate actions with particular 
stimuli by the experimenters. In many joint activities “in the wild” such task rules 
will often be harder to identify though. But it is not unreasonable to suppose that 
representations of task rules may sometimes play a role in enabling coordination in 
the wild too. Take again the example of two people washing dishes together. Here, 
the task distribution between two individuals is usually known to both, one is 
washing and rinsing the dishes, handing over items to the other participant who 
wipes them dry with a cloth and then puts them into a cupboard, and this can, 
stretching language a bit, be described in terms of task rules which map stimuli to 
responses (e.g. if I see you offer a new item for me to dry, then grab it, wipe it and 
put it in the cupboard). 
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The social Simon effect suggests that people tend to treat situations involving others 
as a kind of joint action situation, even if there is no actual interdependence between 
their own and others’ actions. Arguably, what matters is whether or not the 
participants frame what they are doing as part of something done together with the 
other, or if they frame it as something they are doing individually.109  This is the 
upshot of both the shared task representation account, and the agent-identification 
account of Wenke et al. Both these accounts posit mechanisms that are dedicated to 
the execution, monitoring and control of action in a joint action context. Importantly, 
these mechanisms appear to come online automatically and unreflectively, even in 
situations where there is no actual need for the agents to represent and predict other’s 
tasks and actions. This suggests that an agent’s emulation-based motor planning and 
control processes automatically modulated by their social context. In contexts where 
people are performing tasks that are actually interdependent, it is plausible that they 
will be more likely to frame what they are doing as a joint endeavour than in a 
context such as that given by the social Simon task.110 In such contexts, shared task 
representations are likely to help rather than hinder, since such representations will 
enable participants to predict their co-participants’ actions.  
 
5.3.3 Common coding and joint perceptual effects 
Recall that, according to the common coding view, the common “code” of action 
perception and action performance consists of perceptual effects of actions 
(Hommel, 2009). Now, doing something together with a partner has different 
perceptual effects compared to oneself doing one’s part of that joint action on one’s 
own. If contributions to joint actions are coded in term these perceptual effects, then 
we should expect that a member of a group will perform her part of a joint action 
faster if she perceives another group performing a similar joint action (more similar 
                                                
109 Exactly how to explicate what such framing consists in is a moot point—perhaps 
it is a matter of whether or not the participants think they have a Bratmanian shared 
intentions “that we participate in the experiment”. 
110 See Bacharach (2006, pp. 81–87) on the interdependence hypothesis concerning 
group identification. 
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perceptual effects) compared to if she merely perceives an individual performing an 
action that is similar to her part in a non-group context (less similar perceptual 
effects). 
 
Tsai, Sebanz and Knoblich (2011) had participants perform a simple reaction-time 
task with a confederate in order to test this prediction. Each participant sat with a 
confederate facing a screen where two hands were displayed, each hand with its 
index finger raised above a key. In one condition, the hands that the participant and 
the confederate saw were two left hands (see the left pane in Figure 8). The “group” 
consisting of the participant and the confederate were thus observing the left hands 
of the two members of another group (the two left hands must belong to two 
different individuals who, it is natural to assume, are standing next to each other, 
suggesting that they are part of the same group). This condition was thus 
characterised by “inter-group congruency”. In the other incongruent condition, the 
participant and the confederate were instead facing one left hand and one right hand, 
palms facing each other, as if they were a pair of hands belonging to one and the 
same agent (see the right pane in Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8 The two conditions in Tsai et al.’s (2011) group mimicry study. 
 
In all conditions and trials, the only instruction given to the participants was that they 
press a key when the ipsilateral hand immediately in front of them moved. In other 
words, what the confederate did and what the contralateral hand on the screen did 
was never relevant to the participant’s task.  
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In half of the trials on which the participant was supposed to respond, both hands on 
the screen moved simultaneously, and on half of them, only the hand in front of the 
participant moved. What the confederate did varied between two conditions. In the 
numerically compatible condition, the confederate’s task paralleled that of the 
participant. In other words, the confederate responded with a key press when the 
hand in front of him or her moved. In the numerically incompatible condition, the 
confederate’s task was instead to respond when the hand in front of the participant 
moved (the contralateral hand, from the confederate’s perspective) but not when the 
hand in front of the confederate moved. In effect, in the numerically compatible 
condition, both the participant and the confederate responded (“WE response” in 
Figure 9) when both hands on the screen moved, and only one of them responded 
when only one hand moved on the screen. In the numerically incompatible condition 
on the other hand, only the participant responded when both hands on the screen 
moved (“ME response” in Figure 9), and both the participant and the confederate 
responded when only the hand in front of the participant moved. 
 
As expected, the participant responded significantly faster when there was numerical 
compatibility in the “inter-group congruency” condition: The participant responded 
faster by himself or herself in response to one hand moving but she responded faster 
if the confederate also responded when both hands on the screen moved. 
 
 
Figure 9 The results of Experiment 1 reported in Tsai et al. (2011). 
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Note that there was no actual interdependence between the actions of the confederate 
and the participant, and the participant was not aware of this effect on their reaction 
times. Plausibly, it was only when the participant took the two hands on the screen to 
belong to two agents that Tsai at al. found a significant difference. This interpretation 
is strengthened by the fact that Tsai et al. in a second experiment got the same results 
when inter-group congruency/incongruency was induced in a different way. Instead 
of using two left hands in the congruent condition, they used a right and a left hand 
that had different skin colours, but with palms facing each other. 
 
I suggested in the previous section that a plausible interpretation of the social Simon 
effect is that participants tend to treat each other as partners in a joint endeavour 
(possibly with a common goal) even when there is no actual interdependence 
between their actions. Conceiving of what they are doing as parts of a joint action 
has the top-down effect that they represent the other’s task (stimulus-response 
relation) or possibly whose turn it is to act. Similarly, this “group mimicry” effect 
suggests that if people conceive of themselves as taking part in a joint action, then 
they will take into account not just the perceptual effects of their own contribution 
but also the other’s contribution (here I am going beyond what Tsai et al. claim about 
their results). This means that observing similar perceptual effects created by what 
appears to be a joint action of another group will activate representations involved in 
the performance of an individual’s own part of such a joint action. Like the effects of 
shared task representations, these effects are automatic and not under the conscious 
control of the participants. Below the level of practical reasoning and personal-level 
planning, our cognitive systems for action planning and action perception thus 
differentiate between behaviourally identical actions based on whether they are mere 
individual actions or actions performed as parts of joint actions.  
 
5.3.4 Interpersonal coordination by self-organisation 
In this section, I review some work that shows that coordinative structures that may 
simplify bodily coordination and control can be formed through not just the self-
organisation of components belonging to one and the same body, but also through 
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the self-organisation of components that belong to several bodies. A speculative 
upshot of this is that motor plans may trigger adaptive changes in coordinative 
structures that span across an interpersonal system (by changing the value of a 
control parameter). 
 
As I mentioned in section 5.2.2, the so-called HKB-equation succinctly models the 
relations between the oscillation frequency (control parameter) and the relative phase 
difference (order parameter) in a system of coupled oscillators. What is striking is 
that the HKB-equation that I presented is that can be used not only predict and 
characterise a range of phenomena that occurs in bimanual coordination. The 
equation appears to capture the properties of rhythmic interpersonal bodily 
coordination too. For example, two human beings, one walking in front of and in 
view of the other, tend to spontaneously end up in two stable patterns which are 
equivalent to pace (in-phase) and trot (anti-phase) gait modes among horses that I 
discussed earlier (Harrison & Richardson, 2009). The stable states, critical 
fluctuations and critical slowing down that can be observed in the bimanual 
coordination in human subjects also characterises the dynamics of two people who 
try to coordinate the rhythmic movements of, for example, their wriggling fingers or 
their swinging lower legs. In the interpersonal case, the coupling that enables 
coordination is forged through visual rather than neuromuscular connections, but this 
is irrelevant to the whether the general coordination principles of DST apply to the 
system or not. It does not matter whether the connection between the oscillators are 
mechanical or optical, the same model can predict the behaviour of the system in 
question.  
 
The interpersonal entrainment that occurs when two people intentionally try to, for 
example, synchronise their finger-wriggling to the pace of a metronome, also occurs 
unintentionally, when they have visual information about each other’s movements 
but are intentionally trying to perform some other task. Richardson et al. (2007) 
demonstrated that two people in visual contact with each other’s movements 
unintentionally entrained their rocking movements into an in-phase rhythm. The 
participants were told that the study intended to investigate the ergonomics of 
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rocking chair movements and how different postural positions influence the rocking 
movement. This allowed the experimenters to manipulate the gaze of the participants 
by instructing them to gaze at certain locations. Other experiments indicate that it is 
people’s gaze behaviour, induced by visual tracking of the other’s movements, which 
mediate the entrainment process (Schmidt & Richardson, 2008). But it is not the only 
mediator. Further experiments have also shown that entrainment of postural sway 
occurs when people are talking to each other, even when they are not visible to each 
other. Instead, it is the entrainment of the participants’ speech rhythm propagates 
through the body to induce entrainment of postural sway (Fowler, Richardson, 
Marsh, & Shockley, 2008; Shockley, Richardson, & Dale, 2009). The same model 
thus predicts that entrainment will occur in all kinds of systems that are made up of 
coupled oscillators, regardless of whether the oscillator movements are produced by 
pendulums or limbs, or whether the entrainment is mediated by vibrations in a wall, 
neuromuscular signals or the attentional tracking of movement or sounds between 
people. Note that it is hard to see how this could be explained with a “control switch” 
explanation, whereas it follows naturally from DST.  
 
In light of this work on coordination dynamics, there is no reason to think that 
compensatory changes that occur in response to changes in control parameters might 
be the result of self-organisation in systems—coordinative structures—that range 
across individuals. Recall the hypothesis that one way in which bodily coordination 
and control is made possible—in spite of the huge number of components that have 
to be brought into appropriate relations with each other in order to facilitate 
successful action performance—is that many components self-organise into 
coordinative structures that can then be controlled adaptively by merely adjusting 
control parameters (such as increasing the force exerted in each step as one walks, 
say). The DST research on bodily coordination of rhythmic movements shows that 
coordinative structures may form interpersonally as well as intrapersonally. This 
suggests that control of joint activity can be simplified in a way similar to the way 
that control of individual activity can be simplified. Perhaps individuals can control 
interpersonal coordinative structures by intentionally controlling certain control 
parameters, and then rely on the components of their own and others’ bodies self-
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organise in appropriate ways. Shockley et al. seem to suggest that something like this 
is possible in the quote that follows. They propose that synergies formed through 
entrainment in social interaction may account for much of the coordination that 
occurs in face-to-face communication, and describes the notion of an interpersonal 
coordinative structure in the following way: 
 
If joint cognitive tasks are similarly achieved via a functionally defined cross-person 
organization, then perturbing/constraining the actions of one component of the 
cross-person coordinative structure of one member (e.g. a relevant body segment, 
optical information, cognitive constraints) should result in rapid compensatory 
changes in other components of the cross-person structure (e.g. changes in 
movement patterns of a body segment, looking patterns, or cognitive kinematics in 
the other member of the pair). In other words, if the cross-person coordinative 
structure consists of a certain relation among body segments and cognitive states, 
then constraints on the (action) effectors of one person should affect the movements 
and/or cognition of the other member of the pair as readily as cognition can affect 
one’s own efforts. (Shockley et al., 2009, p. 315) 
 
When it comes to the kind of skilful and habitually entrenched interpersonal bodily 
coordination that may be observed when two skilled dance partners do a well-
rehearsed performance for example, interpersonal coordinative structures may be 
present and perhaps play an important role. Coordination may be mediated both by 
visual and tactile information, as well as through both individuals becoming 
entrained to patterns external to them, such as the rhythm of the music. The moves of 
one dancer constrains the moves the other, just like movement of a bodily segment in 
one dancer constrain the movement of another bodily segment in the same dancer. 
Just like an individual may change walking speed by simply intentionally increasing 
exerted force, and let the changes within the cycle of walking (consisting of the 
stance phase, double support phase, and the swing phase) self-organise, an individual 
may intentionally change a control parameter for an interpersonal coordinative 
structure and let its components across the agents involved self-organise. The 
presence of these coordinative structures can in such cases simply be taken for 
granted by each participant’s action system, just like the workings of units of 
coordination comprised of components of its own body are taken for granted by 
executive control systems in the individual. While this is no more than speculation at 
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this point, I can see no reason why it cannot play some role in enabling the 
coordination of joint activities.   
 
Of course, I am not suggesting that this type of emergent coordination could be the 
whole story of the coordination involved when two people dance together for 
example. Emulator-based motor planning and motor control will be no doubt be 
involved in breaking up coordinative structures and patterns that are the result of 
entrainment.  It is hard to see how the DST approach could be scaled up to explain 
more all the coordination involved in, for example, two people washing dishes 
together (and if it could, I imagine that this explanation would provide us with any 
useful understanding of how this coordination was made possible). This is not to say 
that ideas from DST might not play a role in explanations of how various forms of 
complex coordination and motor control are possible. No doubt, motor control and 
motor planning, emergent coordination, as well as personal-level planning and 
practical reasoning are often all at work simultaneously both in individual and joint 
action. To understand how these different systems and forces interact in joint action 
will be challenging indeed (Knoblich et al., 2011). 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
I have presented different ways in which participants who are engaged in a joint 
activity coordinate their actions in ways that do not rely on plan-like commitments 
that are the end-points of practical reasoning. On the one hand, systems underlying 
action performance enable online motor control of action beyond what is specified 
by such plan-like commitments. The representations that are involved in such action 
control not only enable fine-grained and smooth action execution but also, as we 
have seen, action observation and the prediction of the actions of others. While 
perception and prediction are of course important for successful coordination of 
many joint activities, the fact that perception and action shares a representational 
system (has a “code” in common) has been shown to create interference effects 
under experimental conditions where subjects are asked to perform actions while 
they are observing the performance of different action. A proposal I picked up from 
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Sebanz et al. was that when agents engage in joint activities (which often require 
agents to perform different complementary actions), they have “shared task 
representations” that represent the division of labour among the participants, 
mapping certain stimuli to certain agents and responses. Such representations will 
enable to predict what others’ are likely to do within the context of a joint activity 
based not on the actions but based on the presence of stimuli in the environment that 
they are supposed to respond to.  
 
The workings of these mechanisms and representations that are involved in the motor 
planning and control of both individual and joint actions typically are not accessible 
to an agent’s deliberation, planning and reasoning. This means that an agent’s control 
of his action, and several agents’ control of their joint action, does not merely occur 
by way of the control of intentions. Furthermore, there are general principles of 
emergent coordination that facilitates both intrapersonal and interpersonal bodily 
coordination. An important question for the cognitive science of joint action to 
pursue is how representational centralised mechanisms interact with, exploit, and 
counteract coordination that emerge from self-organising coordination structures. 
Another important question is how all this harmonically interact with systems for 
planning agency and practical reasoning (see Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2012). These 
questions all arise both for individual and for joint action.  
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6 Conclusions 
Philosophers have typically assumed that the only kind of small-scale tightly coupled 
multi-agent activity that is philosophically interesting is an activity that is 
coordinated and caused by a “shared intention” (or a “joint” or “collective” 
intention). According to most accounts, such a shared intention consists of a 
mutually known pattern of intentions, commitments and beliefs among the 
participant. The pattern structures the distribution of roles and tasks for the sake of 
the participants’ pursuit of a common goal. In this thesis, I have argued that some 
kinds of small-scale multi-agent activities that are not the outcome of this kind of 
shared intention are still interesting kinds of genuine joint activity. This is not just a 
terminological issue (if it is, then it is a terminological issue with substantial 
consequences). Thinking that joint activities caused by shared intentions are the 
paradigmatic form of joint activity has arguably created a false dualism between 
allegedly bona fide joint activity, where agents together make up a collective ‘we’, 
and other multi-agent activity, where they merely count as a distributive ‘we’. The 
chapters of this thesis are held together by two lacunas that have been left relatively 
unexplored in the wake of this false dualism. The first concerns how to make sense 
of the apparently joint cooperative activities of agents that lack the capacities for 
planning and “mindreading” that one must have in order to be a party to a shared 
intention. The second concerns how participants who have a shared intention are able 
to coordinate their actions “online”—that is, during action execution as a joint 
activity unfolds—without recourse to plans that specify in advance what they should 
do. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 were devoted to the first lacuna. I there developed conceptual and 
theoretical resources for thinking about the joint activities of relatively cognitively 
unsophisticated agents such as young children and non-human primates. As I have 
repeatedly pointed out, accounts of joint activity such as Bratman’s are too 
cognitively and conceptually demanding in light of the socio-cognitive profiles of 
such agents. A common theme in chapters 2 and 3 was to accommodate an account 
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of joint activity to agents who have the concept of ‘goal’ but not that of ‘belief’. In 
chapter 2, I showed the widely accepted requirement that agents must have common 
knowledge of each other’s goals or intentions in order act jointly requires that they 
have the concept of belief. Such a requirement is thus one of the reasons why most 
accounts of joint activity are too conceptually demanding for agents with such a 
socio-cognitive profile.  
 
However, I showed that if participants lack the concept of belief, then one of the two 
main motivations for the common knowledge requirement—to filter out certain 
“concealment” cases that intuitively aren’t cases of genuine joint activity—actually 
dissipates. Concealment cases can only be constructed if the participants have the 
concept of belief, so there is no need to rule out such cases when it comes to 
participants who lack the concept. Furthermore, I have suggested that there is a kind 
“openness” that only requires of participants that they have the concept of goal but 
not that of belief could satisfy the other main motivation for the common knowledge 
requirement, to make sense of the idea that joint activities are non-accidentally 
coordinated. This openness requires of the agents that they are each aware of a 
mutual dependency that must exist between their goals, but this awareness need not 
itself be mutual. But I also submitted at the end of chapter 3 that there are even 
weaker notions of joint activity that may be accidentally coordinated. Agents can 
thus be participants in such joint activities having neither common knowledge nor 
any awareness of mutual goal-dependency.  
 
An upshot of my analysis of the role of common knowledge in accounts of joint 
activity was an initial argument for a kind of pluralism about kinds of joint activity is 
further established in chapter 3. Even if we restrict our analysandum to small-scale, 
more or less egalitarian and highly interdependent joint activities, these come in 
several different genuine kinds (that is, we need not consider cases of large-scale 
industrial action, flash mobs, or the activities of structured groups such as 
corporations, committees and political parties to be pluralists about genuine joint 
activity). The most robust kind of joint activity, in which only agents who have the 
concept of belief can participate, demands that the agents have common knowledge 
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of each other’s goals or intentions with regard to the joint activity. A less robust kind 
of joint action does not require common knowledge but must still be non-
accidentally coordinated, and thus demand of the participants that they each have 
some awareness of mutual-goal dependency. Note that the notion of “openness” as 
awareness of mutual goal-dependency was merely a specification of what a full 
account of such openness needs to achieve. Providing such a full account will require 
further research. 
 
In chapter 3, I constructed an account of a kind of joint activity driven by what I 
called a “joint goal”. The account was supposed to be an explication of a definition 
of cooperative activity as that of “two or more individuals acting together to achieve 
a common goal” that has been influential in the study of the cooperative capacities 
and proclivities of young children and non-human animals (Boesch & Boesch, 1989; 
Brownell et al., 2006; Naderi et al., 2001). While this kind of joint activity falls short 
of being a shared intentional activity in Bratman’s sense, it does not merely consist 
of a collection of coordinated pursuits of individualistic goals; it involves agents 
having a common goal and being in a position to mutually benefit from this fact. 
When two or more agents are in such a position, they have a “joint goal”. A large 
part of chapter 3 was taken up by a discussion of what the criteria for having a 
“common goal” should be (alternatively put, for having the “same goal” or to “share 
a goal”), in order for this notion to earn its place in a definition of cooperation. 
Among other things, I argued that agents do not need to represent a goal in the same 
way in order for it to be their common goal. Furthermore, a common goal need not 
have collective content (“we”-content): it need not have contents such as “that we 
catch the prey” or “that I do my part in our hunting of the prey”, but may be agent-
neutral (“that the prey is caught”) or only implicitly identify the agent of the action 
(“to catch the prey”). These features of my account set it apart from e.g. Bratman’s 
account, and arguably, most accounts of joint activity that appeal to the notion of 
shared, joint or collective intention. Both features also help make my account less 
cognitively and conceptually demanding than Bratman’s account. Participants need 
not engage in Level-2 perspective taking in order to take advantage of the fact that 
they have a common goal, and they do not need to have the concept of “that we J”. 
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In chapters 4 and 5, I moved on to the second lacuna in the philosophical literature 
on joint action. In chapter 4, I reframed Tollefsen’s (2005) account of shared 
intention-in-action, and argued that it is apt primarily as an account of skilful joint 
activities of adult human beings, rather than as an account of children’s joint activity. 
I highlighted what appeared to be a problem with her account, namely that it is in 
conflict with a widely accepted constraint on the content of intentions-in-action. 
According to this “exclusivity constraint”, one cannot intend to perform another 
agent’s action, even if one might intend that she perform it. I showed that the 
exclusivity constraint should not be accepted as an unconditional constraint on the 
contents of intentions-in-action: one may intend to perform a basic action that 
belongs both to oneself and to another agent. Based on the phenomenology of tool 
use, I first argued that intentions-in-action of one’s basic actions may be 
“technologically extended”, meaning that their contents are not restricted to concern 
the agent’s bodily movements. In analogy with this, I then argued that the 
phenomenology of some skilful joint activities supported the idea that one’s basic 
intentions-in-action may be “socially extended”, in violation of the widely accepted 
exclusivity constraint. This argument rests on the details of Searle’s account of 
intention-in-action, and at the end of the chapter, I imagined a potential objector 
saying that the account was actually just a notational variant of Bratman’s account. 
The account, the objection went, is actually subsumed under Bratman’s more general 
account of shared intention, since plan-intentions need not be about the future, but 
may also concern what one should do now. At the beginning of chapter 5, I presented 
some reasons why Searle’s distinction between prior intention and intention-in-
action in some ways is clearer than Bratman’s distinction between future-directed 
and present-directed intentions. These are also reasons for resisting the view that 
Tollefsen’s account is merely a notational variant of a special limiting application of 
Bratman’s account. 
 
In chapter 5, I showed—by reviewing work in cognitive psychology, cognitive 
neuroscience and human movement science—that even if we grant that Bratman’s 
planning framework is applicable to spontaneous joint actions, the joint intentionality 
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of joint actions in general cannot be reduced the contents of the participants plan-
intentions. There are mechanisms and representations involved in the motor planning 
and control of both individual and joint actions that typically are not accessible to the 
agent’s deliberation, planning and reasoning. Furthermore, it is partly in virtue of 
these mechanisms and representations that the actions are imbued with 
purposiveness. This means that an agent’s control of his action, as well as several 
agents’ control of their joint action, does not merely occur by way of control of 
intentions. Furthermore, I presented work that shows there are general principles of 
coordination that facilitates both intrapersonal and interpersonal bodily coordination. 
The workings of such principles enable motor planning and motor control systems to 
exploit the formation of coordinative structures that reduces the degrees of freedom 
that must be centrally controlled during the unfolding of an action or activity. 
Following others, I pointed out that difficult questions are unanswered regarding how 
the various states, mechanism and forces that contribute to the coordination of joint 
activities interact in harmonious ways. 
 
	   190	  
  
	   191	  
Bibliography 
 
Alonso, F. (2009). Shared Intention, reliance, and interpersonal obligations. Ethics, 
119(3), 444–475. 
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1969). Intention. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Apperly, I. A. (2011). Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of “Theory of Mind”. 
Psychology Press. 
Apperly, I. A., Riggs, K., Simpson, A., Chiavarino, C., & Samson, D. (2006). Is 
belief reasoning automatic? Psychological Science, 17(10), 841. 
Atmaca, S., Sebanz, N., Prinz, W., & Knoblich, G. (2008). Action co-representation: 
The joint SNARC - effect. Social Neuroscience, 3(3), 410–420. 
Bacharach, M. (2006). Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game 
Theory. Princeton University Press. 
Back, E., & Apperly, I. A. (2010). Two sources of evidence on the non-automaticity 
of true and false belief ascription. Cognition, 115(1), 54–70.  
Baillargeon, R., Scott, R., & He, Z. (2010). False-belief understanding in infants. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(3), 110–118.  
Becchio, C., Sartori, L., & Castiello, U. (2010). Toward You: The Social Side of 
Actions. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 19(3), 183–188.  
Behne, T., Carpenter, M., & Call, J. (2005). Unwilling versus unable: infants’ 
understanding of intentional action. Developmental Psychology, 41(2), 328–
337. 
Bermúdez, J. L. (1995). Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Nonconceptual 
Point of View. In J. L. Bermúdez, A. Marcel, & N. Eilan (Eds.), The Body 
and the Self (pp. 153–173). MIT Press. 
Blomberg, O. (2011). Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action. Review of Philosophy 
and Psychology, 2(2), 335–353.  
Boesch, C. (2005). Joint cooperative hunting among wild chimpanzees: Taking 
natural observations seriously. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(5), 692–
693. 
Boesch, C., & Boesch, H. (1989). Hunting behavior of wild chimpanzees in the Taï 
National Park. American journal of physical anthropology, 78(4), 547–573. 
Bonnard, M., & Pailhous, J. (1991). Intentional Compensation for Selective Loading 
Affecting Human Gait Phases. Journal of Motor Behavior, 23(1), 4–12. 
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands “feel” touch that eyes see. Nature, 
391(6669), 756. 
Brand, M. (1984). Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory. MIT 
Press. 
Brass, M., Bekkering, H., & Prinz, W. (2001). Movement observation affects 
movement execution in a simple response task. Acta Psychologica, 106(1-2), 
3–22. 
Bratman, M. (1984). Two Faces of Intention. The Philosophical Review, 93(3), 375–
405. 
Bratman, M. (1987). Intention, plans, and practical reason. Harvard University Press. 
Bratman, M. (1992). Shared Cooperative Activity. The Philosophical Review, 101(2), 
327–341. 
Bratman, M. (1993). Shared Intention. Ethics, 104(1), 97–113. 
	   192	  
Bratman, M. (1997). I Intend That We J. In G. Holmström-Hintikka & R. Tuomela 
(Eds.), Contemporary action theory: social action (pp. 49–63). Dordrecht: 
Kluwer. 
Bratman, M. (1999). Faces of intention: selected essays on intention and agency. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bratman, M. (2000). Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency. The 
Philosophical Review, 109(1), 35–61. 
Bratman, M. (2006). Dynamics of sociality. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 30(1), 
1–15. 
Bratman, M. (2007). Structures of Agency: Essays. Oxford University Press. 
Bratman, M. (2009a). Modest sociality and the distinctiveness of intention. 
Philosophical studies, 144(1), 149–165. 
Bratman, M. (2009b). Shared Agency. In C. Mantzavinos (Ed.), Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice (pp. 41–59). 
Cambridge University Press.  
Breheny, R. (2006). Communication and Folk Psychology. Mind & Language, 21, 
74–107. 
Brinck, I., & Gärdenfors, P. (2003). Co–operation and Communication in Apes and 
Humans. Mind & Language, 18(5), 484–501. 
Brosnan, S. F., Salwiczek, L., Bshary, R., Brosnan, S. F., Salwiczek, L., & Bshary, R. 
(2010). The Interplay of Cognition and Cooperation. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 365(1553), 2699–
2710. 
Brownell, C. (2011). Early Developments in Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and 
Psychology, 2(2), 193–211. 
Brownell, CA, & Carriger, M. (1990). Changes in Cooperation and Self-Other 
Differentiation during the Second Year. Child Development, 61(4), 1164–
1174. 
Brownell, CA, Ramani, G., & Zerwas, S. (2006). Becoming a social partner with 
peers: cooperation and social understanding in one- and two-year-olds. Child 
development, 77(4), 803–821. 
Butterfill, S. A. (2011). What is Joint Action? A modestly deflationary approach. 
Unpublished manuscript. 
Butterfill, S. A. (2012a). Joint action and development. The Philosophical Quarterly, 
62(246), 23–47. 
Butterfill, S. A. (2012b). Interacting Mindreaders. Philosophical Studies, 1–27. 
Butterfill, S. A., & Sinigaglia, C. (2012). Intention and Motor Representation in 
Purposive Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Advance 
online publication. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00604.x 
Call, J., Hare, B., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2004). “Unwilling”versus 
“unable”: chimpanzees’ understanding of human intentional action. 
Developmental Science, 7(4), 488–498. 
Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.  
Campbell, J. (2005). Joint Attention and Common Knowledge. In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, 
T. McCormack, & J. Roessler (Eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and 
Other Minds (pp. 287–297). Oxford University Press. 
Carpenter, M. (2009). Just How Joint Is Joint Action in Infancy? Topics in Cognitive 
Science, 1(2), 380–392.  
	   193	  
Carpenter, M., Akhtar, N., & Tomasello, M. (1998). Fourteen- through 18-month-old 
infants differentially imitate intentional and accidental actions. Infant 
behavior & development, 21(2), 315–330. 
Catmur, C., Gillmeister, H., Bird, G., Liepelt, R., & Brass, M. (2008). Through the 
looking glass: counter-mirror activation following incompatible sensorimotor 
learning. European Journal of Neuroscience, 28(6), 1208–1215. 
Chalmeau, R. (1994). Do chimpanzees cooperate in a learning task? Primates, 35, 
385–392. 
Chalmeau, R., & Gallo, A. (1995). Cooperation in primates: Critical analysis of 
behavioural criteria. Behavioural processes, 35(1-3), 101–111. 
Chant, S., & Ernst, Z. (2008). Epistemic Conditions for Collective Action. Mind, 
117(467), 549–573. 
Chartrand, T., & Bargh, J. (1999). The chameleon effect: the perception-behavior 
link and social interaction. Journal of personality and social psychology, 
76(6), 893–910. 
Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing The Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive 
Extension. Oxford University Press.  
Clark, H., & Marshall, C. (1981). Definite reference and mutual knowledge. In A. 
Joshi, B. Webber, & I. Sag (Eds.), Elements of discourse understanding (pp. 
10–63). Cambridge University Press. 
Cohen, P.R., Levesque, H. J., & Smith, I. (1997). On Team Formation. In G. 
Holmström-Hintikka & R. Tuomela (Eds.), Contemporary Action Theory 
Volume 2: Social Action. Synthese. 
Cohen, Philip R., & Levesque, H. J. (1991). Teamwork. Noûs, 25(4), 487–512. 
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2007). “Obsessed with goals”: Functions and mechanisms 
of teleological interpretation of actions in humans. Acta Psychologica, 124(1), 
60–78. 
Cubitt, R. P., & Sugden, R. (2003). Common knowledge, Salience and Convention: 
A Reconstruction of David Lewis’ Game Theory. Economics and Philosophy, 
19(2), 175–210. 
Currie, G., & Ravenscroft, I. (2002). Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy 
and Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. The Journal of Philosophy, 
60(23), 685–700. 
Decety, J., Jeannerod, M., & Prablanc, C. (1989). The timing of mentally represented 
actions. Behavioural Brain Research, 34(1–2), 35–42. 
Denier van der Gon, J. J. (1988). Motor control: Aspects of its organization, control 
signals and properties. In Proceedings of the Seventh Congress of the 
International Electrophysiological Society. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Dennett, D. C. (1998). Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds. MIT Press. 
Desmurget, M., & Grafton, S. (2000). Forward modeling allows feedback control for 
fast reaching movements. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(11), 423–431.  
Di Pellegrino, G., Làdavas, E., & Farné, A. (1997). Seeing where your hands are. 
Nature, 388(6644), 730. 
Drea, C., & Carter, A. (2009). Cooperative problem solving in a social carnivore. 
Animal Behaviour, 78(4), 967–977. 
	   194	  
Eilan, N., Hoerl, C., McCormack, T., & Roessler, J. (2005). Joint Attention: 
Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Farne, A., Serino, A., & Ladavas, E. (2007). Dynamic size-change of peri-hand 
space following tool-use: determinants and spatial characteristics revealed 
through cross-modal extinction. Cortex; a journal devoted to the study of the 
nervous system and behavior, 43(3), 436–443. 
Fogassi, L., Ferrari, P. F., Gesierich, B., Rozzi, S., Chersi, F., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). 
Parietal Lobe: From Action Organization to Intention Understanding. Science, 
308(5722), 662–667.  
Fourneret, P., & Jeannerod, M. (1998). Limited conscious monitoring of motor 
performance in normal subjects. Neuropsychologia, 36(11), 1133–1140. 
Fowler, C., Richardson, M., Marsh, K., & Shockley, K. (2008). Language use, 
coordination, and the emergence of cooperative action. In A. Fuchs & V. K. 
Jirsa (Eds.), Coordination: Neural, behavioral and social dynamics (pp. 261–
279). Springer. 
Gallese, V. (2010). Of Goals and Intentions. In Grammont, Franck, Legrand, 
Dorothée, & Livet, Pierre (Eds.), Naturalizing Intention in Action (pp. 201–
225). MIT Press. 
Gärdenfors, P. (2007). Mind-reading as control theory. European Review, 15(02), 
223–240. 
Georgeff, M., Pell, B., Pollack, M., Tambe, M., & Wooldridge, M. (1999). The 
belief-desire-intention model of agency. In J. P. Müller, A. S. Rao, & P. S. 
Munindar (Eds.), Intelligent Agents V: Agents Theories, Architectures, and 
Languages (pp. 1–10). Paris, France: Springer Verlag. 
Gergely, G, & Csibra, G. (2003). Teleological reasoning in infancy: the naïve theory 
of rational action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(7), 287–292.  
Gergely, György, Bekkering, H., & Király, I. (2002). Developmental psychology: 
Rational imitation in preverbal infants. Nature, 415(6873), 755–755.  
Gilbert, M. (1989). On social facts. London: Routledge. 
Gilbert, M. (1990). Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon. Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy, 15, 1–14. 
Gilbert, M. (2006). Rationality in Collective Action. Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences, 36(1), 3–17. 
Gilbert, M. (2008). Two Approaches to Shared Intention: An Essay in the 
Philosophy of Social Phenomena. Analyse & Kritik, 30, 483–514. 
Gilbert, M. (2009). Shared intention and personal intentions. Philosophical studies, 
144(1), 167–187. 
Glüer, K., & Pagin, P. (2003). Meaning theory and autistic speakers. Mind and 
Language, 18(1), 23–51. 
Gold, N., & Sugden, R. (2007a). Collective Intentions and Team Agency. Journal of 
Philosophy, CIV(3), 109–137. 
Gold, N., & Sugden, R. (2007b). Theories of team agency. In F. Peter & H. B. 
Schmid (Eds.), Rationality and Commitment (pp. 280–312). Oxford 
University Press. 
Gräfenhain, M., Behne, T., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Young 
children’s understanding of joint commitments. Developmental Psychology, 
45(5), 1430–1443. 
	   195	  
Gray, J. (1978). Notes on data base operating systems. Operating Systems, 393–481. 
Grush, R. (1997). The architecture of representation. Philosophical Psychology, 
10(1), 5–23. 
Grush, R. (2003). In defense of some “Cartesian” assumptions concerning the brain 
and its operation. Biology and Philosophy, 18, 33–93. 
Grush, R. (2004). The emulation theory of representation: motor control, imagery, 
and perception. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27(3), 377–96; 
discussion 396–442. 
Hamann, K., Warneken, F., Greenberg, J. R., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Collaboration 
encourages equal sharing in children but not in chimpanzees. Nature, 
476(7360), 328–331. 
Hamann, K., Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Children’s Developing 
Commitments to Joint Goals. Child Development, 83(1), 137–145. 
Harris, P., Kavanaugh, R. D., Wellman, H. M., & Hickling, A. K. (1993). Young 
children’s understanding of pretense. Monographs of the Society for Research 
in Child Development, 58(1), 1–107. 
Harrison, S. J., & Richardson, M. J. (2009). Horsing Around: Spontaneous Four-
Legged Coordination. Journal of Motor Behavior, 41(6), 519–524. 
Hay, D. (1978). Cooperative interactions and sharing between very young children 
and their parents. Developmental Psychology, 15(6), 647–653. 
Heal, J. (1978). Common Knowledge. The Philosophical Quarterly, 28(111), 116–
131. 
Henderson, A. M. E., & Woodward, A. L. (2011). “Let’s work together”: What do 
infants understand about collaborative goals? Cognition, 121(1), 12–21. 
Heyes, C. (2010). Where do mirror neurons come from? Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 34(4), 575–583. 
Hill, K. (2002). Altruistic cooperation during foraging by the Ache, and the evolved 
human predisposition to cooperate. Human Nature, 13(1), 105–128. 
Holmes, N., Calvert, G., & Spence, C. (2004). Extending or projecting peripersonal 
space with tools? Multisensory interactions highlight only the distal and 
proximal ends of tools. Neuroscience Letters, 372(1-2), 62–67. 
Holmes, N., Sanabria, D., Calvert, G., & Spence, C. (2007). Tool-use: capturing 
multisensory spatial attention or extending multisensory peripersonal space? 
Cortex; a journal devoted to the study of the nervous system and behavior, 
43(3), 469–489. 
Hommel, B. (2009). Action control according to TEC (theory of event coding). 
Psychological Research Psychologische Forschung, 73(4), 512–526. 
Hughes, C., Fujisawa, K. K., Ensor, R., Lecce, S., & Marfleet, R. (2006). 
Cooperation and conversations about the mind: A study of individual 
differences in 2-year-olds and their siblings. British Journal of 
Developmental Psychology, 24(1), 53–72. 
Hurley, S. L. (1998). Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press. 
Hutto, D. (2012). Elementary Mind Minding, Enactivist-Style. In A. Seemann (Ed.), 
Joint Attention: New Developments in Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, and 
Social Neuroscience (pp. 307–341). MIT Press 
Itō, M. (1984). The cerebellum and neural control. New York: Raven Press. 
Jacob, P. (2009). A Philosopher’s Reflections on the Discovery of Mirror Neurons. 
Topics in Cognitive Science, 1(3), 570–595. 
	   196	  
Jacob, P. (2012). Sharing and Ascribing Goals. Mind & Language, 27(2), 200–227.  
Jeannerod, M. (1994). The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention 
and imagery, 17(2), 187–202. 
Keijzer, F. (2012). The Sphex story: How the cognitive sciences kept repeating an 
old and questionable anecdote. Philosophical Psychology, 1–18. Advance 
online publication. doi:10.1080/09515089.2012.690177 
Kelso, J. A. S. (1995). Dynamic Patterns: The Self-Organization of Brain and 
Behavior. MIT Press. 
Kilner, J. M., Paulignan, Y., & Blakemore, S. J. (2003). An interference effect of 
observed biological movement on action. Current Biology, 13(6), 522–525. 
Knoblich, G, Butterfill, S., & Sebanz, N. (2011). Psychological Research on Joint 
Action: Theory and Data. In B. Ross (Ed.), The Psychology of Learning and 
Motivation, Vol. 54 (pp. 59–101). Burlington: Academic Press. 
Knoblich, G., & Jordan, J. S. (2002). The mirror system and joint action. Advances in 
Consciousness Research, 42, 115–124. 
Knoblich, G., & Sebanz, N. (2008). Evolving intentions for social interaction: from 
entrainment to joint action. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
B: Biological Sciences, 363(1499), 2021–2031. 
Kutz, C. (2000). Acting Together. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
61(1), 1–31. 
Lewis, D. K. (1969). Convention. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press. 
Ludwig, K. (2007). Collective Intentional Behavior from the Standpoint of 
Semantics. Nous, 41(3), 355–393. 
Mackie, J. L. (1965). Causes and Conditions. American Philosophical Quarterly, 
2(4), 245–264. 
Maravita, A., & Iriki, A. (2004). Tools for the body (schema). Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 8(2), 79–86. 
Masangkay, Z. S., McCluskey, K. A., McIntyre, C. W., Sims-Knight, J., Vaughn, B. 
E., & Flavell, J. H. (1974). The Early Development of Inferences about the 
Visual Percepts of Others. Child Development, 45(2), 357–366.  
Melis, A. P., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Chimpanzees recruit the best 
collaborators. Science, 311(5765), 1297–1300.  
Mendres, K. A., & De Waal, F. B. M. (2000). Capuchins do cooperate: the advantage 
of an intuitive task. Animal Behaviour, 60(4), 523–529. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002). Phenomenology of Perception. (C. Smith, Trans.). 
London: Routledge. (Original work published 1945). 
Miller, K., & Tuomela, R. (2001). What are Collective Goals? In M. Kiikeri & P. 
Ylikoski (Eds.), Explanatory Connections: electronic essays dedicated to 
Matti Sintonen, http://www.helsinki.fi/tint/matti/. Retrieved from 
http://www.helsinki.fi/tint/matti/miller.pdf 
Miller, S. (1986). Conventions, Interdependence of Action, and Collective Ends. 
Nous, 20(2), 117–140. 
Miller, S. (1995). Intentions, Ends and Joint Action. Philosophical Papers, 24(1), 
51–66. 
Miller, S. (2001). Social Action: A Teleological Account. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Millikan, R. G. (2004). Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures. MIT 
Press. 
	   197	  
Milner, D., & Goodale, M. (2006). The Visual Brain in Action (2nd ed.). Oxford 
University Press. 
Moll, H., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Cooperation and human cognition: the 
Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis. Philosophical transactions of the Royal 
Society of London Series B, Biological sciences, 362(1480), 639–648. 
Moore, C., & Dunham, P. J. (Eds.). (1995). Joint Attention. Psychology Press.  
Morton, A. (1996). Folk Psychology is not a Predictive Device. Mind, 105(417), 
119–137. 
Naderi, S., Miklósi, Á., Dóka, A., & Csányi, V. (2001). Co-operative interactions 
between blind persons and their dogs. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 
74(1), 59–80. 
Newman-Norlund, R. D., Van Schie, H. T., Van Zuijlen, A. M. J., & Bekkering, H. 
(2007). The mirror neuron system is more active during complementary 
compared with imitative action. Nature Neuroscience, 10(7), 817–818. 
Noë, R. (2006). Cooperation experiments: coordination through communication 
versus acting apart together. Animal Behaviour, 71(1), 1–18. 
Nøttestad, L., Fernö, A., & Axelsen, B. (2002). Digging in the deep: killer whales’ 
advanced hunting tactic. Polar Biology, 25(12), 939–941. 
Onishi, K., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False 
Beliefs? Science, 308(5719), 255–258. 
Pacherie, E. (2000). The Content of Intentions. Mind & Language, 15, 400–432. 
Pacherie, E. (2007). Is Collective Intentionality Really Primitive? In M. Beaney, C. 
Penco, & M. Vignolo (Eds.), Mental processes: representing and inferring 
(pp. 153–175). Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press. 
Pacherie, E. (2008). The phenomenology of action: a conceptual framework. 
Cognition, 107(1), 179–217. 
Pacherie, E. (2011). Framing Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1–
20. 
Pacherie, E. (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency vs. Joint-
Agency. In A. Seemann (Ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments in 
Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, and Social Neuroscience (pp. 343–389). 
MIT Press. 
Pacherie, E., & Dokic, J. (2006). From mirror neurons to joint actions. Cognitive 
Systems Research, 7(2-3), 101–112. 
Parsons, L. M., Fox, P. T., Downs, J. H., Glass, T., Hirsch, T. B., Martin, C. C., 
Jerabek, P. A., Lancaster, J. L. (1995). Use of implicit motor imagery for 
visual shape discrimination as revealed by PET. Nature, 375(6526), 54–58. 
Paternotte, C. (2010). Being realistic about common knowledge: a Lewisian 
approach. Synthese, 1–28.  
Peacocke, C. (2005). Joint Attention: Its Nature, Reflexivity, and Relation to 
Common Knowledge. In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, & J. Roessler 
(Eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds (pp. 298–323). 
Oxford University Press. 
Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (1992). 
Understanding motor events: a neurophysiological study. Experimental Brain 
Research, 91(1), 176–180. 
Perner, J., & Roessler, J. (2010). Teleology and causal understanding in childrens’ 
theory of mind. In J. H. Aguilar & A. A. Buckareff (Eds.), Causing Human 
	   198	  
Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action (pp. 342–395). 
MIT Press. 
Perry, J. (1979). The Problem of the Essential Indexical. Noûs, 13(1), 3–21. 
Petersson, B. (2007). Collectivity and circularity. Journal of Philosophy, 138–156. 
Petersson, B. (2011). Project application: Intentional agency and agent perspectives. 
Retrieved from http://internt.ht.lu.se/media/documents/project-
192/RJ_12_14.pdf 
Petit, O., Desportes, C., & Thierry, B. (1992). Differential probability of 
“coproduction” in two species of macaque (Macaca tonkeana, M. mulatta). 
Ethology, 90(2), 107–120. 
Pettit, P., & Schweikard, D. (2006). Joint Actions and Group Agents. Philosophy of 
the Social Sciences, 36(1), 18–39. 
Phillips, W., Barnes, J. L., Mahajan, N., Yamaguchi, M., & Santos, L. R. (2009). 
“Unwilling” versus “unable”: capuchin monkeys’ ( Cebus apella) 
understanding of human intentional action. Developmental Science, 12(6), 
938–945. 
Pika, S., & Zuberbühler, K. (2008). Social games between bonobos and humans: 
evidence for shared intentionality? American Journal of Primatology, 70(3), 
207–210. 
Pols, A. (2011). Acting with Artefacts (Doctoral dissertation). Technische 
Universiteit Eindhoven. 
Preston, B. (2013). A Philosophy of Material Culture: Action, Function, and Mind. 
Routledge. 
Prinz, W. (1997). Perception and Action Planning. European Journal of Cognitive 
Psychology, 9(2), 129–154. 
Proust, J. (2003). Action. In B. Smith (Ed.), John Searle (pp. 102–127). Cambridge 
University Press. 
Rakoczy, H. (2006). Pretend play and the development of collective intentionality. 
Cognitive Systems Research, 7, 113–127. 
Rakoczy, H. (2008). Pretence as Individual and Collective Intentionality. Mind and 
Language, 23(5), 499–517. 
Recanati, F. (2007). Content, mode, and self-reference. In S. L. Tsohatzidis (Ed.), 
John Searle’s Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Richardson, M., Marsh, K., Isenhower, R., Goodman, J., & Schmidt, R. (2007). 
Rocking together: Dynamics of intentional and unintentional interpersonal 
coordination. Human Movement Science, 26(6), 867–891. 
Risjord, M. (2012). Improvised Joint Performance. Unpublished manuscript. 
Roth, A. (2003). Practical Intersubjectivity. In F. F. Schmitt (Ed.), Socializing 
Metaphysics: The Nature of Social Reality (pp. 65–91). Rowman & 
Littlefield.  
Roth, A. (2004). Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments. The Philosophical 
Review, 113(3), 359–410. 
Roth, A. (2011). Shared Agency. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition). Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/shared-agency/ 
 
	   199	  
Rubinstein, A. (1989). The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under 
“Almost Common Knowledge”. The American Economic Review, 79(3), 
385–391. 
Rupert, R. (2009). Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. Oxford University 
Press. 
Schiffer, S. R. (1972). Meaning. Oxford University Press. 
Schmidt, R., & Richardson, M. (2008). Dynamics of interpersonal coordination. In A. 
Fuchs & V. K. Jirsa (Eds.), Coordination: Neural, behavioral and social 
dynamics (pp. 281–308). Springer.  
Schöner, G., Jiang, W. Y., & Kelso, J. A. S. (1990). A synergetic theory of 
quadrupedal gaits and gait transitions. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 142(3), 
359–391. 
Searle, J. R. (1980). The intentionality of intention and action. Cognitive Science, 
4(1), 47–70. 
Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Searle, J. R. (1990). Collective Intentions and Actions. In P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan, 
and M. E. Pollack (Eds.), Intentions in Communication (pp. 401–415). MIT 
Press. 
Searle, J. R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. MIT Press. 
Sebanz, N., Bekkering, H., & Knoblich, G. (2006). Joint action: bodies and minds 
moving together. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(2), 70–76. 
Sebanz, N., Knoblich, G., & Prinz, W. (2003). Representing others’ actions: just like 
one’s own? Cognition, 88(3), 11–21. 
Sebanz, N., Knoblich, G., & Prinz, W. (2005). How Two Share a Task: 
Corepresenting Stimulus-Response Mappings. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 31(6), 1234–1246. 
Seed, A. M., Clayton, N. S., & Emery, N. J. (2008). Cooperative problem solving in 
rooks (Corvus frugilegus). Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 275(1641), 1421–1429. 
Seemann, A. (2009a). Why We Did It: An Anscombian Account of Collective 
Action. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 17(5), 637–655. 
Seemann, A. (2009b). Joint Agency: Intersubjectivity, Sense of Control, and the 
Feeling of Trust. Inquiry, 52(5), 500–515. 
Seemann, A. (Ed.). (2012). Joint Attention: New Developments in Psychology, 
Philosophy of Mind, and Social Neuroscience. MIT Press. 
Shockley, K., Richardson, D., & Dale, R. (2009). Conversation and coordinative 
structures. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1(2), 305–319. 
Simon, J. R., & Rudell, A. P. (1967). Auditory S-R compatibility: The effect of an 
irrelevant cue on information processing. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
51(3), 300–304. 
Skyrms, B. (2009). Commentary on Tomasello’s “Why We Cooperate”. In Why We 
Cooperate (pp. 137–146). MIT Press. 
Sober, E., & Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto Others: Evolution and Psychology of 
Unselfish Behavior. Harvard University Press. 
Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance: Communication and Cognition. 
Harvard University Press. 
	   200	  
Stander, P. E. (1992). Cooperative hunting in lions: the role of the individual. 
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 29(6), 445–454. 
Stephan, K. M., Fink, G. R., Passingham, R. E., Silbersweig, D., Ceballos-Baumann, 
A. O., Frith, C. D., & Frackowiak, R. S. (1995). Functional anatomy of the 
mental representation of upper extremity movements in healthy subjects. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 73(1), 373–386. 
Sterelny, K. (2003). Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition. 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
Sterelny, K. (2004). Externalism, Epistemic Artefacts and the Extended Mind. In R. 
Schantz (Ed.), The Externalist Challenge (pp. 239–254). Walter de Gruyter. 
Sterelny, K. (2010). Minds: extended or scaffolded? Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), 465–481. 
Stürmer, B., Aschersleben, G., & Prinz, W. (2000). Correspondence effects with 
manual gestures and postures: A study of imitation. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 26(6), 1746–1759. 
Tanner, J., & Byrne, R. (2010). Triadic and collaborative play by gorillas in social 
games with objects. Animal Cognition, 13(4), 591–607. 
Tebbich, S., Taborsky, M., & Winkler, H. (1996). Social manipulation causes 
cooperation in keas. Animal Behaviour, 52(1), 1–10. 
Tollefsen, D. (2005). Let’s Pretend! Children and Joint Action. Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences, 35(1), 75–97. 
Tollefsen, D., & Dale, R. (2012). Naturalizing joint action: A process-based 
approach. Philosophical Psychology, 25(3), 385–407. 
Tomasello, M. (2009). Why We Cooperate. MIT Press. 
Tomasello, M., Call, J., & Hare, B. (2003). Chimpanzees understand psychological 
states-the question is which ones and to what extent. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 7(4), 153–156. 
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). Understanding 
and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 28(5), 675–691. 
Tomasello, M., & Hamann, K. (2012). Collaboration in young children. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 65(1), 1–12. 
Tsai, C.-C, Kuo, W., Hung, D., & Tzeng, O. (2008). Action co-representation is 
tuned to other humans. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20(11), 2015–24. 
Tsai, C.-C., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2011). The GROOP effect: groups mimic 
group actions. Cognition, 118(1), 135–40. 
Tuomela, R. (2005). We-intentions revisited. Philosophical Studies, 125(3). 
Tuomela, R. (2007). The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View. Oxford 
University Press. 
Tuomela, R., & Miller, K. (1988). We-intentions. Philosophical Studies, 53(3), 367–
389. 
Turvey, M. (1990). Coordination. The American psychologist, 45(8), 938–53. 
Vanderschraaf, P., & Sillari, G. (2009). Common knowledge. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition).  Retrieved 
from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/common-knowledge/ 
Velleman, J. D. (1991). Book Review: Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. The 
Philosophical Review, 100(2), 277–284. 
	   201	  
Velleman, J. D. (1997). How To Share An Intention. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 57(1), 29–50. 
Velleman, J. D. (2007). What good is a will? In A. Leist (Ed.), Action in context (pp. 
193–215). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Verba, M. (1993). The beginnings of collaboration in peer interaction. Human 
Development, 37(3), 125–139. 
Visalberghi, E., Quarantotti, B., & Tranchida, F. (2000). Solving a cooperation task 
without taking into account the partner’s behavior: the case of capuchin 
monkeys (Cebus apella). Journal of comparative psychology, 114(3), 297–
301. 
Ward, P. I., & Enders, M. M. (1985). Conflict and cooperation in the group feeding 
of the social spider Stegodyphus mimosarum. Behaviour, 94, 1(2), 167–182. 
Warneken, F., Chen, F., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Cooperative activities in young 
children and chimpanzees. Child development, 77(3), 640–63. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00895.x 
Warneken, F., & Gräfenhain, M. & Tomasello, M. (2012). Collaborative partner or 
social tool? New evidence for young children’s understanding of joint 
intentions in collaborative activities. Developmental Science, 15(1), 54–61. 
Warneken, F., Chen, F., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Cooperative activities in young 
children and chimpanzees. Child development, 77(3), 640–663. 
Watson, J. S., & Ramey, C. T. (1987). Reactions to response-contingent stimulation 
in early infancy. In J. Oates & S. Sheldon (Eds.), Cognitive Development in 
Infancy (pp. 77–85). The Open University. 
Wellman, H., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2000). Meta­‐analysis of theory­‐of­‐mind 
development: The truth about false belief. Child development, 72(3), 655–684. 
Welsh, T. N., Higgins, L., Ray, M., & Weeks, D. J. (2007). Seeing vs. believing: Is 
believing sufficient to activate the processes of response co-representation? 
Human Movement Science, 26(6), 853–866. 
doi:10.1016/j.humov.2007.06.003 
Wenke, D., Atmaca, S., Holländer, A., Liepelt, R., Baess, P., & Prinz, W. (2011). 
What is Shared in Joint Action? Issues of Co-representation, Response 
Conflict, and Agent Identification. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 
2(2), 147–172. 
Wilby, M. (2010). The simplicity of mutual knowledge. Philosophical Explorations, 
13(2), 83–100. 
Wolpert, D., Doya, K., & Kawato, M. (2003). A unifying computational framework 
for motor control and social interaction. Philosophical transactions of the 
Royal Society of London Series B, Biological sciences, 358(1431), 593–602. 
Wolpert, D., Miall, R., & Kawato, M. (1998). Internal models in the cerebellum. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2(9), 338–347. 
Woodward, A. L. (1998). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor’s 
reach. Cognition, 69(1), 1–34. 
Wooldridge, M. (2000). Reasoning about rational agents. MIT Press. 
Zawidzki, T. (2008). The function of folk psychology: mind reading or mind 
shaping? Philosophical Explorations, 11(3), 193–210. 
